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Abstract
India developed a world-class generic drug manufacturing industry by exclud-
ing pharmaceutical products from patent protection in 1972. In 2005, India rein-
troduced pharmaceutical patenting in order to comply with its obligations as a
WTO member. For an emerging superpower still mired in poverty and public
health crises, the change did not come quickly or without controversy. This Ar-
ticle provides the first major comparative analysis of India’s new patents regime.
Based on the author’s data gathering and interviews in India, the Article evalu-
ates the regime’s first eighteen months. It critiques the new law and the capacity
of India’s administrative and judicial infrastructure to implement it. Multiple in-
fluences shape India’s “mosaic view” of patents: a huge population, widespread
poverty, lack of health insurance, wariness towards foreign influences, a devel-
oped but fragmented pharmaceutical sector, a fledgling entrepreneurial culture of
innovation among indigenous pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, a fragile
coalition government, and a vocal citizenry remarkably aware of esoteric patent
law developments. Concluding that the new patents regime is neither the fully-
Westernized panacea hoped for by its pro-TRIPS advocates nor the unmitigated
disaster for the Indian public predicted by its fiercest critics, the Article offers
recommendations for the future of India’s evolving patent system.
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India developed a world-class generic drug manufacturing industry by excluding
pharmaceutical products from patent protection in 1972.  In 2005, India
reintroduced pharmaceutical patenting in order to comply with its obligations as a
WTO member.  For an emerging superpower still mired in poverty and public health
crises, the change did not come quickly or without controversy.  This Article provides
the first major comparative analysis of India’s new patents regime.  Based on the
author’s data gathering and interviews in India, the Article evaluates the regime’s
first eighteen months.  It critiques the new law and the capacity of India’s
administrative and judicial infrastructure to implement it.  Multiple influences shape
India’s “mosaic view” of patents:  a huge population, widespread poverty, lack of
health insurance, wariness towards foreign influences, a developed but fragmented
pharmaceutical sector, a fledgling entrepreneurial culture of innovation among
indigenous pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, a fragile coalition government,
and a vocal citizenry remarkably aware of esoteric patent law developments.
Concluding that the new patents regime is neither the fully-Westernized panacea
hoped for by its pro-TRIPS advocates nor the unmitigated disaster for the Indian
public predicted by its fiercest critics, the Article offers recommendations for the
future of India’s evolving patent system. 
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 The editorial page of the New York Times observed that for the world’s poor, the end of1
India’s “copycat industry for newer drugs” represents “a double hit–cutting off the supply of
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The first day of January 2005 marked a dramatic turning point in the history of India.  By
deliberately excluding pharmaceutical products from patent protection for the previous 34 years, India
became a world leader in high-quality generic drug manufacturing.  But India’s entry into the global
economy at the end of the 20  century, as evidenced by membership in the World Trade Organizationth
(WTO), compelled the nation to once again award patents on drugs.  Moreover, India henceforth
would have to apply internationally-accepted criteria for granting patents, and the term of its patents
would have to extend twenty years beyond filing.     
For an emerging superpower still mired in immense domestic poverty and public health crises,
these and other fundamental changes to India’s patents regime did not come quickly nor without
controversy.  Their implementation remains uncertain.  It is far too early to empirically establish, for
example, whether India’s adoption of stronger patent laws will catalyze a significant shift from
generic drug manufacturing to indigenous pharmaceutical innovation.  What is clear, however, is that
the implications of India’s tumultuous patent system transformation will be felt not only within India
but also around the globe.   1
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affordable medicines and removing the generic competition that drives down the cost of brand-
name drugs.”  India’s Choice, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A20.
 See Yusuf K. Hamied, Indian Pharma Industry–Decades of Struggle and Achievements2
(text of speech presented April 2, 2005) (on file with author), at 6 (characterizing enactment of
India’s Patents Act, 1970 (2005), as “one of the greatest predictable tragedies the world has
witnessed.”). 
 See AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,3
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) (hereafter
“TRIPS”), Arts. 27-34.
 See B. K. KEAYLA, CONQUEST BY PATENTS: TRIPS AGREEMENT ON PATENT LAWS:4
IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH FOR ALL 9 (Centre for Study of Global Trade
System and Development 1998) (quoting then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the World Health
Assembly in Geneva on May 6, 1981 as stating that “[m]y idea of a better ordered world is one in
which medical discoveries would be free of patents and there would be no profiteering from life or
death.”).  
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From the perspective of millions suffering worldwide from life-threatening diseases, many of
whom previously benefitted from the low-cost products of India’s thriving generic drug
manufacturing sector, the introduction of a pharmaceutical product patents regime in India is viewed
as an international healthcare tragedy.   That view is the extreme.  The true impact of the changes will2
turn on implementation.  Eighteen months into the new patents regime, India is actively exploiting
the flexibilities inherent in the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS).   These flexibilities allow India to balance the need to protect its public from the social costs3
of stronger patent protection while at the same time provide the necessary incentives for domestic
research and development in medicines and healthcare.  The transformation of the nation’s patent
regime is entirely consistent with a burgeoning domestic pharmaceutical and biotech industry that is
beginning to invent rather than merely reverse-engineer.  The traditional Indian view of patent
protection as a moral wrong antithetical to public health  is evolving to a more complex4
understanding--still in its formative implementation stages, to be sure--that a patent system can be
designed and implemented to spur domestic innovation while at the same time maintaining affordable
public access to life-saving patented medicines. 
This article is the first major comparative analysis of India’s newly strengthened patents
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Explanation of Statutory References:  Since its enactment in 1970, India’s patent statute,5
officially titled “The Patents Act, 1970,” has been amended three times:  by (1) the Patents
(Amendment) Act, 1999; (2) the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002; and (3) the Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2005.  See Part II.C infra for further discussion of these amendments, each of
which refer to the Patents Act, 1970, as the “principal Act.”  The most current text of the Patents
Act, 1970, as amended by the 1999, 2002, and 2005 amending Acts, is reprinted in hard copy
form in the booklet UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED BY THE PATENTS
(AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005 (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi) (2005), and this
consolidated version will be referred to throughout this article.  Although electronic versions of
each of the three amending acts are available on-line, as well as an electronic version of the
principal 1970 Act (prior to any amendments), there does not exist as of August 2006 any official
electronic version of the consolidated Patents Act, 1970 (2005), i.e., a consolidated version
incorporating all amendments from 1999, 2002, and 2005.  See “Patents” page of the Intellectual
Property India website, available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm (last visited
Aug. 14, 2006).  The Indian Patent Office would be performing a valuable public service by
posting a consolidated version of the current Patents Act in electronic form.    
 The author spent November 2005 in India conducting field research for this article.6
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regime, i.e, the Patents Act, 1970, as last amended in 2005 [hereafter “India Patents Act, 1970
(2005)”].   The article evaluates the first eighteen months of the new regime’s operation, drawing not5
only from published literature but also from original fact finding, data gathering, and interviews
conducted in India with Indian Patent Office officials, Indian pharmaceutical industry representatives,
Indian patent attorneys, and Indian patent law academics.   6
This article places the evolution of India’s patent laws in context as a reflection of the nation’s
political and economic journey from colonial domination to independent nation to the world’s largest
democracy and emerging superpower.  It offers a detailed critique of India’s new patents law and the
capacity of India’s administrative and judicial infrastructure to implement it.  The potential influence
of the changed law on the future of India’s pharmaceutical sector is gauged as are the implications
for the country’s more than one billion citizens.  From a vantage point beyond the extreme pro- and
anti-patent views currently found in India, this article seeks to convey India’s “mosaic view” of patent
protection as an evolving legal and economic framework that has been shaped by a multiplicity of
influences--a vast population, widespread poverty and lack of health insurance, deeply ingrained
wariness towards foreign influences, a highly fragmented pharmaceutical industry, a fledgling
entrepreneurial culture of innovation among indigenous pharmaceutical and biotech firms, a fragile
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, MARRAKESH AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE7
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Art. II(2) (Apr. 15, 1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm (stating that “[t]he agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as
‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.”). 
The referenced “Annex[] 1” includes the TRIPS Agreement as Annex 1C.  See WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, WTO LEGAL TEXTS, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#annex1 (last visited Aug. 2, 2006).    
 Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Kamal Nath’s Statement on the8
Ordinance Relating to Patents (Third) Amendment, Dec. 27, 2004 (hereafter “Nath Statement”),
at ¶ 5, available at http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=6074.
 The first pharmaceutical product patent to issue under India’s new patents regime was9
reportedly granted on March 2, 2006 to Roche India Pvt. Ltd., the Indian subsidiary of Swiss
pharmaceutical giant Hoffman La Roche.  See P.T. Jyothi Datta, Roche Gets Product Patent on
Hepatitis C, HINDU BUSINESS LINE, Mar. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/03/03/stories/2006030302040200.htm.   The patent is
directed to a new-generation Hepatitis C therapy marketed by Roche under the brand name
Pegasys.  Id.  
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coalition government, and a vocal citizenry remarkably aware of esoteric patent law developments.
In order to gain the economic and political benefits of participation in the WTO’s trading
system, India had no choice but to bring its patent laws into conformity with the WTO’s intellectual
property rules as set forth in TRIPS.   Compliance with TRIPS was not the sole driver for the7
transformation of India’s patents regime, however.  Just as India made a deliberate choice in the
1970s to jump-start its indigenous generic drug manufacturing industry by prohibiting the grant of
patents on pharmaceutical products, in 2005 it again made a deliberate choice to stimulate domestic
innovation in new medicines and therapies.  The pharmaceutical industry is a “sunrise sector” for
India.   The Indian government seeks to exploit pharmaceutical manufacturing skills well-honed in8
the generic drug industry to form a solid base for innovation in the development of new drugs. 
With only a handful of pharmaceutical product patents having been granted in India since
January 1, 2005,  it is premature to draw any firm conclusions about the impact of enhanced patent9
protection.  Separating the influence of stronger patent laws on investment decision-making from
other contributing factors such as India’s highly-skilled and low-cost scientific and technical
workforce is also impractical.  Nevertheless, early signals indicate that India’s adoption of product
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 For example, Indian pharmaceutical major Dr. Reddy’s Laboratory recently teamed with10
venture capital firms Citigroup Venture Capital and ICICI Venture to establish Perlecan Pharma,
a new R&D venture with over $50 million in funding for the development of NCEs.  See Sahad
P.V. & E. Kumar Sharma, The Long-Term Rx, BUSINESS TODAY, Dec. 4, 2005, at 142. 
 See Sajeev Chandran, Archna Roy and Lokesh Jain, Implications of New Patent Regime11
on Indian Pharmaceutical Industry:  Challenges and Opportunities, 10 J. INT. PROP. RTS. 269,
269-80 (2005), available via “Full Text Search” function at
http://www.niscair.res.in/ScienceCommunication/sci.asp?a=topframe.htm&b=leftcon.asp&c=Rese
archJournals/rejour/rejour1.htm&d=test1 (observing that “[n]ow, the specific challenge before IPI
[the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry] is to start investing in basic R&D from the current abysmal
level of less than 2% of total revenue to the world level of 8-10%”);  David K. Tomar, Note and
Comment: A Look Into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Between the United States and
India, 17 WISC. INT’L L.J. 579, 583 (1999) (stating that, as of 1997, “Indian-owned companies
typical[ly] spend 1% of sales on R&D, compared to an average of 15% by Western
pharmaceutical companies”) (citing Amy Louise Kazmin, Now These Copycats Have to Discover
New Drugs, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 24, 1997, at 114).
 See M. Qaiser and P. Mohan Chandran, Patent Era Spurs Drug Discovery,12
PHARMABIZ.COM (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.pharmabiz.com/article/detnews.asp?articleid=31588&sectionid=46&z=y, stating that:
India has . . . realized the importance of allocating increased budgets to R&D in
the wake of the product patent regime.  Earlier, Indian companies invested only
around 1% on R&D, but are now investing whopping amounts on R&D.  In
2003-04, the top 10 Indian pharma companies spent about $400 million on R&D.
In 2004, Ranbaxy invested 7% of its $1 billion sales on R&D, while Dr Reddy's
Laboratories (DRL) spent 14% of its sales of $446 million on R&D. 
Id.  See also Nath Statement, supra note 8, at ¶ 5 (stating that “while Indian companies spent not
even a fraction of a percent on R&D ten years ago, today the larger Indian companies are
spending in the region of 6 to 8 percent of their turnover on R & D.  (The norm for major MNCs
is 12%.)”), available at http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=6074. 
 See Sahad P.V. and Sharma, supra note 10, at 138 (stating that  “[a] dozen global13
companies such as AstraZeneca, Bayer, Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis and Pfizer have
DRAFT August 16, 2006 (6:48pm) 7
patent protection is positively impacting its economy.  Indian pharmaceutical firms are increasing their
investments in new chemical entity (NCE) research and development.   Although the percentage of10
their revenues devoted to research and development is still well below that of western multinational
corporations (MNCs),  investment by the indigenous firms in health care innovation is steadily11
increasing.   India is increasingly viewed as an ideal venue for clinical testing of new drugs  and for12 13
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chosen India as a centre for conducting clinical trials and research”). 
  See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDIA, OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER GENERAL OF14
PATENTS, DESIGNS, TRADE MARKS AND REGISTRAR OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, ANNUAL
REPORT 2004-05 [hereafter “ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005”] (hard copy on file with author; not
available electronically as of August 2006), at 27 (Appendix C) (difference between 17,466 total
filings in FY 2004-2005 and 12,613 total filings in FY 2003-2004 as a percentage of the 12,613
total filings in FY 2003-2004).  Additional data on patent application filings in India are presented
in Part V.A.4 infra.
 Nicholas D. Kristof, They’re Rounding the First Turn!  And the Favorite Is . . ., NEW15
YORK TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at A27.
 See Mark Landler, “India Everywhere” In the Alps, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006,16
at C3 (noting India’s “clamorous democracy” of “675 million eligible voters”).
 See id. (reporting India’s elaborate public relations campaign during 2006 World17
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, “intended to promote the country as the world’s next
economic superstar, and as a democratic alternative to China for the affections of foreign
investors”).  
 India’s current population is estimated at 1.1 billion people, see Central Intelligence18
Agency, India, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 10, 2006) (hereafter “WORLD FACTBOOK”)
(estimating India population of 1,095,351,995 as of July 2006), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html, while China’s population is estimated
at 1.3 billion people.  See Central Intelligence Agency, China, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 10,
2006) (estimating population of 1,313,973,713 as of July 2006), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html.
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contract drug manufacturing.  The Indian Patent Office is grappling with a dramatic increase in
application filings by both foreign and Indian assignees; the total number of filings for fiscal year
2004-05 increased 38 percent from the previous year.  14
These paradigm shifts in India’s patent laws and its pharmaceutical sector more broadly reflect
India’s growing economic power and presence on the international stage.  Once an insular society,
India is today emerging as a global force to be reckoned with.  “[T]he once-great nation of India is
reawakening from several centuries of torpor, and . . . is poised to again be a great world power.”15
India is now the world’s largest democracy,  and actively touts itself as such.   Its population of16 17
1.1 billion is second only to China’s.   India’s economy is growing rapidly, averaging almost seven18
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 WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 18, at India page (noting that India’s economy “has19
posted an excellent average growth rate of more than 6.8% in the decade since 1994, reducing
poverty by about 10 percentage points”).  “India probably achieved greater than 7 percent GDP
growth in 2005, significantly expanding manufacturing.”  Id.
 See Alex Perry, India, Inc.: Bombay’s Boom, TIME, June 26, 2006, at 41 (listing GDP20
growth as one of “10 Ways India Is Changing The World”); see also Somini Sengupta and Saritha
Rai, India Sets Goals of Rural Aid and Education, NEW YORK TIMES, March 1, 2006, at A6
(reporting that “India’s finance minister is predicting an 8.1% economic growth rate for the year
ending March 31, 2007.”). 
 Fareed Zakaria, India Rising, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 6, 2006, at 34.21
 WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 18, at India page.22
 See Perry, supra note 20, at 41 (reporting that India’s “Internet-technology industry,23
which includes other outsourcing services, generated revenues of $36 billion in 2005, up 28%
from 2004").  
 See Interview with Dr. Swati Piramal, Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India24
(Nov. 24, 2005) (discussing her company’s recruitment U.S.-trained Indian scientists) (transcript
on file with author);  Saritha Rai, Indians Find They Can Go Home Again, NEW YORK TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2005, at C1 (noting“reverse brain drain” of “Indians who were educated in and worked
in the United States and Europe, but who have been lured home by the surging Indian economy
and its buoyant technology industry”).
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percent GDP growth in the decade since 1994;  the average GDP growth over the past three years19
is eight percent.   “Over the past 15 years, India has been the second fastest-growing country in the20
world–after China . . . .”21
Having successfully capitalized on its large numbers of well-educated English-speaking
citizens to become a major supplier of information technology services and software,  India is now22
poised to become a global leader in the pharmaceutical industry.  The success story of its IT sector
is admittedly the clearest example of India’s growing stature in the knowledge economy,  but23
innovation in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors is also on the rise.  Many Indian-born
scientists who have trained in the U.S. are returning to India, bringing home their experience in
pharmaceutical research and development.   The country’s ever-expanding pool of scientifically-24
trained workers is also available to the Indian pharmaceutical industry.  Almost forty percent of
India’s university graduates now obtain their degrees in science and engineering, in contrast with
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 See National Council of Applied Economic Research, India Science Report: Science25
Education, Human Resources, and Public Attitude Towards Science and Technology 7 (2005),
available at  http://www.insaindia.org/India%20Science%20report-Main.pdf (reporting at Fig. 2.2
that 38.6% of all bachelors degrees issued in India in 2004 were awarded to science majors, which
includes majors in the natural sciences, engineering, medicine, and agriculture/veterinary
sciences); see also Thomas L. Friedman, THE WORLD IS FLAT:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 257 (2005) (noting that the number of Americans aged 18-24 who
receive science degrees has fallen to 17  in the world, declining from third in the world thirtyth
years ago, and that in engineering, “universities in Asian countries now produce eight times as
many bachelor’s degrees as the United States”).
Disagreements exist as to claims that India is graduating more engineers than the U.S. 
See Vivek Wadhwa, About That Engineering Gap, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2005
(disputing the “commonly cited . . . figures” that 600,000 engineers graduate annually from
China’s institutions of higher education, 350,000 from India, and 70,000 from the U.S., and
finding instead that the U.S. is graduating 222,335 engineers annually while India is graduating
only 215,000), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/dec2005/sb20051212_623922.htm.
 For example, it has been estimated that the costs of conducting clinical trials of drugs in26
India is only one-seventh of that in the United States or Europe.  See Sreenivasaro Vepachedu
and Martha Rumore, Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry in the Indian Union,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY (Oct. 2004), at 46.
 Statement of Norman R. Augustine, Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer27
Lockheed Martin Corporation, and Chair, Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of
the 21st Century, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, Division on Policy and
Global Affairs, The National Academies, before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 
U.S. Senate, October 18, 2005, reproduced in National Academy of Sciences, RISING ABOVE THE
GATHERING STORM, STORM:  ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER
ECONOMIC FUTURE (2005) (hereafter “Gathering Storm Report”), at G-3, available at
http://darwin.nap.edu/books/0309100399/html. 
 See Sahad P.V. and Sharma, supra note 10, at 138.  See also Interview with Dr. Swati28
Piramal, Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India (Nov. 24, 2005) (transcript on file with
author) (stating that “[i]f in the West it costs one billion dollars [to innovate in pharmaceuticals],
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declining enrollments in those fields in the U.S.   India’s pharmaceutical industry is fast becoming25
a force to be reckoned with in the global marketplace because of its strikingly lower costs of drug
research and clinical testing.   “[F]ive qualified chemists can be hired in India for the cost of just one26
in America.”   Estimates are that it will cost only about $100-200 million to develop a new drug in27
India, as compared to the U.S. cost of $500-900 million.  28
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we will make it at $50 million (1 / 20th of the cost)”). 
 See, e.g, Robert Slate, Judicial Copyright Enforcement in China: Shaping World29
Opinion on TRIPS Compliance, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 665 (2006);  Jeffrey A.
Andrews, Pfizer's Viagra Patent and the Promise of Patent Protection in China, 28 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2006);  Ke Shao, Look at My Sign!–Trademarks in China from
Antiquity to the Early Modern Times, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 654 (2005);  Peter
K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First
Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000).
 Kristof, supra note 15, at A27.30
 For example, in 2005 India’s foreign direct investment was an estimated $8.4 billion31
while China’s was $72.4 billion.  See Perry, supra note 20, at 41.  Eighty-one percent of India’s
population lives on less than $2 per day, while in China only 47% live on that amount.  See id.  
 Kristof, supra note 15, at A27.32
 Work in Progress, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 1997, at S3.33
 See Todd C. Fishman, Manufaketure, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, Sect. 6 at p. 40; 34
see also IP Risk Tops China Factory Owners’ Concerns, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://www.managingip.com (reporting that among 138 respondents
of “Low Cost Manufacturing in China” survey, safeguarding intellectual property was regarded as
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Recent academic work on the role of intellectual property law in advanced developing
economies has tended to focus more on China than India.   But India’s rapidly changing IP landscape29
merits just as much, if not more, attention.  “The great race of the 21  century is under way betweenst
China and India to see which will be the leading power in the world in the year 2100.”   Admittedly30
China is far ahead of India in terms of foreign direct investment, manufacturing capability, and
infrastructure.   But other fundamental advantages position India as the more promising incubator31
for pharmaceutical innovation.  Notably, India benefits from a greater degree of political and social
stability.  The country’s “democracy, free press and civil society . . . provide a measure of political
stability. . . . [T]he risks of social and political explosions in India are declining, while in China they
may be rising.”   “India’s democracy, for all its flaws, is real.  People are free to say what they like,32
and they do so with relish.  Governments rule by popular consent.  When they lose that consent, they
are replaced, and peaceably.”   With respect to recognition and enforcement of intellectual property33
rights, concerns have long existed over China’s reputation as a haven for pirating and counterfeiting,34
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
“the biggest risk area for companies with Chinese manufacturing operations in the high tech,
industrial equipment and chemicals sectors”);  David L. McCombs, Into the Mouth of the
Dragon: Patent Protection and Enforcement in China (Presentation to Licensing Executives
Society, Oct. 19-22, 2004), available at
http://www.haynesboone.com/FILES/tbl_s12PublicationsHotTopics/PublicationPDF60/1262/10_
19_2004_McCombs.pdf (observing that “[t]he communist ‘collective’ mentality engrained in
Chinese culture manifests itself with the belief among many that intellectual property is a
commodity to be purchased and then used freely”).
 Todd Datz, Faked in China, CSO ONLINE.COM (Jan. 2006), available at35
http://www.csoonline.com/read/010106/faked_china.html.
 In contrast, China’s legal system often fails to resolve long-standing disputes, sometimes36
refusing to even acknowledge that the legal complaints exist.  See Joseph Kahn, When Chinese
Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/28/international/asia/28land.html?hp&ex=1135832400&en=55
3f5143549e60e2&ei=5094&partner=homepage.  See also McCombs, supra note 34 (stating that
“[t]op Chinese government officials admit the judiciary system is plagued with problems such as
partiality, incompetence, and corruption.”).
 Kristof, supra note 15, at A27 (observing that “India has a solid financial system, while37
China’s banking system is a catastrophe.”).
 See Rukhmini Punoose, India’s Edge, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31, 2005, at E25 (explaining38
why India’s “top managers fare better than their Chinese counterparts in global business circles”).
 Zakaria, supra note 21, at 36; see also Perry, supra note 20, at 41 (observing that the39
“rise of China has been the product of methodical state planning, but India’s is all about private
hustle . . .”).  
 See WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 18, at India page. 40
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marking that country as “the world’s Wal-mart for fake goods.”   By contrast, India benefits from35
a strong rule of law tradition; its court system is stable and governed by an independent, well
respected judiciary.   India’s financial structure is solid in comparison to China’s,  and India benefits36 37
from superior business management skills.   India has a “real and deep private sector (unlike China’s38
many state-owned and state-funded companies) . . . .”39
Despite India’s recent economic growth and comparative advantages for scientific innovation,
the considerable challenges it faces must not be minimized.  Much of the nation remains mired in
poverty, with at least 25 percent of the population still under the official poverty line.   More than40
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 Zakaria, supra note 21, at 34.  But see Simon Long, Now for the Hard Part: A Survey41
of Business in India, ECONOMIST, June 3, 2006, at 4 (stating that 260 million live on less than $1
a day).
 See Perry, supra note 20, at 41 (listing HIV crisis as one of “10 Ways India Is Changing42
The World”).  
 Can India Work? India’s Economic Reforms, THE ECONOMIST, June 12, 2004 (“Special43
Report” section).  Although India’s college- and graduate-level educational system is a success
story, its “primary and secondary schools are lamentable in many parts of the country.”  Id.   
 See WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 18, at India page (reporting a 48.3% female literacy44
rate for 2003).
 See generally Somini Sengupta, Quotas to Aid India's Poor vs. Push for Meritocracy,45
NEW YORK TIMES, May 23, 2006 (describing problem of caste prejudice in India).
 STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN, INDIA: EMERGING POWER (Brookings Institution 2001), at 20.46
 Zakaria, supra note 21, at 36.47
 See Can India Work? India’s Economic Reforms, THE ECONOMIST, June 12, 200448
(“Special Report” section) (noting Indian Institute of Planning and Management study reporting
that each industrial unit in India is “still visited by between 40 and 60 inspectors in the course of a
month.”).
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300 million Indians live on less than a dollar each day.   India now has an estimated 5.7 million41
people living with HIV, more than any other country in the world.   Although India is “world-famous42
for the quality of English-speaking, technically adept engineers produced by its colleges and
universities,” its primary and secondary schools are in crisis.   More than half of the female43
population remains illiterate.   Caste prejudice is still deeply engrained in the culture of India,  “a44 45
modern state but an ancient civilization.”   India’s economic reforms are very recent, with the first46
significant moves towards a free market economy beginning only in 1991.  Governmental bureaucracy
continues to hamper India’s growth, which “is happening not because of the government, but largely
despite it.”   The residue of India’s “license raj” survives, and the “inspector raj” is still very much47
in force.   48
Despite these formidable challenges, India is poised to foster a thriving culture of innovation
in the pharmaceutical industry.  The role of its new patent law framework will be pivotal.  Given its
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 India is typically characterized as an “advanced developing country.”  See European49
Commission, Different Needs, Different Responsibilities: What is the EU Asking from
Developing Countries? (Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/global/development/pr141205_en.htm (stating that
“advanced developing countries” include “the large emerging economies of the G20, who
combine developing country status with high competitiveness in one or more export sector, such
as Brazil (Agriculture), China (Manufacturing) and India (Services).”).  A Rand Corporation
study published in 2006 characterizes India (along with China) as leading the group of
“scientifically proficient” countries.  See Rand Corporation, News Release: Rand Study Says
Advanced Countries Will Benefit Most from Progress in Technology, with Lesser Benefits to
Other Nations (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.rand.org/news/press.06/06.01.html.
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burgeoning science and technology sector, skilled workforce, democratic government and stable rule
of law, India presents a uniquely-situated laboratory for advanced developing country  patent49
systems.  The world is watching to see how India implements its innovative patents framework.  As
a critical test case for the flexibilities inherent in TRIPS, the Indian experiment will determine whether
and how national patent systems can truly accommodate domestic economic conditions and cultural
norms while still satisfying international baseline standards.
Parts II and III of this article explore the landscape in which India’s evolving patents system
is positioned.  Part II explains the historical evolution of India’s patent laws as mirroring the country’s
journey from colonization to fledgling independent democracy to rising global star.  Every bit of the
nation’s history and experience informs and shapes the patent system that India has today.  Part III
conveys the current complex milieu in which India’s new pharmaceutical product patents regime was
implemented and in which it must now function.  That regime is the product of a multitude of
powerful influences, including an extensive but fragmented pharmaceutical industry, a huge and vocal
citizenry, and a fragile coalition government entrenched in political compromise.  Parts IV and V
present the substantive patent law content of the article.  Part IV offers an in-depth comparative
analysis and critique of the key provisions of India’s new Patents Act, 1970 (2005), including a
number of controversial features such as a unique anti-“evergreening” criteria for pharmaceutical
patentability and the world’s most elaborate compulsory licensing scheme.  Part V assesses the
capacity and capability of the Indian Patent Office and the Indian court system to implement the newly
strengthened patents regime.  Empirical evidence on recent patenting activity are presented, as is a
comparison of Indian patent prosecution procedures with U.S. practice.  A case study of recent
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See P. NARAYANAN, PATENT LAW ¶¶ 1-12 & 1-16 (3d ed. 1998, Eastern Law House,50
Calcutta) (hereafter “Narayanan (1998)”).
 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database–Contracting51
Parties–Paris Convention–India–Details, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=246C (last visited Aug. 4, 2006) (noting
India’s accession to the 1967 Stockholm Act version of the Paris Convention on Sept. 7, 1998,
and the entry into force of that Act in India on December 7, 1998);  World Intellectual Property
Organization, Treaties Database–Contracting Parties–PCT–India–Details, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=500C (last visited Aug. 4, 2006) (noting
India’s accession to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) on September 7, 1998, and the entry
into force of the PCT in India on December 7, 1998).
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pharmaceutical patent litigation presages conflicts between the various High Courts.  Based on the
preceding analysis, Part VI of the article concludes with a series of recommendations for the future
of India’s  pharmaceutical product patents regime. 
II.  HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PATENT LAW IN INDIA
The development of India’s patents regime mirrors the country’s journey from colonization
to independence to global citizen.  Three distinct periods can be identified, each of which is detailed
below.  To summarize, in the first or “colonial” period the British enacted India’s first patent statutes
during the latter half of the 19  century.  Although India gained its independence from the British inth
1947, it was unable to enact its first independently-drafted patent laws until the 1970s due to deep
political and policy divisions over the value and role of patent protection in the nation’s developing
economy.  India’s Patents Act, 1970 entered into force during the second or “post-independence”
period.  Although modeled on Great Britain’s Patents Act, 1949, the Indian Act incorporated major
departures intended to lessen the social costs imposed by largely foreign-owned patents.  The Patents
Act, 1970 prohibited patents on products useful as medicines and food, shortened the term of
chemical process patents, and significantly expanded the availability of compulsory licensing.50
During the third or “globalization” period from approximately 1986 to the present, India’s
participation in the debates over the inclusion of intellectual property within the GATT framework
and its eventual entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), along with its accession to the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Patent Cooperation Treaty,  have51
compelled significant strengthening of the nation’s patent laws.  The implementation of those changes
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 See Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Indian Patents Act and Its Relation to Technological52
Development in India: A Preliminary Investigation, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (Feb.
18, 1984), at 287 (contrasting patent law with most other forms of property law in India, which
have domestic origin pre-dating British rule).  The more likely form of pre-existing intellectual
property protection in India is trade secrecy, which was more conducive to the Indian practice of
managing businesses within a family or community.  See Tirthankar Roy, THE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF INDIA 1857-1947 (Oxford University Press 2000), at 181 (noting that “[t]he
traditional Indian business firm typically functioned from within the family and community. . . .
Sometimes, belonging to a community or family helped in keeping trade secrets.  In this sense the
community could behave like a ‘guild.’”). 
 See DENIS JUDD, THE LION AND THE TIGER: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH RAJ,53
1600-1947 (2005), at 6.
 See id. at 10.54
 Judd, supra note 53, at 6; see also id. at 87 (noting that in the aftermath of the Great55
Indian Uprising of 1857-58, “the 1858 Government of India Act swept away the power of the
[East India] Company, which was assumed by the Crown . . . .  The Company continued as a
trading concern, but its great days were over.”).  
 See Judd, supra note 53, at 87 (noting that “the 1858 Government of India Act swept56
away the power of the Company, which was assumed by the Crown.”).
 See id. at 94.57
 See id.58
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is ongoing, and their anticipated impact remains to be fully seen.  Today India stands as a rising global
power with a patent system still very much in flux.       
A.  Colonial Period
India inherited its patent laws from the British; no earlier domestic recognition of patents has
been reported.   British influence in India can be traced back to Queen Elizabeth I’s chartering of the52
“Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies” in 1600.   The53
English East India Company first landed on Indian soil in 1608,  and over the next 250 years, laid54
the groundwork for the British Raj.   The British Crown took over full control of India from the East55
India Company in the aftermath of the Great Indian Uprising of 1857-58,  and Queen Victoria was56
declared Empress of India in 1877  (despite never having set foot on Indian soil).   During the 1858-57 58
1905 zenith of the British Raj, almost twenty percent of Britain’s exports were being shipped to
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See id.59
 See id.60
 Dharma Kumar, ed., 2 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA ( C. 1757–C. 1970)61
947 (1983).
 Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 1-10.  The statute was denominated Act VI of62
1856.  Id.
 See ELIZABETH VERKEY, LAW OF PATENTS 15 (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow,63
India, 2005).
 Act XV of 1859.  See P.S. Narayanan, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN INDIA 164
(Gogia Law Agency, Hyderabad, 2005) (hereafter “Narayanan (2005)”).  The “exclusive
privileges” of making, selling, and using the patented invention in India were granted for a term of
14 years from the date of filing of the patent specification.  See Narayanan (1998), supra note 50,
at ¶ 1-10. 
 See Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 1-10. 65
 See id.66
 Verkey, supra note 63, at 16.  67
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India.  For economic reasons, as well as the perceived prestige of dominating the subcontinent, the59
British considered India the “jewel in the crown” of the British Empire.   Economic policies imposed60
on India were “concerned more with protecting and promoting British interests than with advancing
the welfare of the Indian population.”61
The British implemented the first patent statute in India in 1856, based on the British Patent
Law of 1852.    India’s Act VI of 1856, “On Protections of Inventions,” provided certain exclusive62
privileges to inventors of new manufactures for a 14-year term.   The 1856 Act was modified in 185963
and renamed the “Act for granting exclusive privileges to inventors.”   According to a leading Indian64
treatise, the purpose of this legislation was “to enable the English Patent holders to acquire control
over Indian markets.”   The year 1872 saw enactment of the Patents and Designs Protection Act,65
followed by enactment of the Protection of Inventions Act in 1883.   The 1872 and 1883 acts were66
thereafter consolidated in the Inventions and Designs Act of 1888.67
While the British continued to evolve the patent laws they had imposed, India’s domestic
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 See Judd, supra note 53, at 98 (noting that during British Raj, “over 70 per cent of the68
[Indian] population were completely dependent upon agriculture.”). 
 See Judd, supra note 53, at 100.  See also T. Roy, supra note 52, at 167 (noting that69
“[t]he most outstanding industrial achievement of the prewar era [in India] was the Tata Iron and
Steel Company.  It began as a firm in 1907, and started production from 1911.  Tata Steel owed
its existence to its founder J.N. Tata’s persistence and vision.”).
 See Judd, supra note 53, at 100.70
 See T. Roy, supra note 52, at 158.  Out of all Indians employed in factories in 1921,71
41.62% worked in textile production, followed by 7.2 percent in food production and 4.6 percent
in metals and machinery.  Only 2.6% were employed in the “chemicals” industry; there are no data
reported specifically for pharmaceuticals manufacturing.  See id. (Table 5.2, “Industrial
Composition, 1921-81").   See also Kumar, supra note 61, at 566 (stating that “[t]he history of
large-scale private factory enterprise between 1850 and the First World War is associated almost
entirely with developments in three industries–jute, cotton, and iron and steel.”). 
 Act II of 1911, reprinted in Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 770-96 (Appendix 9).72
 See Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 1-10.  Prior to this, the British Secretary to73
the Government in the Home Department had administered the patent system in India from 1857
to 1888.  See Ved P. Mithal, Patents in India, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 62, 62 (1948).  With the
passage of the Act of 1888 responsibility for the patent system was shifted from the Home
Department to the Department of Revenue and Agriculture.  See id.  In 1904, one H.C. Graves,
an examiner from the British Patent Office, was appointed full-time Patent Secretary; Graves
subsequently became the first Controller of Patents and Designs in 1912.  Id. at 63-64. 
DRAFT August 16, 2006 (6:48pm) 18
technology sector grew.  Although still primarily an agriculture-based economy,  the nation’s68
technology industries grew significantly from the 1880s onward.  Indian industrialists such as the steel
baron J.N. Tata led much of this expansion.   By World War I, India was ranked fourteenth among69
industrialized nations of the world.   Large-scale industrialization during this period was dominated70
by production of textiles, food processing, and metals, however; indigenous pharmaceutical
production was not part of the success story.   71
Meanwhile, enactment by the British of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911  created72
for the first time a system of patent administration in India under the direction of a Controller of
Patents.   The 1911 Act established a form of intra-British Empire priority system such that an73
applicant for an Indian patent who had within the previous twelve months filed an application for the
same invention in the United Kingdom was entitled to the benefit of the earlier United Kingdom filing
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See India Patents Act, 1911, § 78A(1), reprinted in Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at74
770, 793.
 See id. at § 78A(2).75
 Mithal, supra note 73, at 69. 76
 For example, in 1930 the Patents Act, 1911 was amended to provide for “patents of77
addition,” which are patents for “improvements or modifications of inventions in respect of which
protection [already] has been applied for or obtained.”  Mithal, supra note 73, at 65.  The patents
of addition concept is retained in the current statute.  See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) §§ 54-
56.  
 See SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY: PATENT78
PROTECTION, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 128-132(Oxford University Press 2005).
 See Hamied, supra note 2, at 3 (noting 1961 formation of Indian Drug Manufacturers79
Association to work for modification of then-prevailing “draconian” patent laws of India as
embodied in Patents Act, 1911).  
 See Kumar, supra note 61, at 639. 80
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date;  publications or uses of the invention in India during the intervening priority period would not74
invalidate the Indian patent.   Patents granted under the 1911 Act expired sixteen years after their75
filing date, although extensions of up to seven additional years were available.   The 1911 Act76
remained in effect, with various amendments,  until an independent  India enacted its first  indigenous77
patent law more than 50 years later.  Like its predecessor Acts, the 1911 permitted patenting of
pharmaceutical products.
 Despite industrial progress in other sectors such as steel production, the growth of India’s
indigenous pharmaceutical industry remained relatively stunted during British control.  Multinationals
reportedly used the 1911 Act to prevent Indian drug firms from manufacturing drugs invented
abroad.   Not surprisingly, the indigenous drug makers viewed the 1911 Act as draconian.78 79
Whatever the true motivations underlying the 1911 Act, it had negligible effect in terms of spurring
domestic pharmaceutical (or other) innovation.  For example, in 1930 a total of 1,099 patent
applications were filed in India and 80 percent of these were filed by foreigners “intend[ing] mainly
to establish pre-emptive claims for improvements elsewhere.”   By the time of independence in 194780
when India’s population was approximately 400 million persons, only 2,610 patent applications (on
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 See Mithal, supra note 73, at 64 (not specifying the numerical breakdown between81
Indian and foreign-owned patents).  The total staff strength of the Indian Patent Office examining
corps as of 1946 was “about 26" persons.  Id.   
 Hamied, supra note 2, at 2.82
 See Judd, supra note 53, at 2.83
 See LARRY COLLINS AND DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, FREEDOM AT MIDNIGHT xi (1997 ed.). 84
 See T. Roy, supra note 52, at 1 (stating that “[i]n 1947, India was one of the poorest85
countries in the world, having seen rather low rates of economic growth in the late nineteenth and
the early twentieth centuries”).
 See generally Collins and Lapierre, supra note 84 (detailing events leading up to India’s86
independence from the British Empire in 1947, the partition of the country into India, Pakistan,
and East Pakistan (today Bangladesh), and the ensuing slaughter of over one million Hindus,
Sikhs, and Moslems).  See also JUDITH E. WALSH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIA 205 (2006) (stating
that over a million people “lost their lives in partition violence” and that more than 10 million
“fled their former homes on either side of the border to become refugees within the other
country”). 
 See Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQUETTE INT.87
PROP. L. REV. 273, 301 (2006) (stating that “[w]hen India became independent, the
pharmaceutical sector was dominated by multinational companies.”);  Sunil K. Sahu,
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all types of inventions) were filed annually with the Indian Patent Office.   The minuscule number81
of filings reflects to some degree the lack of pharmaceutical activity in India at that time.  Prior to
World War II, there was “virtually no basic drug manufacture in the country.”  82
B.  Post-Independence Period
When India finally seceded from Great Britain in 1947, eighty percent of the subjects of the
British Empire “gained their independence at one stroke.”   At the time of independence, India’s 40083
million people represented one-fifth of the world’s population.   Moreover, the nation at that time84
was among the world’s poorest.   Meeting the potentially staggering demand for low-cost medicines85
became a paramount challenge for India’s new leaders.   
After the ensuing tragedy of the Partition,  a fledgling independent India turned its attention86
to an impoverished domestic economy and eradication of the vestiges of colonization.  India at this
stage had little in the way of an indigenous pharmaceutical industry.   The unfortunate legacy of87
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, DEPENDENCE, AND SELF-RELIANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD
WORLD: THE PHARMACEUTICAL AND MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRIES IN INDIA 55 (Praeger 1998)
(observing that “[a]lthough the foundation of the modern pharmaceutical industry was laid in
1901 with the establishment of Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works, and the two World
Wars gave a boost to the development of the industry, the progress made under British rule was
insignificant and India depended largely on imports from Britain, France, and Germany for its
requirements of drugs and medicines.  At the time of independence, pharmaceutical operation
involved merely simple packaging and bottling; it could hardly have been termed an industry.”). 
Cf. Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 22 (reporting that by 1939, indigenous pharmaceutical firms
were supplying 13% of the medicinal requirements of India, but “still had a long way to go to
attain self-sufficiency”).
 Planning Commission, Government of India,1  FIVE YEAR PLAN (submitted Dec. 7,ST88
1952) (“Conclusion”), at Chap. 1 (“Planning: Economic and Social Aspects”), ¶ 13, available at
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/default.html (stating that “[a]griculture is still
the mainstay of life for about 70 per cent of the population, and productivity in this sector is
exceedingly low.”).
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 132 (noting the finding of an “American Senate89
Committee (Kefauver Committee)” that “India was among the highest priced nations in the
world” with respect to drug prices);  Chandran et al., supra note 11, at 269-80 (noting that during
post-independence era and until 1970, India became “increasingly dependent on imports for bulk
drugs and formulations and thus, drug prices were amongst the highest in the world.”); Donald G.
McNeil Jr., Selling Cheap ‘Generic’ Drugs, India’s Copycats Irk Industry, NEW YORK TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2000, at A1 (stating that at the time of enactment of the Patents Act, 1970, “India’s drug
prices were among the highest in the world”), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/01/science/01PIRA.html?ex=1141016400&en=b3ff7dc3708cf0
95&ei=5070.  
The “Kefauver Committee” report, as referred to supra by Chaudhuri, is formally known
as SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY, U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, S. REP.
NO. 448, 87  CONG., 1  SESS., STUDY OF ADMINISTERED PRICES IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY (JuneTH ST
27, 1961).  The study compared prices charged for identical drugs sold in various countries.  See
id. at 32 (subcommittee “secure[d] from abroad the prices of a number of important drug
products”).  In several instances drug prices in India as of 1959 were higher (sometimes
significantly so) than prices for identical drugs in developed countries.  For example, the price in
India in 1959 for the tranquilizer meprobamate was 147% of the U.S. price and higher than the
price reported for any other country included in the data set except Venezuela.  See id. at 35
(Table 13).  The price for the tranquilizer Serpasil, although only 44% of the U.S. price, was
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British-imposed, foreign-favoring patent laws and a largely agrarian economy  was a health care88
system in which most modern  medicines were manufactured abroad, imported into India and sold
there at some of the highest prices in the world.   Multinational pharmaceutical corporations largely89
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
nevertheless higher than the price charged for Serpasil in France, Austria, Germany, England, and
several other developed countries.  See id. at 36 (Table 14).  The price in India in 1959 for the
oral antidiabetic Tolbutamide was 86% of the U.S. price, but over twice the price in Austria, and
higher than the price in Germany, Holland, England, France, Italy, Brazil, and Belgium.  See id. at
37 (Table 15).  The price in India for the broad spectrum antibiotic Chloromycetin was only 59%
of the U.S. price, but nevertheless higher than the price charged in Iran, England, Mexico, and
Holland.  See id. at 40 (Table 18).  The price charged in India for the broad spectrum antibiotic
Aureomycin was 136% of the U.S. price and a higher price than that charged by any other
country in the data set.  See id. at 41 (Table 19).  The price charged in India for the broad
spectrum antibiotic Tetracycline was 128% of the U.S. price and higher than the price charged by
any other country in the data set except Belgium.  See id. at 42 (Table 20).    
 See Ragavan, supra note 87, at 280 (noting that at the time of India’s 1ST FIVE YEAR90
PLAN (submitted Dec. 7, 1952), “multinationals . . . formed more than 90% of the Indian
pharmaceutical industry”); Hamied, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that in 1971 [a year before the India
Patents Act, 1970 took effect] “the MNC’s controlled over 70% of the domestic pharma[ceutical]
market”).   
 Planning Commission, Government of India,1  FIVE YEAR PLAN (submitted Dec. 7,ST91
1952) (“Conclusion”), at Chap. 32 (“Health”), ¶¶ 96 & 99, available at
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/default.html.
 See Bagchi, supra note 52, at 293 (observing that Bombay High Court’s judgment in92
Farbwerke Hoechst & Bruning Corp. v. Unichem Lab., 1969 A.I.R. 56 (Bom[bay]) 255,
enjoining Unichem from further manufacture of tolbutamide, “strengthened the case for treating
preparations of chemical substances including food, drugs and medicines in a special manner from
a legal point of view, and this special treatment was embodied in the [Patents] Act of 1970”).  See
also Srividhya Ragavan, A “Patent” Restriction on Research & Development: Infringers or
Innovators?, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 73, 87-88 (2004) (discussing Hoechst decision).
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controlled India’s drug industry.   Critical drugs such as insulin and penicillin were wholly90
imported.   An unpopular decision of the Bombay High Court awarding the West German chemical91
giant Hoechst an injunction against the Indian drug maker Unichem Laboratories added fuel to the
fire.   India’s leaders demanded major changes to the patent law in order to jump-start indigenous92
manufacture of medicines at affordable prices. 
The Indian government wasted no time in beginning to craft an indigenous patent law.  Only
a few months following Independence, a committee was appointed by a resolution of the Indian
government dated January 10, 1948 to “review the patent laws in India with a view to ensure that the
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 Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS LAW93
(September 1959), at Preface.   
 Narayanan (2005), supra note 64, at 1.94
 Id.95
 See Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 1-10.96
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 93-94.  But see Bagchi, supra note 52, at 300 (noting97
without citation to authority that “over the years 1971-74, under sections 22 and 23cc of the old
Act (Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911), 47 applications for compulsory licenses were made
and 14 such applications were granted.”). 
 Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS LAW98
(September 1959) (on file at National Law School of India University, Bangalore) (reviewed by
author at NLSIU Library on Nov. 18, 2005).  See also Narayanan (2005), supra note 64, at 1.
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patent system was more conducive to national interests.”   These efforts ultimately led to the93
issuance of two comprehensive reports on the patent system.  The first report, authored by a
committee chaired by Indian Supreme Court Justice Bakshi Tek Chand and published in 1950,
explored the failure of India’s patent system to “stimulate invention and encourage exploitation of
new inventions for industrial purposes.”   The Chand Report recommended that compulsory licenses94
be issued and that an “efficient machinery should be evolved to tackle the issue of abuses [of
patents].”   Based on the Chand Report’s recommendations a patent bill was introduced in95
Parliament in 1953 but thereafter lapsed.   Although the compulsory licensing provisions of the 191196
Act were amended in 1950 and 1952 in the wake of the Chand Report, compulsory licenses were
nevertheless rarely sought, at least in part because patent owners retained the right to oppose the
grant of such licenses and to appeal any such grants.97
A second government-commissioned report was likely the most important catalyst for the
Patents Act, 1970.  The Ayyangar Report, issued in 1959, was prepared for the Indian Ministry of
Commerce and Industry and authored by a commission chaired by retired Indian Supreme Court
Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar.   The Ayyangar Report, which has been described as “form[ing] the98
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 Ragavan, supra note 87, at 281 n. 53 (2006) (observing that the “Ayyangar Report, as99
modified by the Report of the Joint Committee of Parliament in 1966, forms the backbone of the
Indian patent system.”) 
 Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 1-11.100
 See Narayanan (2005), supra note 64, at 1.  For example, the first of seven Indian101
Institutes of Technology was established in 1950.  See Indian Institutes of Technology, IIT-
History, available at http://www.iit.org/history.php (last visited June 26, 2006).  Today, the IIT
system “churn[s] out and export[s] some of the most gifted engineering, computer science, and
software talent on the globe.”  Thomas L. Friedman, THE WORLD IS FLAT:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 104 (2005).
 See Narayanan (2005), supra note 64, at 2.102
 Id.103
 Id.104
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backbone of the Indian patent system,”  recommended “radical”  modifications of India’s existing99 100
patent laws to accommodate India’s fledgling technological advancement and industrialization, the
need to encourage and reward inventors, and the increasing number of Indian research institutes and
emphasis on technical education.   The report’s three-pronged strategy has been summarized as:101 102
(i)identification of the types of inventions for which patent protection should be available;
(ii) determination either to prohibit the granting of Indian patents to foreign entities or to require
working of such patents in India; and
(iii) determination to withstand international pressures on India to join international intellectual
property conventions such as the Paris Convention, which required national treatment.   103
By holding out against membership in the prevailing international IP conventions, India hoped to
develop its economy independently without “arm-twisting from developed nations.”   104
As is not uncommon in Indian legislative matters, change came very slowly.  Even after
issuance of the Ayyangar Report, it would be more than ten years before India enacted its own patent
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 A patent bill was introduced in the Indian Lok Sabha (Lower House) in 1965 but105
thereafter lapsed.  Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 1-11.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (No. 39 of 1970), available at106
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/in/in004en.pdf (enacted by Parliament on Sept. 19,
1970 and entered in force on April 20, 1972).   
 See id. at § 1(3) n.1 (providing that “[t]he provisions of this Act, other than sections107
12(2), 13(2), 28, 68, and 125 to 132 came into force on 20-4-1972, vide S.O. 300(E), dated 20th
April, 1972, published in Gazette of India, Extra., Pt. II, sec. 3(ii), p. 735.”).
 B.K. Keayla, TRIPS PATENT SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE AND PHARMA108
INDUSTRY (PATENTS (SECOND AMENDMENT) BILL 1999) 4 (Centre for Study of Global Trade
System and Development, New Delhi, 2000). 
 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 162(1) (providing that “[t]he Indian Patents and Designs109
Act, 1911, in so far as it relates to patents, is hereby repealed . . .”). 
 Id. at § 5.110
 Id. at § 5 (stating that “no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substances111
themselves, but claims for  the methods or processes of manufacture shall be patentable.”).
 Id. at § 53(a) (providing that “in respect of an invention claiming the method or process112
of manufacture of a substance, where the substance is intended for use, or is capable of being
used, as food or as a medicine or drug, be five years from the date of sealing of the patent, or
seven years from the date of the patent whichever period is shorter”). 
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law.   The India Patents Act, 1970  finally came into force on April 20, 1972,  “after long105 106 107
deliberations in Joint Select Committees and in-depth debate in both the Houses of Parliament
preceded by recommendations of [the] high-powered [Tek Chand and Ayyengar]
commissions . . . .”   The prior Patents and Design Act, 1911, was repealed.   108 109
The most notable feature of the India Patents Act, 1970, was its repeal of patentability for
pharmaceutical products.  The Act specifically prohibited patents on “substances intended for use,
or capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug, or . . . relating to substances prepared or
produced by chemical processes (including alloys, optical glass, semi- conductors and inter-metallic
compounds).”   Processes for the making of such substances remained patentable, however,  but110 111
with an extremely short patent term.  Process patents would only last the shorter of five (5) years
from sealing or seven (7) years from the date of the patent,  while the term of all other types of112
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The “date of the patent” was apparently the date on which the complete specification had
been filed.  See India Patents Act, 1970, at § 45(1).
 Id. at § 53(b).  113
 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 87 (titled “Certain patents deemed to be endorsed with114
the words ‘Licenses of right.’”), reprinted in Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 543, 575.  For a
reported example of a license of right, see Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Controller General of
Patents, AIR 1978 Calcutta 77 (decision of Calcutta High Court affirming Controller of Patents’
order deeming Imperial’s patent, claiming a catalyst useful in hydrocarbon reforming as well as a
process for making the catalyst, to be subject to licensing of right).  
 India Patents Act, 1970, § 83(a)-(b).115
 With limited exceptions, the provisions of the Patents Act, 1970 came into force on116
April 20, 1972.  See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 1(3) and n.1.
 See Bagchi, supra note 52, at 293 (Table 1: “Number of Patents Applied For, Sealed117
and In Force in India, 1968--1979-80").  In 1968, foreign entities filed 4,284 patent applications
in India while Indian entities (i.e., persons or entities having resident status in India) filed 1,110
applications.  In FY 1978-79, foreign entities filed 1,080 applications and Indian entities filed
1,124 applications.  Id.
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patents (e.g., mechanical devices) was fourteen (14) years from the date of the patent.   The Patents113
Act, 1970, also included expansive compulsory licensing provisions, such that patented processes for
manufacturing substances capable of being used as medicine or food were deemed automatically
endorsed with the designation “licenses of right.”   India quite bluntly set forth the justifications for114
its broad limitations on patent exclusivity in the 1970 Act’s statement of “general principles;” namely,
“that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are worked in
India on a commercial scale and . . . that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a
monopoly for the importation of the patented article . . . .”115
         No longer able to protect their pharmaceutical product innovations in the Indian market,
foreign enterprises dramatically cut back their patent filings in India.  The Patents Act, 1970 went into
effect on April 20, 1972.   By fiscal year (FY) 1978-79, the number of foreign-owned patent116
applications filed in India had decreased to 1,010, less than one quarter of the 4,248 applications filed
by non-Indians ten years prior in 1968.   (Indian-owned application filing levels stayed constant,117
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 See id. (reporting that Indian entities filed 1,110 patent applications in India in 1968118
and filed 1,124 applications in FY 1978-79).
 See George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent119
Protection: the U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. &
FOR. AFF. 283, 306-07 (1998).
 Professor Frederick M. Scherer has observed with respect to the Indian generic firms120
that “‘[i]t’s a marvelous piece of P.R. to get these companies called pirates.’” McNeil, supra
note 89 (quoting Scherer, an emeritus professor of public policy at Harvard University’s Kennedy
School of Government).  “‘What they’re doing is perfectly legitimate, until 2005, under the Paris
convention and the Uruguay Round of trade talks.’” Id.  
 McNeil, supra note 89, at A1.  121
 Switzerland and the Netherlands did not have patent systems in the latter part of the122
nineteenth century.  See generally ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL
PATENTS (Princeton, 1971).
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though low, during the same time period. ) 118
The eventual economic effect of the India Patents Act, 1970, was a dramatic increase in
domestic generic drug manufacturing and a sharp decline in the price of medicines sold in India.
Pharmaceutical products patented outside of India could be freely copied in India under the Act, so
long as the process by which they were produced did not infringe an Indian process patent (which in
any event lasted only 5-7 years).  India developed a reputation as a “pirate” nation adept at copying
drugs invented and patented in other countries.   The “pirate” label was unduly pejorative, however,119
and contradicted the basic principle of territoriality in patent law.  No violations of any foreign patent
laws occurred so long as the copied drugs were made and sold only in India (or exported only to
other countries that similarly did not recognize pharmaceutical product patents).   120
In shaping its first indigenous patents regime, India made a deliberate choice to stimulate
domestic drug manufacturing and reduce the price of medicines.  Its Patents Act, 1970, “conceived
in postcolonial days when India still suffered famines and the average Indian man could expect to live
only about 40 years, was intended to encourage the founding of local industries to break the choke
hold of foreign chemical companies.”   With the possible exception of those countries that outright121
repealed their patent systems during the nineteenth century,  no clearer example exists in modern122
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 Ragavan, supra note 87, at 289. 123
 Hamied, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that in 1971 [a year before the India Patents Act,124
1970 took effect] “the MNC’s controlled over 70% of the domestic pharma[ceutical] market,”
but that by 2005, the market share of MNCs was “below 23%”).
 See Ali Imam, How Patent Protection Helps Developing Countries, 33 AIPLA Q.J.125
377, 385 (2005) (observing that “India, one of the fastest-growing developing countries, has been
unable to attract much foreign-based pharmaceutical R&D investment because of weak patent
protection for pharmaceutical products.”) (citing generally Heinz Redwood, NEW HORIZONS IN
INDIA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION (1994)).  As of 1993,
“only 16 of the world’s largest pharmaceutical-producing countries had a direct investment
position in India . . . .”  Id. at 386.
 See Interview with attorney Krishna Sarma, Corporate Law Group, in New Delhi, India126
(Nov. 14, 2005) (transcript on file with author);  Interview with Dr. Swati Piramal, Nicholas
Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India (Nov. 24, 2005) (transcript on file with author);  
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 59 (noting that under the Patents Act, 1970, the127
“cost-efficient processes developed by the indigenous sector could be used for manufacturing the
latest drugs, introducing them at a fraction of international prices and dislodging the MNCs from
the position of dominance in the domestic market.”). 
 See B. K. KEAYLA, CONQUEST BY PATENTS: TRIPS AGREEMENT ON PATENT LAWS:128
IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH FOR ALL 59 (Centre for Study of Global Trade
System and Development 1998) (Table 11, titled “Price comparison of medicines”).
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history of a nation restructuring its patent laws “as a tool . . . to achieve its national priorities”  than123
India’s enactment of its Patents Act, 1970.  
In the wake of the new legislation, India’s generic drug industry flourished as indigenous firms
made huge gains in market share against the MNCs.   A number of MNCs left India or chose not124
to invest there given the lack of patent protection.   At the same time, scientists employed by the125
generic firms became skilled in process chemistry and reverse engineering.   Drug prices in India fell126
dramatically.   For example, the price in 1998 of the Indian equivalent of ranitidine, the active127
ingredient in Glaxo’s Zantac anti-ulcer medicine, was over 100 times less than the price of Zantac on
the U.S. market.   128
Despite the dramatic turnaround in domestic drug manufacturing after the Patents Act, 1970,
India’s generic drug industry did not become an innovator of new molecules.  Virtually no research
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 Bagchi posits that under the Patents Act, 1970, foreign firms did not feel compelled to129
take out patents and abide by India’s expansive compulsory licensing provisions because India
never posed a “credible threat” in terms of a “high rate of innovative activity by domestic firms
and research organisations.”  Bagchi, supra note 52, at 302.   Domestic innovation activity was
held up by a combination of factors including diversion of R&D resources to “expensive,
unproductive” industry sectors such as nuclear energy and space; the failure to build stronger links
between industry and research laboratories; and a “slow rate of industrial growth.”  Id.    
 See Cohen, supra note 46, at 117 (noting in his 2001 book that “[a]bout half of all130
Indian scientists trained in the United States stay there on a semipermanent basis.”); Susan
Finston, India: A Cautionary Tale on the Critical Importance of Intellectual Property Protection,
12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 887, 890 (2002) (observing that the then-“[l]ack
of patent protection has eliminated any incentive for India’s best scientific minds to develop cures
for tropical diseases endemic to India, or even to remain in India to work in the domestic
industry.”). 
 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, FICCI REPORT FOR131
NATIONAL MANUFACTURING COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL 10 (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.ficci.com/studies/pharma.pdf.
 See Chandran et al., supra note 11, at 269-80 (observing that “[n]ow, the specific132
challenge before IPI [the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry] is to start investing in basic R&D from
the current abysmal level of less than 2% of total revenue to the world level of 8-10%”);  David
K. Tomar, Note and Comment: A Look Into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Between
the United States and India, 17 WISC. INT’L L.J. 579, 583 (1999) (stating that, as of 1997,
“Indian-owned companies typical[ly] spend 1% of sales on R&D, compared to an average of 15%
by Western pharmaceutical companies”) (citing Amy Louise Kazmin, Now These Copycats Have
to Discover New Drugs, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 24, 1997, at 114).
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and development into new molecules was undertaken in India in the pre-TRIPS era,  and its129
indigenous pharmaceutical industry felt the effects of “brain drain” as skilled scientists left the country
or remained abroad after completing their foreign training.   Even as recently as 2005, “low130
investments in innovative R&D and lack of resources to compete with MNCs for New Drug
Discovery Research and to commercialize molecules on a worldwide basis” are still cited as
weaknesses of India’s domestic pharmaceutical sector.   Compared to Western pharmaceutical131
companies, the level of R&D investment of Indian firms as a percentage of total sales remains
paltry.   The lack of investment in new molecule R&D has disadvantaged India in a wide number132
of  inter-connected ways:
[s]ince independence, efforts of IPI [the Indian Pharmaceutical
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 Chandran et al., supra note 11, at 269-80.133
 Cohen, supra note 46, at 95.134
 See id. 135
 See Walsh, supra note 86, at 219 (discussing Indira Gandhi’s “move to the left” and136
nationalization of Indian private banks);  Das, supra note 323, at 157 (stating that “[during the
1970s and 1980s] Indira Gandhi's government became even more rigid, introduced more controls,
and became bureaucratic and authoritarian.  It nationalized banks, discouraged foreign investment,
and placed more hurdles before domestic enterprise.”);  STANLEY WOLPERT, INDIA 228 (Univ. of
Cal. Press 1991) (describing Indira Gandhi’s economic policies as an “Emergency Raj” designed
to “distribute India’s wealth more equitably and to assist the weakest, most impoverished half of
society.”).
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Industry] have mostly been directed towards the development of
alternative cost effective manufacturing processes for molecules
already invented and patented in other countries.  Very little or no
effort was invested in R&D towards development of new
molecules/products.  Over the last few decades, this contracted patent
regime in India, recognizing only process patent[s], has had a negative
impact on the development of professional expertise in new chemical
entity development as potential therapeutic agent[s].  This in turn also
gave lesser exposure to conducting advanced clinical trials and
drafting patents and patent related litigation in the areas of new
chemical entities, genetic engineering, combinatorial chemistry, natural
products, agro-chemicals and agricultural products.133
C.  Globalization Period
India’s entry onto the global stage as an emerging superpower in the waning days of the
twentieth century follows a long process of domestic economic reform.  Following independence
from Great Britain in 1947, the government of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, favored
“social engineering and economic egalitarianism” which “dampened the spirit of private enterprise
and profit.”   The British Raj was replaced with the “License Raj,” “a vast system of national and134
state-level licenses and quotas” which shackled Indian business.   Economic conditions did not135
improve under the subsequent tenure of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who nationalized industries,
imposed protectionist policies and implemented stiff restrictions on foreign direct investment.136
The first real movement to a free market for India occurred in 1991, as a result of a balance
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 See Cohen, supra note 46, at 101.137
 Reforming India’s Economy, THE ECONOMIST, June 12, 2004 (“Special Report”138
section).  
 See Sengupta and Rai, supra note 20 (reporting that “India’s finance minister is139
predicting an 8.1% economic growth rate for the year ending March 31, 2007.”). 
 See Foster, supra note 119, at 311.  140
 See Natasha Seeratan, The Negative Impact of Intellectual Property Patent Rights on141
Developing Countries: An Examination of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 3 SCHOLAR 339,
352-53 (2001).
 See Foster, supra note 119, at 315. 142
 See N.K. CHOWDHRY AND J.C. AGGARWAL, II DUNKEL PROPOSALS: THE FINAL143
ACT–1994: SIGNIFICANCE FOR INDIA AND THE WORLD TRADE 13 (Shipra Publications, Delhi,
1994) (quoting Indian Minister of Commerce Mr. Pranab Mukherjee as stating in Parliament on
December 16, 1993 that “[w]hile India had initially not been in favour of inclusion of trade-related
intellectual property rights in the scope of the Uruguay Round, it had ultimately to go along with
the rest of the world community. . . .  If we were to opt out of the new agreement, the possibility
of our major trading partners insisting upon a much earlier introduction of product patents on the
threat of imposition of restriction on the export of our goods into their markets cannot be ruled
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of payments crisis.   Led by then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh (today India’s Prime Minister),137
the “license raj” was radically reformed.  “The rupee was devalued; import controls were dismantled
and customs duties slashed; industrial licensing was liberalised and the capital markets opened up.”138
These measures appear to be having the desired effect; today India’s economy is growing at more
than eight percent annually.   139
Despite its internal economic reforms, India led the opposition to inclusion of patent and
intellectual property rights in a GATT accord for the first three years of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations.   India and other developing countries viewed the GATT framework as a tool by140
which wealthy nations would impose strong IPRs as the cost of much-needed access for the
developing world to western markets.   Although initially joined in its opposition by other advanced141
developing countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, when these countries changed their
position India was no longer able to “go it alone.”   India feared restrictions on its exports if it did142
not accept TRIPS.   In view of its declining economy in the late 1980s, India could ill afford to lose143
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out.”). 
 See Foster, supra note 119, at 315-17.144
 See id. at 311.145
 See id. at 311-12 (stating that “it is generally recognized that India was instrumental in146
persuading the GATT members to include the lengthy transition period for lesser-developed
countries.”);  JAGDISH N BHAGWATI AND MATHIAS HIRSCH, EDS., THE URUGUAY ROUND AND
BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL 46 (University of Michigan Press 1999)
(observing that “India had its way for a 10-year transitional period for product patents in the field
of technology where product patents were not being granted at the time of entering into force of
the Agreement.”).  
 See Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to147
Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives
Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1084-85 (1996).
 See Foster, supra note 119, at 283.148
 See World Trade Organization, “India and the WTO,” available at149
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2005).
 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, MARRAKESH AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE150
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Art. II(2) (Apr. 15, 1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm (stating that “[t]he agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as
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valuable textile tariff concessions and economic aid from foreign sources such as the International
Monetary Fund and the U.S. government.   144
By 1989 India had reversed its anti-TRIPS stance and agreed to serious negotiations over
patent protection, while nevertheless maintaining that the extent of patent protection required should
vary with an individual country’s extent of economic development.   India is viewed as the nation145
primarily responsible for the TRIPS’ multi-year transition periods,  which the multinational146
pharmaceutical industry had vociferously opposed.  147
India signed the Uruguay Round Agreements (along with 116 other nations) on April 15,
1994,  and became a member of the WTO effective January 1, 1995.   Thus India became148 149
obligated to amend its domestic intellectual property laws in order to come into compliance with the
WTO’s TRIPS Agreement.   Certain implementations were required immediately and others could150
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.”). 
The referenced “Annex[] 1” includes the TRIPS Agreement as Annex 1C.  See WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, WTO LEGAL TEXTS, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#annex1 (last visited Aug. 2, 2006).
 See TRIPS Art. 65.4.151
 See generally Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 65-70 (section titled “Implementation of152
TRIPS in India”).
 See Part II.C.1 infra.153
 India Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 (No. 17 of 1999) (Mar. 26, 1999), available at154
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.PDF. 
 India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (No. 38 of 2002) (June 25, 2002), available at155
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patentg.pdf.
 See Part II.C.3 infra.156
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be postponed for the duration of the applicable transition period.  Most notably, as a country that had
not granted patent protection on pharmaceutical products at the time of its entry into the WTO, India
was given ten years, i.e., until January 1, 2005, to implement that portion of TRIPS into its laws.151
The TRIPS-catalyzed transformation of India’s patent laws has thus far involved a three-stage
process  corresponding to three acts amending the Patents Act, 1970 (referred to throughout India’s152
patent laws as the “Principal Act”).  Each stage of the process is described in further detail below,
but a summary is provided here.  First, a “mailbox” facility was created to establish so-called pipeline
protection for pharmaceutical product patent applications filed (but not taken up by the Patent Office
for examination) during India’s ten-year TRIPS transition period that extended from January 1, 1995
through December 31, 2004.   The mailbox procedure, along with exclusive marketing rights153
(EMRs), was initially implemented by Presidential decree.  In the aftermath of a WTO dispute
proceeding brought by the U.S., India formally enacted the mailbox facility into law by Parliament’s
passage of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999.   Second, the Principal Act was amended by the154
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002,  so as to provide the TRIPS-required twenty-year patent term,155
reversal of the burden of proof for process patent infringement, and modifications to compulsory
licensing requirements.   Lastly, India put pharmaceutical product patent protection into full effect156
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 India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 (No. 15 of 2005) (April 4, 2005), available at157
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.  See Part II.C.5 infra.
 See TRIPS Art. 65.4.158
 TRIPS Art. 70.8(a).  159
 See JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 609-10 (BNA 2005).160
 See TRIPS Art. 70.9.  161
 No. 13 of 1994, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/in/in001en.html. 162
The 1994 Ordinance was officially published in 81 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA (Dec. 31, 1994),
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/fiche.jsp?uid=in001.  Presidential authority for the
promulgation of ordinances is derived from the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 123 of
India’s Constitution.  See Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994 (citing Constitution and noting
that “Parliament is not in session and the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which
render it necessary for him to take immediate action.”), available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/in/in001en.html.
 See India Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994, § 1(2).163
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as of January 1, 2005, via the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.    157
1.  The Mailbox Facility Controversy
Although the TRIPS Agreement’s transitional arrangements allowed India until January 1,
2005 to begin granting patents on qualifying applications claiming pharmaceutical products,  TRIPS158
nonetheless required India to “provide as from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement
[i.e., January 1, 1995] a means by which applications for patents for such inventions can be filed
. . . .”   In other words, India had to set up a “mailbox” facility to accept pharmaceutical product159
patent applications filed during the TRIPS transition period and to assign each application a filing
date.  This system is also commonly referred to as “pipeline protection.”   TRIPS also required that160
exclusive marketing rights (EMRs), a short-term quasi-patent right as further detailed below, be
granted during the transition period for certain mailbox applications that met additional specified
criteria.   161
Accordingly, an Ordinance (similar to an Executive Order in the U.S.) was promulgated by
India’s President on December 31, 1994, while Parliament was not in session.   Designed to162
implement a mailbox facility and EMRs, the Ordinance came into effect on January 1, 1995.   The163
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 65-66.164
 See id. at 66.  165
 See Foster, supra note 119, at 318 (stating that “India once again grew recalcitrant166
over patent reform in the aftermath of the Marrakech signing, when its economic position
improved, and it acquired new plausible security threats.”).
 Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS167
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 890 (2003).  See also Thomas, supra note 160, at 612
(describing the U.S.-India dispute as “a significant opinion for the newly formed WTO,” which
“signaled that the WTO would take seriously the commitments of its members with respect to the
TRIPS Agreement.”).
 See World Trade Organization, Dispute DS50, “India--Patent Protection for168
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,” available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds50_e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
 See World Trade Organization, No. WT/DS50/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body,169
India–Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (Dec. 4, 1997), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds50_e.htm (upholding the
WTO panel’s conclusion that “India has not complied with its obligations under Article 70.8(a) to
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Ordinance subsequently lapsed, however, because implementing legislation was not enacted within
the requisite six-week time period following the Ordinance’s introduction.   The Indian Parliament’s164
Lok Sabha (Lower House) subsequently passed a bill to implement the mailbox facility but the
legislation was never enacted because the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) did not pass it before
Parliament was dissolved in May 1996.   The Indian legislators’ recalcitrance to amend the patent165
laws as required by TRIPS likely found its basis in a then-improving Indian economy and political
landscape that led the lawmakers to risk U.S. ire.166
The U.S. did not hesitate to employ the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism in the face of
India’s failure to formally enact the mailbox and EMR regime into law, thus triggering the “seminal
TRIPS dispute before the WTO.”   In July 1996 the U.S. filed a request for consultations with India,167
the first step in the WTO dispute resolution process.   The WTO’s Appellate Body held in168
December 1997 that by India’s failure to timely amend its patent laws, India had failed to satisfy its
obligation under Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement to establish “a means” that adequately
preserved novelty and priority of pharmaceutical product patent applications.   India thereafter169
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establish ‘a means’ that adequately preserves novelty and priority in respect of applications for
product patents in respect of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical inventions during the
transitional periods provided for in Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement . . .”).
 See World Trade Organization, Dispute DS50, India--Patent Protection for170
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds50_e.htm (section titled “Implementation
Status of Adopted Reports”).
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 66.171
 India Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 (No. 17 of 1999) (Mar. 26, 1999), available at172
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.PDF. 
 See id. at § 1(2) (deeming Act retroactive to January 1, 1995); § 2 (inserting Section173
5(2) into the Patents Act, 1970, providing that claims to substances useful as medicine or drug
“may be made and shall be dealt . . . in the manner provided in Chapter IVA”); § 3 (inserting
Chapter IVA into the Patents Act, 1970).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (1999) § 24A(1) (providing that “[n]otwithstanding174
anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 12 [“Examination of application”], the Controller
shall not, under that sub-section, refer an application in respect of a claim for a patent covered
under sub-section (2) of section 5 to an examiner for making a report until the 31  day ofst
December, 2004 . . .”); see also Sreenivasaro Vepachedu and Martha Rumore, Patent Protection
and the Pharmaceutical Industry in the Indian Union, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY (Oct.
2004), at 44.
DRAFT August 16, 2006 (6:48pm) 36
agreed to implement the recommendations of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body by April 1999.170
An implementing bill was passed in the Rajya Sabha on December 22, 1998, but was never passed
by the Lok Sabha.  171
2.  The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999
Ultimately enacted in March 1999, India’s Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999  formally172
implemented the mailbox procedure for patent applications claiming pharmaceutical and agro-
chemical products and made it retroactive to January 1, 1995.   The 1999 Act also formally173
implemented EMRs.  
Mailbox applications went into a symbolic “black box,” not to be taken out for examination
nor even published by the Indian Patent Office until on or after January 1, 2005.   It is now known174
that during India’s ten-year TRIPS transition period, almost 9,000 mailbox applications were filed
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 A total of 8,926 mailbox applications were filed in the Indian Patent Office prior to175
January 1, 2005.  Of these, 3,672 were filed in the Chennai branch and 1,952 were filed in the
New Delhi branch.   Interview with K.S. Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, in
New Delhi, India (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author).    
 See P.T. Jyothi Datta, Day 1 of product patent regime–Pharmaceutical industry kept176
guessing, HINDU BUSINESS LINE, Jan. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/01/04/stories/2005010402840100.htm (observing that
number of mailbox applications was still not officially declared, and that “the lack of clarity on the
final number of product patent applications in the box has left the domestic drug industry
worried.”).
 See K.G. Narendranath, Patent mailbox opens, Pfizer is top applicant, FINANCIAL177
EXPRESS, March 21, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/fearchive_frame.php (reporting that “the Kolkata-based Patents
Office [had] opened the mailbox of patent pleas for pharma and agrochem inventions for
1995-2005.”). 
 “Of a total of 8,926 patent pleas in the mailbox [1995-2004], a majority of 7,520178
belong to foreign entities, while the balance 1,406 are Indian applications.”  Id.  United States-
based Pfizer was the leading filer of mailbox applications, with 373 filings.  Id.  Johnson &
Johnson, another U.S.-based company, was second, with 262 mailbox applications.  Id.  Among
Indian companies, Dr. Reddy’s Labs filed the most mailbox applications (i.e., 205).  Id.  Ranbaxy
made 38 filings.  Id.  “While US-based entities put 2,324 applications, including 2,096
pharma-related pleas, Indian submissions were 1,406 including 1,300 in pharma sector.”   Id. 
“Among foreign countries, Germany made 1,238 filings including 1,134 pharma filings to occupy
the third slot behind US and India, followed by UK (631/573), Switzerland (596/538), Japan
(503/434), Sweden 364/351), France (322/278), Denmark (306/278) and Belgium (177/170).”  
Id.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (as amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 and the179
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002) [hereafter “India Patents Act, 1970 (2002)”] §5(1), as reprinted
in UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED BY THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT,
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in the four branches of the Indian Patent Office,  although the government did not publish running175
totals during the transition period;  the first official “opening of the mailbox” with confirmation of176
the number of application filings did not occur until the latter part of March 2005.   About177
84 percent of the mailbox filings were applications owned by foreign (i.e., non-Indian) entities.178
These mailbox applications claimed then-unpatentable “substances intended for use, or capable of
being used, as food or medicine or drug, or . . . relating to substances prepared or produced by
chemical processes . . . .”   Notwithstanding their exclusion from patentability until after January179
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2005 (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi) (2005), at 172, 173 (“Annexe”).
 See id. at § 5(2).180
 See id. at §§ 24A-24F.  Chapter IVA, titled “Exclusive Marketing Rights,” was181
inserted into the Patents Act, 1970 by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999, § 3 (made
retroactively effective to Jan. 1, 1995), and repealed therefrom by the Patents (Amendment) Act,
2005, § 21 (effective Jan. 1, 2005).  See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005), as reprinted in
UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED BY THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005
(Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi) (2005), at 19 (reproducing repealed provisions of
Chapter IVA) & 19 n.2.  
Section 24A of Chapter IVA (now repealed) provided that the Controller would not refer
mailbox applications to an examiner for the making of an examination report in accordance with
Section 12(1) (“Examination of application”), as would normally be the case where a patent
applicant has filed a request for examination, see India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11B(1)
(providing that “[n]o application for a patent shall be examined unless the applicant or any other
interested person makes a request in the prescribed manner for such examination within the
prescribed period”), until December 31, 2004.  See India Patents Act, 1970 (2002) § 24A(1), as
reprinted in UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED BY THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT)
ACT, 2005 (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi) (2005), at 176 (“Annexe”).  See also
India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11B(3) (providing that “[i]n case of an application in respect of
a claim for a patent filed under sub-section (2) of section 5 before the 1  day of January, 2005 ast
request for its examination shall be made in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed
period by the applicant or any other interested person.”).  Rather, the mailbox applications
remained on hold, having been assigned a filing date, to be taken up for substantive examination
on or after January 1, 2005. 
 Weekly issues of the Official Journal published in 2005 are available at182
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/patent_journal_2005.htm. 
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1, 2005, applications claiming such substances were permitted to be filed under what was then
Section 5(2) of India’s Patents Act,  and were dealt with under special provisions set forth in the180
Act’s Chapter IVA (now repealed).181
Although no information concerning individual mailbox applications was published by the
Indian Patent Office during the ten-year TRIPS transition period, one-page summaries of filing data
for each application began to be published in the on-line Official Journal during January 2005.   As182
of June 30, 2006, after the new pharmaceutical product patents regime has been in operation for its
first eighteen months, a total of approximately 6,660 mailbox application summaries have been
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 A search of the Official Journal of the Patent Office, available at183
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/patent_journal_2005.htm (for 2005) and
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/patent_journal_2006.htm (for 2006),
indicates that the following numbers of mailbox application abstracts have been published in the
first eighteen months of India’s pharmaceutical product patents regime:
Official Journal Number of Mailbox Application
Publication Month Summaries Published
Jan. 2005 40
Feb. 2005 222
Mar. 2005 4,982 *
Apr. 2005 240
May 2005 8
June 2005 39
July 2005 156
Aug. 2005 56
Sept. 2005 105
Oct. 2005 83
Nov. 2005 58
Dec. 2005 92
Jan. 2006 50
Feb. 2006 45
Mar. 2006 113
Apr. 2006 112
May 2006 177
June 2006 82
Total (Jan. 2005 - June 2006) 6,660
Mailbox application summaries were identified from the Official Journal records as those bearing
the legends “Filed U/S [Under Section] 5(2) before The Patents (Amendment) Ordinance,
2004: YES” or “Filed U/S 5(2) before the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005: YES” or “Filed U/s.
5(2): YES.”  All Official Journals published between January 21, 2005 and February 4, 2005 are
composed of scanned images of publication data that required manual searching, rather than
computer-searchable text fields.   
* The total number of mailbox application summaries published in March 2005 is
incomplete because Volume IX (out of Volumes I-X) from the Mar. 4, 2005 “Special Issue” of
the Official Journal is missing from the Indian Patent Office’s website.  See
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/pat_arch_040305/mumbai_wto_volume.htm (last
visited Aug. 5, 2006) (error message stating that “the page cannot be found”).
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published,  representing about 75 percent of total of 8,926 mailbox applications filed.  Currently the183
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 Interview with K.S. Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, in New184
Delhi, India (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author); see also India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005)
§ 24B(2)(i) (providing that “[a] request for examination of application for patent filed under sub-
rule (1) shall be taken up for examination in the order in which the request is filed”).  Mailbox
applications for which no request for examination was filed by the end of 2005 were dropped. 
See Interview with K.S. Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, in New Delhi, India
(Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author);  see also India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005)
§ 24B(1)(ii) (providing that “[t]he period within which the request for examination under
subsection (3) of section 11B [“Request for examination” for applications claiming subject matter
under § 5(2) of the Patents Act; i.e., mailbox applications] to be made shall be thirty-six months
from the date of priority or from the date of filing of the application or twelve months from the 1st
day of January, 2005").  Requests for examination of mailbox applications have in most cases
been filed prior to publication of the application, in contrast with the procedure for regular (i.e.,
non-mailbox) applications.  Compare India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005) § 24B(1)(i) (providing
that “[a] request for examination under section 11B shall be made in Form 18 after the publication
of the application but within thirty-six months from the date of priority of the application or from
the date of filing of the application, whichever is earlier”) (emphasis added).  
Explanatory Note Concerning Patents Rules: The “principal rules” for the Indian patent
system are codified as India Patents Rules, 2003, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_re_03.pdf.  Since their promulgation in 2003 the
principal rules have been amended in 2005 and again in 2006.  The 2005 amendments are set forth
as the India Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2005, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/The%20Patents%20(Amendments)%20Rules%202005%20(E
NGLISH).pdf.  The 2006 amendments are set forth as the India Patents (Amendments) Rules,
2006, available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_rules_2006.pdf.  The Indian Patent
Office has not published to date an official consolidated version of the Patents Rules (i.e., a
version showing the 2003 principal rules as modified with all subsequent amendments).  In order
to determine the current language of a particular rule, one must read the 2003 principal rule and
then check both the 2005 and 2006 amending acts to see if that language has been amended.  In
this article, the Patents Rules as amended in 2005 will hereafter be referred to as “India Patents
Rules, 2003 (2005).”  A hard-copy version of the India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005) is reprinted in
UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED BY THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005
(Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi) (2005), at 85-157, and that version will be cited
herein.  The Patents Rules as further amended in 2006 will hereafter be referred to as “India
Patents Rules, 2003 (2006).”  
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mailbox applications are being taken up for examination in order of the dates on which their owners
(or other interested persons) previously filed requests for examination.  In November 2005, Indian184
Patent Office officials reported a backlog of “about four months” for examination of mailbox
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 Interview with K.S. Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, in New185
Delhi, India (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author).
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 21 (providing that “Chapter IVA [§§24A-186
24F] of the principal Act shall be omitted”).
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 68 n.18 (citing information obtained from the Office187
of the Controller of Patents and Designs in Calcutta that as of August 2004, only 13 EMR
applications had been filed).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2002) § 24B(1).188
 These requirements are derived from TRIPS Art. 70.9, which provides that “[w]here a189
product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in accordance with paragraph 8(a) [of
Art. 70], exclusive marketing rights shall be granted, notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI,
for a period of five years after obtaining marketing approval in that Member or until a product
patent is granted or rejected in that Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that,
subsequent to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has been filed and
a patent granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval obtained in such
other Member.”
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applications.   The framework for filing mailbox applications, as a creature of the TRIPS transition185
period that ended for India on December 31, 2004, is now obsolete, and those provisions have been
repealed from India’s current Patents Act.186
A handful of those who filed mailbox applications during the TRIPS transition period took
the additional step of seeking EMRs for their inventions.   If granted, an EMR would convey the187
exclusive right to sell or distribute the invention in India for a period of five years from the grant of
the EMR, until a patent was granted from the mailbox application, or until the mailbox application
was finally rejected, whichever was earlier.   Thus, the eventual grant of a patent on a mailbox188
application also extinguished any corresponding EMR.  An EMR was available only for those
inventions claimed in mailbox applications that further satisfied the following elaborate set of
requirements:    189
(1) an examination by the Indian Patent Office had concluded that the
invention did not fall within any of the categories of subject matter considered not to
be inventions under Section 3 of the India Patents Act (including, for example, the
evergreening prohibition of Section 3(d)), nor within the scope of the Act’s Section 4
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 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2002) § 24A(1).190
  See id. at § 24B(1)(a).191
 See id.192
 See id.193
  See id. at § 24B(1).194
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 68 n.18 (citing information obtained from the Office195
of the Controller of Patents and Designs in Calcutta that as of August 2004, only thirteen EMR
applications had been filed); N.R. Subbaram, Grant of Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMR) Under
the Patents Act [19]70: Issues & Concerns, in Patentmatics.org (Publication Archives, Oct.
2004), available at http://www.patentmatics.org/pub2004/pub10j.doc (noting that as of Oct.
2004, “17 [EMR] applications have been filed, out of which, 4 EMR have been granted, 4 have
been rejected and the remaining 9 are pending.”).
 For example, Eli Lilly’s Cialis brand erectile dysfunction drug tadalafil was the subject196
of a granted EMR, but enforcement of the EMR was stayed by the Indian courts.  E-mail from
Donald L. Corneglio, attorney for Eli Lilly Corp. (Jan. 20, 2006) (on file with author);  see also
P.T. Jyothi Datta, Eli Lilly’s Exclusive Marketing Right Under Legal Cloud, THE HINDU
BUSINESS LINE, Sept. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/09/09/stories/2004090901240400.htm (describing
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prohibition on patenting inventions relating to atomic energy;190
(2) the mailbox/EMR applicant had filed a patent application for the same
invention, claiming the “identical article or substance” in a “convention country” on
or after January 1, 1995;191
(3) the mailbox/EMR applicant had been granted a patent by the convention
country on or after the date it filed its mailbox application in India;192
(4) the convention country had granted “approval to sell or distribute the
article or substance” in the convention country on the basis of “appropriate tests”
conducted in the convention country on or after January 1, 1995;  and193
(5) the Central Government of India had granted approval to sell or distribute
the article in India.   194
Perhaps because of the complexity of these requirements, less then twenty mailbox applicants sought
EMRs,  and even fewer have successfully enforced them.   195 196
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petition of Ajanta Pharma for stay of EMR on Cialis and Calcutta High Court order granting same
in late August 2005). 
The Indian courts may be inclined to treat EMRs granted to Indian companies more
favorably, however.  The Madras High Court in November 2005 reversed the lower court and
reinstated EMR holder Wockhardt’s interim injunction against Hetero, manufacturer of an
infringing nadifloxacin 1% cream.  See Wockhardt Ltd. v. Hetero Drugs Ltd., O.S.A. Nos. 232,
233 and 234 of 2005 (Mad. 2005), available at http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=5606.  
 India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (No. 38 of 2002) (June 25, 2002), available at197
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patentg.pdf.
 As required by TRIPS Art. 33.198
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, § 27 (amending section 53(1) of principal199
Act to provide that “the term of every patent granted, after the commencement of the Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2002, and the term of every patent which has not expired and has not ceased
to have effect, on the date of such commencement, under this Act, shall be twenty years from the
date of filing of the application for patent”).  For PCT applications designating India, the patent
will expire twenty years after the PCT international filing date.  See India Patents Act, 1970
(2005) § 53(1) (Explanation).  
 India Patents Act, 1970, at § 53(a) (providing that “in respect of an invention claiming200
the method or process of manufacture of a substance, where the substance is intended for use, or
is capable of being used, as food or as a medicine or drug, be five years from the date of sealing of
the patent, or seven years from the date of the patent whichever period is shorter”). 
The “date of the patent” was apparently the date on which the complete specification had
been filed.  See India Patents Act, 1970, at § 45(1).
 Id. at § 53(b).  201
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3.  The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002
The second of the three amending acts in the evolution of India’s patent laws towards TRIPS
compliance was the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, which took effect June 25, 2002.   The 2002197
Act implemented a number of important changes, but most significant was the extension of patent
term to twenty years.   The 2002 Act amended the principal Act so as provide that the term of all198
Indian patents would henceforth expire twenty years after their application filing date.   Prior to this199
amendment, Indian process patents lasted only for the shorter of five (5) years from sealing or seven
(7) years from the date of the patent,  while the term of all other types of patents (e.g., mechanical200
devices) was fourteen (14) years from the date of the patent.  201
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 See World Intellectual Property Organization, About WIPO, available at202
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
 See TRIPS Art. 2.1 (providing that “[i]n respect of Parts II, III and IV of this203
Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris
Convention (1967).”).
 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database–Contracting204
Parties–Paris Convention–India–Details, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=246C (last visited Aug. 4, 2006) (noting
India’s accession to the 1967 Stockholm Act version of the Paris Convention on Sept. 7, 1998,
and the entry into force of that Act in India on December 7, 1998). 
 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property Art. 2. 205
 See id. at Art. 4.206
 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database–Contracting207
Parties–PCT–India–Details, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=500C (last visited Aug. 4, 2006) (noting
India’s accession to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) on September 7, 1998, and the entry
into force of the PCT in India on December 7, 1998).
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Another notable aspect of the 2002 amendments was formal recognition in India’s Patents Act
of the nation’s accession to two leading international intellectual property treaties, both administered
by the United Nations-affiliated World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).   As required202
by TRIPS,  India brought its laws into compliance with the provisions of the Paris Convention for203
the Protection of Industrial Property, which entered into force in India on December 7, 1998.   India204
henceforth had to abide by inter alia the Convention’s national treatment principle, which forbids
discriminatory treatment of foreign applicants,  as well as its right of priority, which allows205
foreigners who have previously filed an application for patent in their home countries a twelve-month
priority period in which to file an application directed to the same invention in India while retaining
the benefit of their earlier home country filing date.   Also with effect from December 7, 1998, India206
joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).   As a PCT signatory, India had to begin accepting207
national phase filings of international applications originally filed abroad under the PCT and
designating India; previously patent applications could only be filed directly with the Indian Patent
Office.  Accordingly, the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, included numerous provisions formally
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, §§ 3(b) (adding definition of “convention208
country”); 3(e) (adding definition of “international application”); 3(k) (adding definition of
“Patent Cooperation Treaty”); 6; 8(b); and 58©).
 See Part V.A.4 infra.209
 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Press Release: Exceptional Growth210
from North East Asia in Record Year for International Patent Filings (Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2006/wipo_pr_2006_436.html.  Indian nationals filed 648 PCT
international applications in 2005, as compared to 4,747 for the Republic of Korea and 2,452 for
China.  See id.  India was followed by Singapore (428), South Africa (336), Brazil (283), and
Mexico (136).  International applications received from developing countries accounted for 6.7%
of all PCT international applications filed in 2005.  See id.  
Two Indian organizations were listed among the top 10 users of the PCT from developing
countries in 2005: the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and Ranbaxy
Laboratories.  See id.     
PCT filings by Indian nationals have followed a generally upward trend, although with
some flattening since 2003.  Indian nationals have filed the following numbers of PCT
international applications in the past five years: 190 in the year 2000, 295 in the year 2001, 525 in
the year 2002, 764 in the year 2003, 723 in the year 2004, and 648 in the year 2005.  See id.
(table titled “PCT International Applications by Nationality of First Applicant”).  
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, § 3(f).211
 See id. at § 4.212
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integrating Paris Convention and PCT terminology and provisions into the framework of India’s
principal Act.   208
Today (as of 2006), about sixty percent of patent applications received by the Indian Patent
Office are PCT national phase filings; almost all of these are foreign-owned.   India’s membership209
in the PCT is not a benefit solely for foreigners, however; India’s own citizens are filing international
applications under the PCT in growing numbers.  In 2005 India was ranked third highest (following
the Republic of Korea and China) among the world’s developing countries in the number of PCT
international applications filed by its nationals.210
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, implemented a myriad of other  changes intended to
bring India’s patents law into accord with the TRIPS Agreement, including new definitions of
“invention” and “inventive step,”  new exclusions from patentable subject matter,  a new burden211 212
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 See id. at § 43.213
 See id. at § 39.214
 Narayan Kulkarni, India Enters Product Patent Regime, BIOSPECTRUM (Jan. 6, 2005),215
available at http://www.biospectrumindia.com/archive/articledetail.asp?arid=65747&mode=disp
(quoting Commerce Minister Kamal Nath).
 India’s Choice, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at 20 (editorial).  216
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of proof provision for cases of process patent infringement,  and a revised compulsory licensing213
framework.   Each of these changes is discussed in further detail in Part IV, infra, in the context of214
a comprehensive analysis and critique of the most significant provisions in India’s current law, the
Patents Act, 1970 (2005).     
4.  The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005
The final step in India’s implementation of the changes needed to bring its patent law into
compliance with the WTO TRIPS Agreement was the most traumatic for the country.  Effective
January 1, 2005, India would have to provide full recognition of patent-eligibility for pharmaceutical
products (i.e., substances capable of use as medicine or food).  In practical terms, this meant that any
new patent application filed in the Indian Patent Office on or after January 1, 2005 and claiming a
pharmaceutical product would need to be substantively examined for patentability, in addition to the
approximately 9,000 mailbox applications filed between 1995-2004 that already awaited examination.
In order to timely implement the necessary changes in the face of widespread political
disagreement about the value of pharmaceutical product patent protection, India’s President signed
the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004, on December 26, 2004.  Government officials described
the Ordinance as “an interim measure to fulfill [India’s] legal obligations within the stipulated time.”215
Commentators around the world criticized its provisions as failing to balance the public’s need for
access to medicines against the rights of patent owners.  A New York Times editorial observed that
“[h]eavily influenced by multinational and Indian drug makers eager to sell patented medicines to
India’s huge middle class, the decree is so tilted toward the pharmaceutical industry that it does not
even take advantage of rights countries enjoy under the W.T.O. to protect public health.”  216
Following the Ordinance’s promulgation, a three-month maelstrom of intense public debate
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See Better Now, But . . ., BUSINESS STANDARD, Mar. 24, 2005, at 9 (editorial),217
available at http://www.westlaw.com (2005 WLNR 4569166) (observing that “[i]n the last few
weeks, criticism of the proposed law had begun to mount, and it was clear that the critics (which
included the Left parties) had a point.  The main opposition, in the form of the NDA [National
Democratic Alliance, which includes the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)], had also come round to
the view that the Bill could not be passed in its original form, though it was the NDA government
that first mooted the Bill.  So the government had no choice other than to listen to the critics,
since without support from the NDA or the Left, the Bill would have been defeated.”).  See also
Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New Delhi, India
(Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author) (describing “[r]un-up to recognition of product
patent protection” in India as “quite a turmoil”).
 Available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.218
 Id.219
 Patently Unclear: Intellectual Property in India, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005.220
 Cf. Sreenivasaro Vepachedu and Martha Rumore, Patent Protection and the221
Pharmaceutical Industry in the Indian Union, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY (Oct. 2004), at
46 (observing that “[a]s a thriving democracy with a multiparty system, where political coalitions
are the order of the day, it is a daunting task to legislate any laws that are perceived as anti-people
or anti-poor.”).
 Deccan Herald 4.4.2005222
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and last-minute political compromises ultimately led to significantly revised legislation,  which was217
enacted April 5, 2005, as the Patents (Amendments) Act, 2005.   In 2005, no political party had218
majority power in India; the nation’s several national parties were aligned in three shifting alliances:
one dominated by the Congress Party (the “mainstream” party of Ghandi and Nehru, of which Prime
Minister Singh is a member), another by the Bharatiya Janata Party (or “BJP,” the Hindu nationalist
party), and a third by the “Left” (Communist) parties.  Shortly after the Ordinance was219
promulgated, the Left alliance announced that it would oppose the legislation when it came up for
scheduled debate in the Indian Parliament in February 2005.   The Left viewed the legislation as220
harmful to India’s poor.221
In order to appease the Left parties, the ruling Congress Party had to make last-minute
amendments on ten out of twelve points “as demanded by the Left.”   Among other changes, these222
amendments “excluded embedded software from the ambit of the product patent regime and curbed
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 Better Now, But . . ., BUSINESS STANDARD, Mar. 24, 2005, at 9 (editorial), available at223
http://www.westlaw.com (2005 WLNR 4569166).  Both of these provisions is detailed in Part
IV, infra.
 See Part IV.D.1 infra for a complete description of India’s pre-grant opposition224
procedure.
 See India Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004, § 23 (substituting a new section225
25(1) into the principal Act, which would have limited the grounds for pre-grant opposition to
only “(a) patentability including novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability, or (b) non-
disclosure or wrongful mentioning in complete specification, source and geographical origin of
biological material used in the invention and anticipation of invention by the knowledge, oral or
otherwise available within any local or indigenous community in India or elsewhere . . .”). 
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(1) (enumerating grounds (a) through (k)).226
 See India Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004, § 23 (substituting new section 25(2)227
into the principal Act, which would have provided that “[n]otwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1), the person making a representation referred to in that sub-section shall not
become a party to any proceedings under this Act only for the reason that he has made such
representation”).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(1) (not including any estoppel provision).228
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 1(2) (providing that with minor229
exceptions, “the remaining provisions of this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the
1  day of January, 2005.”).st
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the evergreening of patents by clarifying the concept of patentability in unmistakable terms.”   The223
amendments also encompassed pre-grant opposition, a procedure within the Patent Office allowing
third party challenges to pending applications.   The Ordinance would have narrowed the grounds224
on which pre-grant opposition could be based;  a more expansive scope of grounds for pre-grant225
opposition was restored in the amended legislation.   The Ordinance would also have denied any226
person who filed a pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act the right of becoming
a party to any further proceedings under the Act;  this restriction was deleted in the Patent227
(Amendments) Act, 2005.228
 Once the 2005 amendments were enacted in April 2005 (with retroactive effect from
January 1, 2005 ), India’s patents law stood in its current form (referred to herein as the “Patents229
Act, 1970 (2005)”).  No further amendments to the Act have been promulgated as of July 2006,
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See India Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2006 (effective May 5, 2006), available at230
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_rules_2006.pdf.  Applicable rule changes are further
discussed in Part IV, infra.  
 See Interview with Ranjit Shahani, Managing Director, Novartis India, in Mumbai,231
India (Nov. 23, 2005) (transcript on file with author) (observing that “[p]atent law is just one part
of a bigger picture; the canvas is much bigger, colorful, and more controversial than just that.”).
 See generally ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:232
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
 See Part II.C.4 supra.233
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although some of the implementing Patents Rules have changed.   Specific provisions of the Act and230
Rules are further examined and critiqued in Part IV infra.  
III.  CURRENT MILIEU:  INDIA’S “MOSAIC VIEW” OF PATENTS
This Part conveys the socio-economic backstory in which India’s new pharmaceutical product
patent system was implemented and the milieu in which it now must function.   The ongoing debate231
in the United States over patent law reform, “patent trolls,” the viability of business method patents,
and the like  simply pales in comparison to the level of public discourse, debate and controversy in232
India concerning the new patents regime.  Although one might distill the Indian debate over
strengthened patent protection as a purely bilateral fight between research-based MNCs and Indian
generic drug manufacturers, the true picture is significantly more complex and defies easy labeling.
Any analysis of India’s patent system must confront it through a mosaic lens as the product of a
multitude of powerful influences.  The political compromises required by India’s complex multi-party
system, as discussed above, are a key example.   Other important influences include the unique233
structure of India’s pharmaceutical sector, the nation’s formidable demographics, the precarious
nature of its health care system, and the government’s imposition of price controls for essential drugs.
Each factor is discussed below.
A.  Fragmented Pharmaceutical Sector
India’s pharmaceutical sector is highly fragmented in its structure, and that structural diversity
has fundamentally contributed to a great diversity of opinion about strengthened patent protection.
At the highest level of generality, the Indian pharmaceutical industry comprises two groups: the
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 See Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New234
Delhi, India (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author) (describing industry structure).
 See Generic Pharmaceutical Association, Statistics: Our Industry, available at235
http://www.gphaonline.org/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutGenerics/Statistics/Statistics.htm (last
visited Aug. 6, 2006) (reporting that U.S. brand pharmaceutical sales for 2005 were
$229.5 billion, compared to $22.3 billion in U.S. generic pharmaceutical sales for 2005).
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 18 (Table 2.2).  This is the lowest market share for236
MNCs during the reported time period ranging from 1952 to 2004.  See id.  The MNCs’ market
share was highest in 1970.  See id.  At that time, just before India enacted its Patents Act, 1970
(effective 1972), which abolished product patent protection for pharmaceuticals, the MNCs had a
68% market share and Indian domestic companies had the remaining 32%.  See id.
MNC market share is predicted to gain slightly.  See Ernst & Young, UNVEILING INDIA’S
PHARMACEUTICAL FUTURE (2005), at 10, available at
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/India/HS_INDIA/$file/INDIA.pdf (noting that “[t]oday,
multinational pharma companies have a domestic market share of about 20 percent. . . .  By 2007,
they are expected to comprise about 25 percent of the market.”).  
 Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 17-18.237
 See, e.g., Novartis AG v. Adarsh Pharma, 2004 (29) PTC 108, 126 (Mad[ras]) (citing238
affidavit revealing that “the second plaintiff [Novartis India] imports the drugs manufactured by
the first plaintiff [Novartis AG of Switzerland] for distribution in India”).
 Pharmaceuticals in India, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1996, at 60.239
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multinational corporations (MNCs) and the domestic (entirely Indian-owned) companies,  each of234
which is discussed below.  India’s pharmaceutical market structure is very different from the U.S.,
where the multi-national research-based pharmaceutical manufacturers command a larger market
share than generic drug manufacturers.   In India, MNCs held only a 23% share of the Indian235
pharmaceutical market in 2004 as compared to the domestic companies’ 77% market share.   “In236
fact, India and Japan are the only two countries where the western MNCs do not dominate.”  237
1.  Multinational Corporations
Traditionally MNCs imported into India their pharmaceuticals manufactured elsewhere.238
MNCs were hesitant to manufacture in India, because they had “for many years been frustrated by
low profits, caused by government-controlled prices, lack of patent protection, restrictions on foreign
companies' activities and labour problems.”   “The weak old regime long deterred foreign firms from239
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Patently Unclear: Intellectual Property in India, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005.240
 McNeil, supra note 89, at A1 (quoting PhRMA position).  241
 Id.242
 Saritha Rai, Chief Sees Surge in G.E. Business in India, NEW YORK TIMES, May 28,243
2005, at C13 (quoting General Electric chairman Jeffrey R. Immelt’s description of India).  
 Such MNC subsidiaries can now be wholly-owned.  India’s Foreign Exchange244
Management Act of 2000 “allowed 100% foreign investment in a new or existing Indian company
in the pharmaceutical manufacturing business.”  Ragavan, supra note 87, at 299.  The lifting of
FDI restrictions in the pharmaceutical industry is part of a broader withdrawal since the mid-
1990s of policies put in place by India in the 1970s and 1980s to regulate MNCs.  See Chaudhuri,
supra note 78, at 138. 
 See Ernst & Young, supra note 236, at Exhibit 7 (titled “Top Multinational Pharmas245
with an Active Presence in India”).  
 See Novartis AG v. Adarsh Pharma, 2004 (29) PTC 108, 126 (Mad[ras]) (“the first246
plaintiff is holding 50.93% shares in the second plaintiff company, the remaining belonging to the
Indian public.”).
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setting up in India to use the country’s ample supply of educated workers to develop new
products.”   The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) organization240
took the position that India’s pre-TRIPS patents law was “‘designed to punish importers of patented
technology into India and to coerce local production.’”   The group contended that the experience241
of most U.S. drug makers in India was “‘so negative that most companies have abandoned efforts to
obtain or enforce patents in India.’”  242
Today, the strengthened patents regime in India is at least one factor (albeit among many
others) spurring MNCs to reconsider past views.  MNCs now see India as a “rising star,”  and a243
good many of the leading multi-national pharmaceutical firms now have subsidiaries in India.   These244
include Abbott Laboratories India Ltd., AstraZeneca Pharma India Ltd., Burroughs Wellcome India
Ltd., E-Merck (India) Ltd., Glaxo India Ltd., Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., Novartis India Ltd.,
Pfizer Ltd., Sanofi Aventis, Smithkline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (India) Ltd., and Wyeth Ltd.   A245
typical arrangement is exemplified by Novartis India, 51% of the shares of which are owned by parent
company Novartis AG of Switzerland (with the remainder being owned by the Indian public).   The246
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 See Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New247
Delhi, India (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author).
 Id.248
 Id.249
 Id.250
 Steve Lohr, Outsourcing is Climibing Skills Ladder, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006,251
at C1, C17.
 E-mail from William Banholzer, Corporate Vice President and Chief Technology252
Officer, Dow Chemical Company (Feb. 23, 2006) (on file with author).
 E-mail from William Banholzer, Corporate Vice President and Chief Technology253
Officer, Dow Chemical Company (Feb. 22, 2006) (on file with author).
 See id.; Lohr, supra note 251.  254
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MNCs conduct varying degrees of drug manufacturing within India.  Pfizer, for example, currently
maintains a single drug manufacturing facility near Mumbai, but also outsources manufacturing to
about twenty Indian companies.     247
Capitalizing on India’s low labor costs and skilled workforce, several MNCs are establishing
major research and development facilities in India.  For example, General Electric’s Jack Welch
Technology Center in Bangalore is the company’s largest R&D center outside the U.S.   General248
Electric is also teaming with the Indian health care company MediCity to build a medical center
outside of New Delhi, scheduled to open in 2007.   The center will house “high-end medical249
diagnostics and clinical research” as well as a “1,800-bed multispecialty hospital incorporating
alternative healing therapies.”   Dow Chemical is finishing plans for a “large installation” to conduct250
research and development in India.”   The facility will most likely support product development251
including design analysis and process engineering to support Dow’s plant design.   Although Dow252
views India’s strengthening of its patent system as an important consideration in its decision to build
in India,  the primary reasons for the move include India’s swift economic growth, the advantages253
of being in India when products need to be tailored for local conditions, and the skills of Indian
scientists.254
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 The IPA’s website is available at http://www.ipapharma.org/.255
 The OPPI’s website is available at http://www.indiaoppi.com/.256
 Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India, Pharmaceutical Industry in India,257
available at http://www.indiaoppi.com/pharmindindia.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2005).
 PhRMA Press Release, Mar. 23, 2005, available at258
http://www.phrma.org/news_room/press_releases/phrma_welcomes_passage_of_patent_bill_in_in
dia/.
 See TRIPS Art. 39.3 (providing that “Members, when requiring, as a condition of259
approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use.  In addition,
Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public,
or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.”).
For a contrary reading of TRIPS, see Carlos M. Correa, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
1, 49 (2001) (explaining that “Article 39.3 of TRIPs obliges countries to protect confidential data
. . . submitted for the registration of new chemical entities, only if their generation involved a
‘considerable effort.’  Article 39.3, however, does not create exclusive rights on such data. . . The
only protection arguably conferred under TRIPs is against ‘dishonest’ commercial practices in the
framework of unfair competition law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2006 Special 301 Report: Priority260
Watch List, at 13, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Re
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The research-based MNCs led the call for stronger patent protection in India.  Two leading
trade groups for manufacturers of branded drugs, the Indian Pharmaceutical Association (IPA)  and255
the Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI),  strongly supported the TRIPS-256
required reforms.  OPPI took the position that “[d]ecisions on fresh investment, focus on R&D,
Clinical Trials and Productive Collaboration between Indian and International companies will all take
place only if there is an assured climate of world class patent protection.”   The U.S.-based PhRMA257
declared that “[p]atent protection for pharmaceutical products will provide India’s scientists with
incentives to discover and develop new life-saving drugs.”  258
In parallel with their calls for stronger patent protection, MNCs operating in India also
advocated the implementation of stronger, U.S.-style data protection laws.  The MNCs interpret the
TRIPS Agreement as requiring this form of data exclusivity,  and the U.S. government concurs.259 260
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view/asset_upload_file353_9337.pdf (stating that  “[t]he United States urges India to improve its
IPR regime by providing . . . protection against unfair commercial use of undisclosed test and
other data submitted by pharmaceutical companies seeking marketing approval for their
products.”).
 See Thomas, supra note 160, at 625 (stating that “national governments require261
sponsors of new drugs to submit preclinical, clinical, manufacturing, and other data that evidences
their safety and efficacy”).
 In the U.S., the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,262
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), popularly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, currently
provides five-year data exclusivity for new molecular entities (NMEs).  See 21 U.S.C.
355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006).  
For views of Indian pharmaceutical officials advocating the need for greater data
protection, see Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New
Delhi, India (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author); Interview with Ranjit Shahani,
Managing Director, Novartis India, in Mumbai, India (Nov. 23, 2005) (transcript on file with
author); Interview with Dr. Swati Piramal, Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India (Nov.
24, 2005) (transcript on file with author). 
The Indian generic companies counter that stronger data protection laws could in some
cases facilitate patent evergreening.  See Milind Antani and Prashant Iyengar, Towards a Law on
Data Exclusivity, PHARMABIZ.COM, Jan. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.pharmabiz.com/article/detnews.asp?articleid=25566&sectionid=46 (reporting
concerns of Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance about patent evergreening through data protection). 
For example, consider a country that has adopted a five-year term of data exclusivity.  If due to
regulatory approval delays a patented drug did not enter the market until the 17  year of itsth
twenty-year patent term, data exclusivity would “effectively extend the patent to 17 plus five
equaling 22 years.”  Id.  Government supporters also contend that even if the generic
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The data in question are the safety and efficacy data, derived from costly clinical trials, that MNCs
must submit to government regulators when seeking approval to market and sell new drugs.   In261
order to market a generic version of the same drug, a generic competitor must submit data showing
bio-equivalency with the new drug.  Although a generic manufacturer would not be able to legally
make and sell a generic equivalent of a patented drug before the patent had expired, the generic firm
with  freedom to rely on the innovator’s data would be in a position to seek regulatory approval early
enough to facilitate market entry immediately upon the patent’s expiration.  Viewing this as an unfair
advantage, the MNCs contend that generic manufacturers should not be allowed to copy and use their
data for some period of time; for example, during the first five years after the data is published, as in
the U.S.   As of July 2006, the Indian government had not yet implemented the data exclusivity laws262
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
manufacturers are granted compulsory licenses to make and sell patented medicines, data
exclusivity laws would prevent them from obtaining marketing approval during the time period in
which data exclusivity is in operation.  See Sebastian PT, Joshi Cautions Government on Data
Exclusivity, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, June 17, 2006, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=130840.  
 See id. (citing letter of BJP leader Murli Manohar Joshi to Prime Minister Singh,263
asserting that certain government ministries are “on the verge of conceding to MNCs’ demand of
data exclusivity”).
 See Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New264
Delhi, India (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author) (describing industry structure).
 Ernst & Young, supra note 236, at 6 (Exhibit 2).  Sales figures, in U.S. $ Millions,265
were:
Ranbaxy 823.93 (Dec. 2004 fiscal year end)
Cipla 484.72 (Mar. 2005 fiscal year end)
Dr. Reddy’s 346.16 (Mar. 2005 fiscal year end)
Id.  
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 318-19.  Cipla’s position may be changing, however. 266
The company’s chairman describes it as “cooperat[ing] with all companies in whatever way
possible for mutual interest.”  E-mail from Dr. Yusuf K. Hamied, Chairman and Managing
Director, Cipla Ltd., India (Feb. 3, 2006) (on file with author) (rejecting as inaccurate
Chaudhuri’s assertion that “as a matter of policy, [Cipla] does not collaborate with the MNCs at
any level”).  
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sought by the MNCs, although press reports suggest that such action may be imminent.        263
2.  Domestic Companies
The wholly Indian-owned domestic pharmaceutical sector is itself highly fragmented.  A
number of large indigenous companies engage in some original research and development along with
generic drug manufacturing, while hundreds of other, smaller firms subsist exclusively on reverse-
engineering drugs that are still under patent outside of India as well as those off-patent.264
The top three Indian pharmaceutical firms (in terms of sales reported for 2004) are Ranbaxy
Laboratories Ltd., Cipla Ltd., and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. (DRL).   Although they compete265
against MNCs in the global generics market, Ranbaxy and DRL also engage in research partnerships
and collaborations with the MNCs; Cipla thus far does not.   These Indian majors are also266
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., Corporate Website, Research and Development, available at267
http://www.ranbaxy.com/rnd.htm.
 Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., Ranbaxy World (Aug. 2005), at 7, available at268
http://www.ranbaxy.com/newsroom/rworld_aug05/rworld_2005.pdf (newsletter quoting
Ranbaxy’s President, Pharmaceuticals and Executive Director, Malvinder Mohan Singh, as stating
that “Ranbaxy is one of the largest spender[s] on R&D (7% of sales in 2004) and has one of the
largest state-of-the-art R&D infrastructure in India”).
 DR. REDDY’S LABORATORIES LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005-06, at 38, available at269
http://www.drreddys.com/investors/pdf/annualreport2006.pdf (reporting in Table 5 total revenues
for FY 2005-06 of 24,267 million Rs. and R&D expenses of 2,153 million Rs.).  Dr. Reddy’s had
seven new chemical entities in development in FY 2005-06, with “four in clinical development and
three in the pre-clinical stages.”  Id. at 15.
 Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 44.270
 Id. at 182.271
 See generally Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 195-208 (describing current status of Indian272
exporters in the U.S. generics market and future export opportunities in the U.S.)
 See RANBAXY LABS. LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 19, available at273
http://www.ranbaxy.com/irannualreports.asp.
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developing significant independent R&D capabilities.  Ranbaxy, which has adopted a mission
statement emphasizing the company’s goal of becoming a “research-based international
pharmaceutical [c]ompany,”  spent seven percent of its annual revenues for 2004 on research and267
development.   For fiscal year 2005-06, DRL expended almost nine percent of its revenues on268
research and development.    269
India has been a net exporter of drugs since 1988-89,  with the exporting done mainly by270
domestic companies rather than MNCs.   The U.S. is the top export target market for the Indian-271
owned majors.   In 2004, for example, Ranbaxy made $426 million in sales in the U.S. market as272
compared to $217 million sales in India.   One way in which the Indian majors attempt to increase273
their share of the U.S. generics market is through aggressively challenging the validity of MNC-
owned pharmaceutical patents in the U.S. courts.  Ranbaxy and DRL are particularly active in
attacking U.S. patents through filing Abbreviated new Drug Applications (ANDAs) with Paragraph
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 An ANDA may include a “paragraph IV certification” asserting that the pharmaceutical274
patent in question is invalid or will not be infringed by the ANDA applicant’s product.  See 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006).
 The Indian generics’ strategy was quite successful initially.  For example, Dr. Reddy’s275
introduced its generic version of Eli Lilly’s blockbuster antidepressant Prozac in the U.S. in 2001
after successfully challenging Lilly’s patent, see Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 202-03, and
Ranbaxy had similar success in 2002 with a generic version of GlaxoSmithKline’s antibiotic
Ceftin.  See Indian Drug Maker Says It Will Keep Attacking Patents Despite Pfizer Loss, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at C7.  
Since those early triumphs, however, no Indian company has succeeded in a Paragraph IV
challenge to a U.S. pharmaceutical patent, although many have made attempts.  See Ragavan,
supra note 87, at 301 (observing that Indian companies in 2004 “filed 33% of the global filings of
drug master files [DMFs] and abbreviated new drug applications [ANDAs] with the United States
Food and Drug Administration [FDA].”).  Filing a DMF with the U.S. FDA is required in order to
obtain permission to sell bulk drugs in the U.S.  See Vandana Gombar, Indian Firms Queue Up
for $20-BN US Drug Generics, BUSINESS STANDARD, May 8, 2006, available at
http://www.business-standard.com/common/storypage.php?leftnm=lmnu2&subLeft=1&autono=9
0235&tab=r.  In 2006, “seven of the top 10 DMF filers at the US FDA are Indian.”  Id.
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 202-03.276
 See Indian Drug Maker Says It Will Keep Attacking Patents Despite Pfizer Loss, The277
New York Times, Dec. 20, 2005, at C7 (reporting that “India’s leading drug companies are
aggressively challenging patents because they are having trouble making much money by simply
selling generic versions of drugs whose patents have already expired.  The United States–their
primary market–is becoming particularly price-competitive among generics.”)
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 214.278
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IV certifications  in the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.   Because the first generic firm to274 275
successfully challenge a pharmaceutical patent gains an 180-day period of U.S. marketing exclusivity,
this litigation strategy is considered high-risk/high-reward.   Such risk-taking is seen as a justified276
counter-measure against growing competition among generic suppliers in the U.S. market.  Even as
more and more blockbuster drugs go off-patent and become freely copyable, the number of generic
manufacturers competing for the U.S. market is expanding.   Indian generic drug manufacturers277
compete today not only against U.S. generic firms (such as Watson, Barr, and Mylan), but also
generic firms based in Israel (e.g., Teva), China, Italy, and a number of other countries.278
In the next tier of major Indian-owned pharmaceutical companies are Wockhardt Ltd.,
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 See Ernst & Young, supra note 236, at 6 (Exhibit 2) (based on sales reported at end of279
FY 2005). 
 Nicholas Piramal, About Us, available at http://www.nicholaspiramal.com/aboutus.htm280
(last visited Apr. 29, 2006) (touting company’s “proven commitment to IPR”),
 See Interview with Dr. Swati Piramal, Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India281
(Nov. 24, 2005) (transcript on file with author). 
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 15 & 15-16 n.2.282
 See id.283
 For example, more than 75% of Indian bulk drug production is exported.  See id. at 47.284
 Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 182.285
 See id. at 180-81.286
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Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Lupin Ltd., and Cadila Healthcare
Ltd.   Of this latter group, Nicholas Piramal is uniquely positioning itself as a leader in low-cost279
R&D and eschews any generic drug manufacturing.  Nicholas Piramal touts its respect for intellectual
property  and does not join Ranbaxy and DRL in challenging U.S. pharmaceutical patents.280
According to Nicholas Piramal officials, the company would prefer to partner with the U.S. firms and
join with them in collaborative R&D rather than confront them in court.    281
In addition to the majors, the Indian drug manufacturing sector includes a host of smaller
domestic firms.  Many of these firms produce primarily bulk drugs; i.e., the active ingredients present
in medicines.   A smaller number of firms produce formulations; i.e., the processing of bulk drugs282
into finished dosage forms such as tablets and capsules.   As is the case for the majors, the export283
market is the mainstay of these smaller firms,  but most export only to markets characterized as284
“unregulated.”   Such markets have little or no requirements for registration and quality inspection,285
and include countries such as Vietnam, Syria, Jordan, Brazil, China, Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt.286
Of the total exports of bulk drugs and formulations from India in 2001-02, an estimated 62% were
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See id. at 182 (Table 6.1).  287
 See id.288
 See id. at 180-81.289
 Hamied, supra note 2, at 3. 290
 Hamied, supra note 2, at 6.  Cipla appears to be adopting a more nuanced stance,291
however, explaining its position as one that is not opposed to the notion of rewarding innovation
but that is nevertheless strongly critical of patent-based monopolies in need-based areas such as
health and food.  See id. at 1.  Doctor Hamied maintains that appropriate rewards and incentives
can be given, while maintaining the public’s access to medicines, through “an automatic license of
right with a suitable royalty payment on net[] sales to the innovator.”  Id. at 7 (and also noting
that Canada, a developed country, used this framework from 1969 to 1992).  
Cipla is not opposed to patents per se, and in fact the company owns a number of patents. 
E-mail from Dr. Yusuf K. Hamied, Chairman and Managing Director, Cipla Ltd., India (Feb. 6,
2006) (on file with author).  Cipla’s patents do not claim new chemical entities, however; rather,
they are directed to drug delivery systems, processes, and the like.  See id.; see also U.S. Patent
No. 6,903,228, titled “Preparation of phthalanes” (issued June 7, 2005); and U.S. Patent No.
5,929,030, titled “Pharmaceutical compositions” (issued July 27, 1999).  Cipla obtains these
patents for essentially defensive reasons.  See E-mail from Dr. Yusuf K. Hamied, Chairman and
Managing Director, Cipla Ltd., India (Feb. 6, 2006) (on file with author) (explaining that “if we
do not patent, we may be later stopped from marketing [the] drugs in question.”).    
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to unregulated markets.   The remaining 38% of exports were to regulated markets  with higher287 288
entry barriers, including the U.S. and other North American countries, Western Europe, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand.    289
Many Indian drug manufacturing firms, large and small, vehemently opposed the recent patent
law reforms.  For example, Dr. Yusuf Hamied, the outspoken chairman of leading generic
manufacturer Cipla, declared the enactment of the Patents Act, 1970 to be “the dawn of a Golden
Age” for the Indian pharmaceutical industry,  while contrasting the 2005 introduction of290
pharmaceutical product patent protection in India as “one of the greatest predictable tragedies the
world has witnessed.”   The Indian Drug Manufacturers’ Association, a leading trade group for  the291
nation’s generic drug manufacturing firms, warned that the strengthened patents regime would have
“adverse implications for the drug industry and consumers in India.  As recently observed in
Sub-Saharan African countries, the impact of the strong product patent protection could indeed be
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 Indian Drug Manufacturers’ Association, WTO Agreement on TRIPS, available at292
http://www.idma-assn.org/ (last visited July 13, 2006).
 Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., Ranbaxy World (Aug. 2005) (newsletter), at 18 (section293
titled New Patent Regime: New Opportunities), available at
http://www.ranbaxy.com/newsroom/rworld_aug05/rworld_2005.pdf.
 Ranbaxy is an active user of the PCT international patenting mechanism.  In 2005,294
Ranbaxy was among the top ten users of the PCT from developing countries.  See World
Intellectual Property Organization, Press Release: Exceptional Growth from North East Asia in
Record Year for International Patent Filings (Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2006/wipo_pr_2006_436.html.
 RANBAXY LABS. LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 20 (table titled “Intellectual Property295
Generated”), available at http://www.ranbaxy.com/ar2005/ar2005.pdf.
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very grave, if the national patent law fails to provide for [an] effective and efficient compulsory
licence system.”292
Other Indian drug makers, primarily the major firms with significant R&D functions in
addition to generic drug manufacturing, took a more favorable stance towards enhanced patent
protection.  For example, Ranbaxy touts India’s new patents regime as one that “provides an
incentive for organizations to be innovative and promises a plethora of opportunities for forward
thinking organizations that believe in research & development.”   Ranbaxy seeks patents not only293
in India but worldwide,  filing a total of 185 patent applications during 2005.294 295
As the above comparison of views about strengthened patent protection indicates, the wide
disparity of opinion among Indian drug manufacturing firms is completely consistent with the broad
range of capabilities and expertise within the sector.  As succinctly summarized by the United
Kingdom’s Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Commission: 
In developing countries with strong generic industries, the outlook
[for stronger patent protection] is also uncertain.  On the one hand,
manufacturers of mainly generic drugs are likely to be adversely
affected by the introduction of patent protection, and also consumers
and governments who will need to pay more for drugs that receive
patent protection.  On the other hand, producers who are developing
a research capability, or who may be able to obtain licences from
multinational companies, may perceive benefits from patent
protection.  These conflicting impacts explain why the introduction of
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL296
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 37-38 (2002), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf (PDF pages 49-50).
 See Rishi Gupta, TRIPS Compliance: Dealing With the Consequences of Drug Patents297
in India, 26 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 599, 630 (2004) (citing Jean O. Lanjouw, The Introduction of
Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: “Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering”?,
4 NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (NBER)WORKING PAPER NO. 6366 (1998), at 30, available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/W6366).
 See Chandran et al., supra note 11, at 269-80.298
 See Part IV.E infra.299
 See id.300
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patent protection in India is so controversial.296
The lack of hegemony within the Indian domestic drug manufacturing sector thus exerted a significant
influence on the complexity of India’s new patent patents regime.  The sector’s diversity also
illustrates the fallacy of viewing the debate over patents in India as a purely two-sided argument
between foreign and domestic drug companies.
Some scholars have predicted that Indian drug manufacturers will face a “push, not pull”
effect of the new patent laws, such that these firms will have to increase innovative R&D activity
simply to survive in a market where they will henceforth be precluded from continuing their profitable
copying.   Although India’s enhanced patents regime will undoubtedly force some degree of change297
on the generic drug manufacturing firms, such predictions likely overstate the negative impact.  With
key U.S.  and other patents set to expire by 2009 on molecules worth an estimated $44 billion, the
generic drug market is not likely to evaporate any time soon.   Moreover, as detailed infra, the298
unique provisions of India’s new patents law guarantee that generic manufacturers can continue to
copy any pharmaceutical product already available on the Indian market prior to January 1, 2005.299
With respect to those products for which a mailbox application matures into a granted patent on or
after January 1, 2005, payment of a royalty to the patentee will be required but ongoing production
by the generic firm cannot be restrained.300
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 As of August 2006, the world population is estimated to be approximately 6.5 billion301
people.  See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clocks - POPClocks, available at
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2006).
 Nicholas Piramal corporate website, “About Us,” “Corporate Strategy,” available at 302
http://www.nicholaspiramal.com/aboutus_corstrategy.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2006).
 Zakaria, supra note 21, at 39.  See also Karina Robinson, India Slowly Opens to the303
World, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, July 15-16, 2006, at 14 (referring to “India’s
expanding middle class of 250 million to 300 million people in need of financial services.”).
 Ernst & Young, supra note 236, at 4. 304
 “Pegasys was launched in India in 2003 and the cost to a patient is about Rs 2.25 lakh305
for six months.”  Datta, Roche Gets Product Patent, supra note 9.  The Indian “lakh” refers to a
quantity of 100,000.  Thus Rs. 2.25 lakh means 225,000 rupees.  At an exchange rate of about 46
rupees per U.S. dollar as of July 13, 2006, see Yahoo Finance Currency Converter, available at
http://finance.yahoo.com/currency, 225,000 rupees converts to $4,856 in U.S. currency.  Thus a
patient’s one-year cost for Pegasys is $9,712.  This pricing of Pegasys is explained as the “total
cost includ[ing] the cost of therapy, testing, monitoring and follow-up, besides the cost of the
drug itself.  Ribavirin, another medicine used in some cases with Pegasys, is also bundled into this
package. . . .”  Datta, Roche Gets Product Patent, supra note 9 (quoting Dr. G.L. Telang,
Managing Director of Roche in India).  
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B.  Demographics, Healthcare and Market Pricing
India’s population of approximately 1.1 billion people represents one-sixth of all humanity.301
The immensity of that potential consumer demand has not escaped the attention of pharmaceutical
manufacturers.  For example, the website of Nicholas Piramal, a leading Indian drug firm, observes
that “[a]lthough buying power and pharmaceuticals penetration is currently lower [in India] than some
of the more developed markets, it is expected to grow to US $ 25 billion by the year 2010.”   India’s302
current 1.1 billion population includes a rapidly growing middle class of about 300 million.   Ernst303
& Young reports that about one-third, or 100 million, of this group “can afford quality private health
care.”   This wealthiest ten percent or so of the Indian population is no doubt the target market for304
companies such as Hoffman-La Roche, which is pricing its newly-patented Hepatitis C therapy,
Pegasys, in India at about $10,000 per patient per year.305
But what of the remainder of India’s population, including an estimated 800 million that live
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See Zakaria, supra note 21, at 38.306
 Hamied, supra note 2, at 7.307
 See Ernst & Young, supra note 236, at 4 (citing Espicom Pharmaceuticals Market308
Fact Book, 2005).
 Id. at 4 (citing U.S. figure for 2003).309
 Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India, Pharmaceutical Industry in India,310
available at http://www.indiaoppi.com/pharmindindia.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (stating that
“[h]ardly 3.5% of the population (mainly public service and industrial employees) are covered by
health insurance.”).
 Ouseph Tharakan, Access to Drugs the Key Issue, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April 6,311
2005, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/print.php?content_id=87106.
 Ranbaxy World (Aug. 2005) (newsletter), at 18, available at312
http://www.ranbaxy.com/newsroom/rworld_aug05/rworld_2005.pdf.
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on less than two dollars a day?   In contrast with the U.S. and other developed countries, there is306
little or  no social safety net for the majority of Indian citizens.  They face a health care system that
has been described as operating “in a state of perpetual crisis.”   For example, in 2005 India’s per307
capita expenditure on health care was about $28 a year, with about $3 a year per capita spent on
pharmaceuticals,  as compared to per capita health care spending of $5,635 in the U.S.308 309
According to the Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India, less than four percent of the
Indian population carries health insurance.   Accordingly, “in countries, such as India, where health310
insurance coverage is so rare, any change in the demand structure could have a significant impact on
the poor.”311
The lack of a well-established medical insurance industry in India may perversely benefit
patients in one respect, however, which is the breadth of therapeutic alternatives available in the
Indian market.  The wide variety of alternatives available for many drugs operates as a lever to keep
prices in check, and should continue to function even after the introduction of pharmaceutical product
patent protection.  According to Ranbaxy, “[d]rug pricing will continue to be market driven.  In India,
all major therapeutic areas have multiple drug choices and so any new drug cannot command a
premium just because it has a patent.”   As a Pfizer official explained, because so few patients have312
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 See Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New313
Delhi, India (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author) 
 See id.314
 See id.315
 See note 9 supra.316
 Nath Statement, supra note 8, at ¶ 12.317
 See Chandran et al., supra note 11, at 269-80 (also noting that only 5 of 300 WHO318
Essential List drugs are in any way patent protected).  
 Compulsory licensing is detailed in Part IV infra.319
 Drug price controls are discussed in Part III.D infra.  320
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private health insurance in India, most drug purchases are paid for out-of-pocket.   If, for example,313
an Indian doctor gives a patient a prescription for a branded generic drug priced above what that
patient can afford, the Indian pharmacist will likely suggest an un-branded generic alternative.  314
Many more therapeutic alternatives exist in India than in the U.S., where the medical insurance system
frequently imposes limits on the number of products approved for reimbursement.   315
After only eighteen months of operation of the new pharmaceutical product patents regime,
it is too soon to quantitatively assess its impact on drug pricing.  After all, as of March 2006 only a
single pharmaceutical product patent had issued in India.   The consensus view appears to be that316
at least in the short term, the introduction of pharmaceutical product patent protection in India will
have a relatively minor overall impact on drug prices.  The Indian government takes the position that
“[t]he fear that prices of medicines will spiral is unfounded,” noting that “97% of all drugs
manufactured in India are off-patent, and so will remain unaffected” by the new regime.   Another317
estimate is that in the short term, prices will be impacted for at most about fifteen percent of
medicines sold in the Indian market.   Safety valves such as compulsory licensing  and318 319
government-set drug price ceilings  are also available.  The scenario in which patent protection may320
have a more substantial and negative impact on the public is in the longer term, when a new
generation of drugs will be invented and patented.  At risk “are new generations of much more
expensive AIDS drugs that will soon be needed worldwide as resistance builds to current
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 India’s Choice, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at 20 (editorial).  321
 See Walsh, supra note 86, at 287 (stating that according to 2001 census, “72.2 percent322
of India’s population lives in more than 638,588 villages; 27.8 percent lives in India’s 5,161 cities
and towns.”).
 GURCHARAN DAS, INDIA UNBOUND: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVOLUTION FROM323
INDEPENDENCE TO THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE 125 (2002). 
 Discussion meeting with Manoj Pillai, Lex Orbis Intellectual Property Practice, New324
Delhi, Nov. 16, 2006.
 Kumar, supra note 61, at 950 (referring to “the Gandhians who believe in a non-violent325
revolution, leading to decentralized, relatively self-sufficient village communities without an
artificial proliferation of wants and minimal recourse to modern technology”);  Das, supra note
323, at 125 (discussing “Gandhi’s dream of building modern India along the lines of self-
governing village republics”).
 See Part V.A.4 infra for statistics on the composition of India’s patent application326
filings.
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medicines.”321
C.  Cultural Norms
A number of cultural norms influence the Indian public’s generally negative view of patents.
First, the exclusive ownership (albeit temporary) conveyed by a patent is contrary to the Indian norm
of communal property ownership in villages.  Despite the recent and much-publicized success of the
Indian IT sector, the nation’s economy is still primarily agrarian.  More than two-thirds of the Indian
population still lives in villages rather than urban centers.   A typical villages economy is322
“functionally integrated between agriculture and handicraft industry” including “agriculturists,
craftsmen, astrologers, tanners, carpenters, barbers, priests, smiths, petty retailers, musicians, record
keepers, headmen, and so on.”   Communal ownership is the norm in the villages; individual323
creativity and ownership of the fruits of that creativity is a relatively new and foreign idea.   324
India’s hard-won freedom from colonial subjugation combined with the Gandhian goal of self-
sufficiency  make its citizens understandably wary of foreign influences.  A “westernized” patent325
system as required by the WTO TRIPS Agreement, in which over three-quarters of Indian patent
applications still are foreign-owned,  is not easily accepted by many.  The words of B.K. Keayla,326
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 See generally B.K. Keayla, Amended Patents Act: A Critique, 4 COMBAT LAW (June-327
July 2005), available at http://www.indiatogether.org/combatlaw/vol4/issue2/.
 B.K. Keayla, TRIPS PATENT SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE AND PHARMA328
INDUSTRY (PATENTS (SECOND AMENDMENT) BILL 1999) 2 (Centre for Study of Global Trade
System and Development, New Delhi, 2000).
 Cohen, supra note 46, at 34.329
 India Patents Act, 1970.  330
 See Interview with Dr. Swati Piramal, Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India331
(Nov. 24, 2005) (transcript on file with author).  See also Frederick M. Abbott, Beginning of a
New Policy Chapter, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April 6, 2005, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/print.php?content_id=87112 (stating that “[n]o one should
mistake this new [patent] legislation as an endpoint.  It is only the beginning of a new chapter in
addressing public health needs in India and around the world.”).
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a leading patent system critic and convener of the National Working Group on Patent Law,  are327
illustrative of this view:  “If we are serious about defending the interest of our people, our objectives
should be to assert our position and use every legal latitude that exists for doing so, rather than to
submit ourselves obediently to certain particular interpretation of legal rectitude that we have received
from the developed countries.”   India’s new patents regime thus can be understood as an uneasy328
compromise between these opposing tensions.
Lastly, the relatively rapid pace of India’s patent law transformation is also contrary to
cultural norms.  Although India received a ten-year transition period in which to implement
pharmaceutical product protection under TRIPS, the implementation was viewed by many as far too
hasty.  In a nation with a “3,000-year history of growth, decay, and renewal; of invasion, absorption,
and survival; of imperial conquest and imperial subordination,”  change need not happen quickly.329
It is worth noting that after its independence in 1947, India did not enact its first indigenous patent
law until 1970.   The current evolutionary stage of India’s patents regime is for many a journey, not330
a destination.331
D.  Drug Price Controls
India’s new pharmaceutical product patents regime operates in the shadow of government-
imposed price controls on drugs.  First implemented in 1970, India’s Drug Price Control Order
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 276; Ragavan, supra note 87, at 292-302 (describing332
historical development of DPCO from 1970 to present).  
 See generally NPAA Website, available at http://nppaindia.nic.in/index1.html (last333
visited July 14, 2006).
 See Ernst & Young, supra note 236, at 14.334
 See National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, List of Controlled Bulk Drugs,335
available at http://nppaindia.nic.in/list1.html (last visited July 14, 2006).
 See National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, Frequently Asked Questions, available336
at http://nppaindia.nic.in/frequent.html#4 (last visited July 14, 2006) (stating in response to
Question 4 that “[o]nly 74 out of about 500 commonly used bulk drugs are kept under statutory
price control.  All formulations containing these bulk drugs either in a single or combination form
fall under price controlled category.  However, the prices of other drugs can be regulated, if
warranted in public interest.”).  The current schedule of price-controlled bulk drugs, available at
http://nppaindia.nic.in/list1.html, lists 75 bulk drugs. 
 Nath Statement, supra note 8, at ¶ 13 (observing that in addition to compulsory337
licensing and government acquisition of patents, “[t]here is also the Drug Price Control Order
administered by the National Pharmaceuticals Price Authority.  With this framework in place it is
clear that the concerns and fears expressed by various sections are wholly misplaced.”).
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(DPCO) set price ceilings on hundreds of essential medicines.   Currently the National332
Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPAA)  determines which drugs will be included in the DPCO333
and how pricing for those drugs will be formulated.   Although the number of included drugs has334
been reduced significantly over time, today the prices of 74 bulk drugs (such as penicillin, tetracycline,
insulin, aspirin, ibuprofen, and ciprofloxacin)  and the formulations containing them remain subject335
to strict controls.   It is still unknown whether newly-patented pharmaceutical products will be336
considered for inclusion in the DPCO, but government officials have mentioned price controls as one
of several tools at their disposal for protecting the Indian public from unreasonably high prices.337
IV.  INDIA PATENTS ACT, 1970 (2005): ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
This part analyzes and critiques the significant features of India’s current patent law, the India
Patents Act, 1970 (2005).  A number of these features are controversial and have yet to be
interpreted by the Indian courts.  They include detailed provisions enumerating what is and is not
considered patentable subject matter, a new and ambiguous definition of the “inventive step” criterion
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 India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 4 (providing that “Section 5 of the principal338
Act shall be omitted.”).
 Article 27.1 of TRIPS requires that, subject to certain permissible exclusions from339
patentability set forth in Articles 27.2 and 27.3, “patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2002) §5.  The complete text of Section 5 of the India Patents340
Act, 1970 (2002), as it stood prior to its amendment by the India Patents (Amendment) Act,
2005, was as follows:
     5.  Inventions where only methods or processes of manufacture patentable.–(1) In the case
of inventions–
(a) claiming substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as
medicine or drug, or
(b) relating to substances prepared or produced by chemical processes (including alloys,
optical glass, semi-conductors and inter-metallic compounds),
no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substances themselves, but claims for the
methods or processes of manufacture shall be patentable. 
     (2) Nothwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a claim for patent of an invention
for a substance itself intended for use, or capable of being used, as medicine or drug, except the
medicine or drug specified under sub-clause (v) of clause (l) of sub-section (1) of section 2, may
be made and shall be dealt, without prejudice to the other provisions of this Act, in the manner
provided in Chapter IVA.
     Explanation.–For purposes of this section, “chemical process” includes biochemical,
biotechnological and microbiological processes.
India Patents Act, 1970 (2002), §5, as reprinted in UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS
DRAFT August 16, 2006 (6:48pm) 68
of patentability, procedures governing both pre- and post-grant opposition, and an extensive
framework for compulsory licensing.  
A.  Patentable Subject Matter
1.  Product Patents for Pharmaceutical Substances
For the first time since 1972, India’s patents regime once again recognizes the potential
patentability of pharmaceutical products.  Section 4 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005,  the338
cornerstone provision for bringing India’s patents law into compliance with TRIPS,  repealed the339
pre-existing statutory prohibition on the patenting of claims to “substances intended for use, or
capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug, or . . . relating to substances prepared or
produced by chemical processes (including alloys, optical glass, semi-conductors and inter-metallic
compounds) . . . .”340
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
AMENDED BY THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005 (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
Delhi) (2005), at 172, 173 (“Annexe”) (providing provisions of Patents Act, 1970, as they stood
before their omission or substitution by Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005).
 See Part II.C.2 supra.341
 See id. at note 183. 342
 See id.343
 For example, India Patent Application No. 00242/KOLNP/2005, titled “N-Substitute-344
2-Oxodihydropyridine Derivatives,” was filed on January 22, 2005.  The one-page summary of
the application published on June 23, 2006, indicates that the claimed compound is useful “as a
neuropeptide Y receptor antagonist agent and is also useful as an agent for the treatment of
bulimia, obesity or diabetes.”  The application is assigned to Banyu Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. of
Japan.  See OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, June 23, 2006, at 12286, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/pat_arch_062006/official_journ
al_23062006.pdf (PDF page 441).  
 An Indian patent claiming a therapy for Hepatitis C, marketed under the brand name345
Pegasys, was reportedly granted on March 2, 2006 to Swiss pharmaceutical giant Hoffman-La
Roche AG.  See Datta, Roche Gets Product Patent, supra note 9.  Official notice of the grant was
not published until May 2006, however.  See OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, May 19,
2006, at 10000 (notice of grant of Indian Pat. No. 198,952, titled “A Physiologically Active
Branched PEG-IFNa Conjugate,” on Application No. 1032/MAS/1997, assigned to Hoffman-La
Roche), available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/pat_arch_052006/official_journ
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The immediate impact of this fundamental expansion of patentability in India is a huge influx
of product patent applications awaiting examination.  As discussed supra, approximately 9,000
mailbox applications were filed with the Indian Patent Office during the TRIPS transition period of
January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2004 that claimed substances capable of use as food, medicine or
drug.   During the first eighteen months of the new patents regime, i.e., during January 1, 2005 to341
June 30, 2006, summaries of approximately 6,700 of those mailbox applications have been
published.   The Indian Office began taking up the mailbox applications for examination in January342
2005.   In addition, regular (non-mailbox) applications claiming pharmaceutical substances began343
to be filed on or after January 1, 2005 and are also awaiting examination.   The first pharmaceutical344
product patent to issue under India’s new patents regime was granted in March 2006 to Hoffman-La
Roche for its Hepatitis C therapy sold under the brand name Pegasys.   345
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al_19052006.pdf (PDF page 412).  A summary of Application No. 1032/MAS/1997A was
published in OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, Oct. 28, 2005, at 24056, available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/pat_arch_102005/official_journal_28102005.pdf
(PDF page 198).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 2(1)(j).346
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, § 3(f).347
 See TRIPS Art. 27.1 (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, “patents shall be348
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”) (emphasis
added).  
 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining potentially patentable subject matter as349
encompassing “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof . . .”).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (1999), § 2(1)(j).350
 See id. 351
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2.  Inventions, Not Discoveries
Section 2(1)(j) of India’s patent statute now defines an “invention” as “a new product or
process involving an inventive step and capable of industrial application.”   This language was346
implemented via the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002,  so as to expressly incorporate the TRIPS-347
mandated “inventive step” criteria of patentability  into the definition of an invention.  The prior348
version of the statute omitted the inventive step criterion and defined “invention” in a more
complicated (and U.S.-style ) manner as encompassing:  349
any new and useful—
(i)  art, process, method or manner of manufacture;
(ii)  machine, apparatus or other article;
(iii)  substance produced by manufacture,
and includes any new and useful improvement of any of them, and an alleged
invention.350
India’s new definition of invention as “a new product or process involving an inventive step and
capable of industrial application” also compresses the categories of potentially patentable subject
matter to simply “products and processes,” in accordance with TRIPS.351
In contrast with U.S. patent law, the new Indian definition of an invention omits
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2006) (providing that “[t]he term ‘invention’ means352
invention or discovery.”).  This statutory definition derives from the U.S. Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8,
cl. 8 (emphasis added).
 See European Patent Convention (2006) Art. 52(2)(a), available at353
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar52.html#A52 (providing that “discoveries,
scientific theories and mathematical methods” shall not be regarded as inventions for which
European patents are available). 
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“discoveries.”   This is consistent with the European approach, which expressly excludes352
“discoveries” from patentability.353
3.  Exclusions from Patentable Subject Matter
India’s new patent law includes an extensive list of exclusions from patentability, enumerated
in Section 3 of the Patents Act, 1970 (2005).  Some of these exclusions are likely to test the limits
of TRIPS-permitted exclusions.  Others are unfortunately ambiguous and will require further
interpretation by the Indian Patent Office and judiciary.  The most significant exclusions from
patentability are discussed individually below. 
a.  Section 3(d): Derivatives of Known Substances
In its most controversial exclusionary provision, India’s new Patents Act prohibits patents on
derivatives of known substances, unless such derivatives display significantly enhanced efficacy.
Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970 (2005), provides: 
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 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) §3(d) (emphases added except for “Explanation,” which354
is italicized in original).  The quoted language was substituted for the prior version of clause (d)
of Section 3 by The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, §3 (titled “Amendment of section 3").
 See Chandran et al., supra note 11, at 269-80 (observing that under Section 3(d),355
“secondary patents would not be permitted unless these are therapeutically significant”);  Manisha
Singh, India’s Patent Law–Is It TRIPS Compliant?, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(Jul./Aug. 2005), at 67, 69 (noting that the objective behind section 3(d)’s “elaborate explanation”
is “probably to check what the Indian generic drug makers allege as evergreening”);  Ahibhusan
De and Uma Baskaran, What the New Patent Regime Means In Practice, MANAGING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Jul./Aug. 2005), at 63, 64 (commenting that the section 3(d) 
“amendment provides a gate for patents with improvements in efficacy for existing molecules such
as polymorphic forms, at the same time restricting evergreening of patents for such forms of
substances without significant efficiency in the properties.”);  Ouseph Tharakan, Access to Drugs
the Key Issue, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April 6, 2005, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/print.php?content_id=87106 (noting that section 3(d) “seeks to
prevent the extending of patent life by making minimal changes to the patented molecule.”); 
Better Now, But . . ., BUSINESS STANDARD, Mar. 24, 2005, available at http://www.business-
standard.com (stating that “the official amendments [to the Ordinance of December 2004] have . .
. curbed the evergreening of patents by clarifying the concept of patentability in unmistakable
terms.  Evergreening would have allowed a patent holder, nearing the end of the 20-year life of a
patent, to renew the patent for a fresh 20-year period–as many pharmaceutical companies had
been preparing to do.”).
 See Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in BioSpace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (2005)356
(noting scholars’ concern over evergreening, the practice of attempts by patent holders “to refresh
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The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act,--
. . . 
(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new
property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine
or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one
new reactant.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites,
pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other
derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they
differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy; . . .354
This express and detailed statutory exclusion of derivatives, unique among the world’s patent
regimes, reflects a strong resentment towards evergreening of pharmaceutical patents.355
“Evergreening” in this context refers to attempts by owners of pharmaceutical product patents to
effectively extend the term of those patents by obtaining related patents on modified forms of the
same drug, new delivery systems for the drug, new uses of the drug, and the like.   MNCs are well356
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
their patents by patenting updated versions, alternative delivery methods, or other variations of
the original product,” and suggesting that patenting metabolites may also be form of
evergreening); Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have they
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 401 n.44 (1999) (defining evergreening as “using a
series of related patents (divisionals, continuations) covering different aspects of the same basic
product invention in combination with patent term extensions to unduly prolong the exclusive
market period.”). 
 See Gladys Mirandah, War on Pharmaceutical Patents Begins, MANAGING357
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Feb. 2006), at 135, available at
http://www.managingip.com/?Page=10&PUBID=34&ISS=21306&SID=610810&TYPE=20.
 See Pharma Sector Seeks Clear Patent Guidelines, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 27, 2004,358
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com (quoting letter from the Indian Pharmaceutical
Alliance (IPA) to the Indian government’s Group of Ministers looking into amendments in patent
legislation).  The IPA’s letter stated that “[p]atents intended to delay the entry of generics, such as
patents for polymorphs, hydrates, isomers, metabolites, substantially pure, particle size and blood
levels must not be permitted.”  Id.  The IPA’s letter clarified that “there are no differences among
its members, including Ranbaxy, on this issue.”  Id. 
 See, e.g., McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 337 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003)359
(affirming district court’s holding that improvement patents directed to combination of anti-
diarrheal drug loperamide with anti-gas drug simethicone were invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 in view of prior art patents held by third parties, but reversing district court’s award of
attorney fees to patent challenger).  The Federal Circuit noted the district court’s concern that the
patentee had “set out as an objective developing products that extended the life of [its] basic
patent on loperamide,” id. at 1373, but declined to find the case exceptional under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 (which would have supported an award of fees).  See id.  “While it may be considered more
socially desirable for companies to seek truly novel inventions for maladies not yet treatable,” the
Federal Circuit observed, “the patent laws set the standards of novelty, non-obviousness, and
utility as the requirements for patentability, without making value judgments concerning the
motives for making and attempting to patent new inventions of lesser medical value.”  Id.   
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versed in developing new dosage forms, searching for alternative uses of established drugs, and
obtaining U.S. patent protection on the results.   The Indian pharmaceutical industry, including both357
research-based companies and major generic manufacturers, professes unity in its opposition to patent
extensions through evergreening.358
The patent laws of the U.S. have no provision directly analogous to India’s Section 3(d).  In
some cases, U.S. courts deal with the evergreening problem under general principles of obviousness359
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 See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir.360
2003) (affirming district court’s judgment invalidating patent that claimed a metabolite of the
antihistamine loratadine, on ground of inherent anticipation by same patentee’s earlier patent
directed to loratadine (marketed as Claritin) where ingestion of loratadine inevitably formed
claimed metabolite in patient’s body).  
 See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW, SECOND361
EDITION 48-52 (Aspen Publishers 2006).
 In U.S. parlance, this is “same-invention type” double patenting, which is based on the362
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful [invention]
may obtain a patent therefor . . .” (emphasis added).  
 Terminal disclaimer practice in the U.S. patent system is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 253,363
¶ 2 (2006) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321.
 Nor can obviousness-type double patenting be asserted by the USPTO when a second364
patent results from a restriction requirement imposed by the Office.  See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2006)
(providing that “[a] patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for
restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a
requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the
courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on
either of them, if the divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other
application.”).
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or the doctrine of inherent anticipation.   In other cases, evergreening is assessed under the doctrine360
of double patenting, a rather complex amalgam of statutory and case law.   At bottom, the double361
patenting doctrine is a prohibition on a given patent owner unfairly extending its monopoly by
acquiring more than one patent on a given invention.  Although there is universal agreement that a
patentee cannot obtain a second patent claiming the identical invention already claimed in that
patentee’s first patent,  the U.S. does allow issuance of a second patent to the same patentee on a362
merely obvious variant of the invention claimed in that patentee’s first patent.  Ideally, the second
patent will be subject to terminal disclaimer, meaning that it must expire at the same time as the first
patent and thereby prevent monopoly extension, as a result of the USPTO’s rejection of the second
application on the ground of “obviousness-type” double patenting.   Nevertheless, the issuance of363
a second patent to the same entity is permitted.   364
The real problem arises when the USPTO fails to reject the second application on the basis
of double patenting and allows it to issue without the imposition of a terminal disclaimer.  These
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 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has studied potentially anticompetitive attempts365
by owners of such follow on patents to obtain multiple 30-month stays before onset of generic
drug competition via improperly listing the patents in the Food and Drug Administration’s
“Orange Book.” See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 39-57 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (describing Commission’s study of “Orange
Book Patent Listing Practices and Use of Multiple 30-Month Stays”).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) §3(d) (emphasis added).366
 In a November 16, 2005 interview with the author, Assistant Controller of Patents and367
Designs K.S. Kardam (then head of the New Delhi branch of the Patent Office) stated that the
Patent Office had not yet had to apply or interpret the new “efficacy” language.  However, in
Kardam’s personal view, as a chemist, the new language of section 3(d) “makes it easier to decide
patentability,” because “chemists know what ‘efficacy’ means.”).  
 See Gladys Mirandah, supra note 357, at 135 (referring to Section 3(d) as a “nebulous368
provision”).
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follow-on patents can be challenged in the courts as violating the double patenting prohibition, but
their invalidation is by no means automatic nor rapid.  Unless and until invalidated by the courts, the
follow-on patent remains in force.   Thus, the U.S. system of dealing with the evergreening problem365
is a much less straightforward approach than that taken by India. 
Under India’s new Patents Act, the extent of a claimed derivative’s “efficacy” will be the
pivotal question raised by the section 3(d) exclusion from patentability.  Although the first paragraph
of section 3(d) permits the patenting of a derivative that provides an “enhancement of the known
efficacy” of a “known substance,” the second paragraph’s “Explanation” further raises the bar by
requiring that the derivative and the known substance “differ significantly in properties with regard
to efficacy.”   Section 3(d) thus raises both qualitative and quantitative questions–i.e., what kind of366
data will be required to establish “efficacy” and how great an improvement over the efficacy of the
prior art invention will be required to obtain a patent.  
It is likely that before these interpretive questions reach the courts, the Indian Patent Office
will have to answer them.  Although Patent Office officials have indicated a certain comfort level with
the new efficacy criteria,  the ambiguity of the language  endows the Office with a great deal of367 368
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 See India Patents Rules, 2003 (2006).  The principal (2003) rules as amended through369
2006 are referred to herein as “India Patents Rules, 2003 (2006).”  
 See Patent Office, India, MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005),370
available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual-2052005.pdf (hereafter “MPPP”).  As of
August 2006, the MPPP was published on the Indian Patent Office’s website but still in draft
form.  See id. at 1.  Public comments on the draft MPPP were due by August 20, 2005.  See
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).  Patent Office officials
had expected the draft MPPP to be finalized by November 30, 2005.  Interview with K.S.
Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, in New Delhi, India (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes
on file with author). 
Like the U.S. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, the Indian MPPP does not
have the force and effect of law.  Rather, it is an internal document intended to provide guidance
to patent examiners.  See MPPP, at 4 (stating that “[t]he contents of this manual including the
guidelines are merely for the purpose of illustrations and not meant for legal purposes.  In case of
any conflict, legal provisions of the Patents Act will prevail.”).  
 See MPPP, supra note 370, at 17-18 (discussing section 3(d) only with regard to the371
prohibition on new use patents and not referring to “efficacy” criterion).
 See Patent Office, India, Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications Relating to372
Inventions In the Field of Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Annexure 1 of MPPP,
supra note 370, at 138-142. 
 Id. at 141 (paragraph 6.0 titled “Pharmaceutical Compositions”) (emphasis added).373
 Current staffing levels of Indian Patent Office patent examiners and the need for further374
recruitment, especially in the chemical arts, are discussed in Part V.A.2.b infra.
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discretion and virtually no guidance for applying it.  Nothing in India’s Patents Rules  (comparable369
to the United States’ patent rules set forth at 37 C.F.R.) elucidates what will be required to satisfy
the enhanced efficacy requirement.  The latest draft Indian Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure
(hereafter “MPPP”)  does not provide any explicit guidance for interpreting the enhanced efficacy370
requirement,  although an annexed set of draft guidelines for examination of pharmaceutical and371
biotechnological subject matter  instruct that “known pharmaceutical compositions in different new372
dosages and different form such as capsules, tablets, syrups, suspensions etc., are not patentable
under sections 2(1)(j), 3(d), and 3(e) of the Act.”   373
The present capability of Indian Patent Office examiners to review and evaluate efficacy data
submitted by pharmaceutical product patent applicants is unclear,  as is the procedural mechanism374
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Id. at 138.375
 See Part IV.D.1 infra.376
 Dr. Mashelkar is Director General of the Council of Scientific & Industrial Research377
(CSIR), India’s premier industrial research and development organization.  See
http://www.csir.res.in/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
 Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Order (April 5, 2005) (copy378
obtained from Dr. R.A. Mashelkar, Director General of the Council of Scientific & Industrial
Research, on file with author).  The Mashelkar committee will also examine “whether it would be
TRIPs compatible to exclude micro-organisms for [sic, from] patenting.”  Id.  See also Mashelkar
to Head Panel on Patent Law, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, April 6, 2005, available at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1070509.cms (reporting that formation of expert
committee was “a direct follow-up of the assurance given by [Minister of Commerce and
Industry] Kamal Nath while moving the official amendments to the Patents (Amendment) Bill
2005 in the Lok Sabha [Lower House] on March 22 [2005].”).  
DRAFT August 16, 2006 (6:48pm) 77
for submitting such data to the examiners.  This lack of transparency is not particularly surprising,
however, in view of the fact that the Indian Patent Office has not granted pharmaceutical product
patents for 35 years.  The work-in-progress nature of the endeavor is clearly evidenced elsewhere in
the MPPP, which broadly observes that “[c]riteria for granting product patents in a particular field
i.e. chemicals, foods, pharmaceuticals or biotechnology etc. will have to be assessed carefully within
the legal framework and relevant court-rulings.”375
Despite these uncertainties, the Indian Patent Office is the first-instance actor required to
interpret and apply the new section 3(d) prohibition on pharmaceutical derivatives; the Controller of
Patents reportedly has already rejected patent applications under section 3(d) in the context of
deciding pre-grant oppositions.   However, a different government-empowered body is soon376
expected to provide additional guidance on the import of Section 3(d).  As part of the political
compromise required to enact the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005), the Indian government charged
a “Technical Expert Group” chaired by prominent scientist Dr. R.A. Mashelkar  with determining377
“whether it would be TRIPS compatible to limit the grant of patent for pharmaceutical substance to
new chemical entity or to new medical entity involving one or more incentive [sic, inventive]
steps. . . .”   With its consideration of whether pharmaceutical product patents should be limited to378
“new chemical entit[ies],” i.e., excluding patents on mere derivatives thereof, the Mashelkar
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 See Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India, Pharmaceutical Industry in379
India,, available at http://www.indiaoppi.com/pharmindindia.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2005)
(stating that “[t]he patentability criteria is also narrowly defined in the new Act which is restricted
only to New Chemical Entities (NCEs).  Salts, esters, polymorphs, isomers, etc. are not
patentable unless they ‘differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.’  However, this
clause is being reviewed and a Committee has been formed to examine it in detail.”).
 E-mail from Dr. R.A. Mashelkar, Director General of the Council of Scientific &380
Industrial Research (Jan. 18, 2006) (on file with author). 
 See id. (stating that committee must complete its work “within the next three months”).381
 See Editorial, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, available at382
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-1063471,curpg-2.cms (opining that “[i]n
the case of patentability, it would be useful to accept the Mashelkar panel’s recommendation on
restricting patentability to new chemical entities and limiting the amplitude of novelty and utility,
characteristics that make for patentability, through clear enunciation. NCEs number less than 300
since 1995.”).
 See Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New383
Delhi, India (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author);  Interview with Ranjit Shahani,
Managing Director, Novartis India, in Mumbai, India (Nov. 23, 2005) (transcript on file with
author) (observing that “incremental innovation happens all the time; breakthroughs are relatively
rare.  We should allow patents on incremental innovation.  The scientists here haven't reached the
breakthrough stage.”).
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Committee’s assignment is generally understood as a referendum on section 3(d) of the India Patents
Act, 1970 (2005).   In carrying out its terms of reference, the Mashelkar Committee has taken379
evidence from stakeholders through presentations, interviews, and receipt of written comments.380
The committee’s report to the Indian government was expected by the end of April 2006  but has381
not been publicly released as of August 2006.  
Echoing the Indian political left and the smaller generic drug manufacturers, press coverage
in India generally favors a narrow definition of patentability.   But MNCs argue to the contrary that382
innovation is incremental, and that the new patent laws should be interpreted to allow patenting of
incremental improvements such as derivatives of known substances of the type listed in section
3(d).   According to the MNCs, this expansive view of patentability would directly benefit the type383
of innovation for which the majority of Indian drugmakers (i.e., the generic firms) are best
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 See Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New384
Delhi, India (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author) (observing that reverse engineering
and process patenting is only one step away from incremental innovations, such as new
formulations and delivery systems, and that most Indian firms do not have the funds to undertake
full-scale new chemical entity (NCE) drug discovery research); see also Interview with Dr. Swati
Piramal, Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India (Nov. 24, 2005) (transcript on file with
author) (observing that science is “not perfect,” and that incremental innovation “is the norm,”
and asking why India’s patent laws should not reflect this scientific and technical reality).  
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 3(d).385
 See MPPP, supra note 370, at 17 (item I).386
 Id.387
 See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (defining the term “process” as “includ[ing] a new use388
of a known . . . composition of matter . . .”).  
 MPPP, supra note 370, at 18 (item II).389
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equipped.  384
b.  Sec. 3(d): New Uses of Known Substances
Section 3(d) of the Patents Act deals not only with chemical derivatives but also with new
methods of using known pharmaceutical products, providing in pertinent part that “the mere
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance” are “not inventions within the
meaning of this Act . . . .”   For example, according to the 2005 draft MPPP, the mere discovery385
that a known substance such as aspirin, a known analgesic, is also useful for the treatment of
cardiovascular disease, would not be considered patentable.   “However, a new and alternative386
method for preparing Aspirin is patentable.”   The latter is a new method of making a known387
substance, as opposed to a non-patentable new method of using a known substance.  
India’s restrictive position is in sharp contrast with the U.S., which broadly permits the
patenting of any new use for a known product (so long as that new use meets the requirements of
novelty, nonobviousness, and utility).   As India’s MPPP further clarifies, a “2nd or 3  use for a388 rd
known substance cannot be allowed.”   This statement also contrast India’s position with that of the389
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 See John K. McDonald, A Patent Practitioner’s Perspective: Advising Pharmaceutical390
Clients, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 517, 521 (2003) (explaining that “[m]ethods of treatment are
not patentable in Europe and many other jurisdictions, but you can get what’s called a second
medical use claim--for example, the use of a composition in the manufacturing of a medicine
useful to treat HIV/AIDS.”). 
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 3(i) (providing that “any process for the391
medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic [diagnostic, therapeutic] or other treatment of human
beings or any process for a similar treatment of animals to render them free of disease or to
increase their economic value or that of their products” is “not [an] invention[] within the
meaning of this Act . . .”).
 Professor Correa has observed:392
While TRIPs requires member states to protect products and processes, . . . it
does not specifically refer to the protection of new uses, thus leaving member
countries free to choose whether or not to protect them.  In principle, a country
that broadly excludes methods of medical treatment could also broadly exclude
new therapeutic uses for old products. 
Correa, supra note 392, at 16 (footnote omitted). 
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European patent regimes, in which so-called “second medical use” claims are allowable.   Second390
medical use claims, also known as “Swiss type” claims, typically recite the “use of compound X for
the manufacture of a medicament for the treatment of disease Y.”
The question accordingly arises whether Section 3(d)’s broad exclusion of new use patents
complies with TRIPS.  Although Article 27.1 of TRIPS mandates that patents be available for
“processes . . . in all fields of technology,” TRIPS nowhere defines “processes.”  Moreover, Art. 27.3
of TRIPS explicitly permits member countries to exclude “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
methods for the treatment of humans or animals” from patentability.  India’s Patents Act already
excludes such methods of treatment in Section 3(i),  so one must conclude that the Section 3(d)391
exclusion covers broader ground; i.e., methods of use even beyond those contemplated within Section
3(i).  If new uses of known substances as well as methods of human/animal treatment are non-
patentable, the remaining patent-eligible subject matter is narrow indeed; i.e., encompassing merely
new uses of new substances for  purposes other than treatment of humans or animals.    
Some observers contend that such broad exclusions are acceptable under TRIPS, at least in
principle.   Others counter that the sum total effect of Sections 3(d) and 3(i) is to effectively392
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 See LexOrbis, India’s Patents Bill, 2005–Is It TRIPS Compliant?, at 2 (law firm393
monograph, on file with author).
 See Correa, supra note 392, at 16 (observing that “[c]onsistency is required in defining394
excludable therapeutic methods.  The impact of any such exclusions on local needs and industry
should also be taken into account.”).
 See Amar Singh, Role of Traditional Medicine–Ayurvedic System and a Dispensary395
for Every Central Village in India, 15 GEOGRAPHIA MEDICA 216, 218 (describing ayurveda as an
“ancient” system that is ‘well tried under Indian conditions”);  Interview with Dr. Swati Piramal,
Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India (Nov. 24, 2005) (transcript on file with author)
(describing India’s “5,000-year tradition of ayurvedic drugs”).  See also What Is Ayurveda?,
available at http://www.webmd.com/hw/alternative_medicine/tp21271.asp (last visited June 27,
2006).
 See Interview with Dr. Swati Piramal, Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., in Mumbai, India396
(Nov. 24, 2005) (transcript on file with author);  see also Benjamin Liu, Past Cultural
Achievement as a Future Technological Resource: Contradictions and Opportunities in the
Intellectual Property Protection of Chinese Medicine in China, 21 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 75,
83-89 (2003) (section describing “Patent and CM”).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 3(j).397
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eliminate all method of use claims from patentability.   393
Whether or not the broad exclusions of Section 3(d) would survive a TRIPS challenge, their
potential negative impact on an important form of indigenous innovation  should not be ignored.394
For example, ayurvedic therapies emphasizing holistic lifestyle changes and natural herb-based
remedies have been practiced in India for thousands of years.   However, innovative new ayurvedic395
methods of using ancient ingredients could not be protected in India under the patents statute as
written, reducing incentives to develop such methods.  In comparison, China’s booming herbal
medicine market benefits greatly from the broader availability there of patent protection.   In its zeal396
to prevent pharmaceutical product patent holders from extending their monopolies through follow-on
process patents, India may have suppressed an important means of stimulating indigenous innovation.
c.  Section 3(j): Plants and Animals
India’s new Patents Act excludes from patentability “plants and animals in whole or any part
thereof other than micro-organisms but including seeds, varieties and species and essentially biological
processes for production or propagation of plants and animals.”   This provision was added to the397
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 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, § 4.398
 TRIPS Art. 27.3(b).  The provision also mandates that “Members shall provide for the399
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any
combination thereof.”  Id.
 Act No. 53 of 2001 (enacted Oct. 30, 2001), available at400
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=200153.  On the topic of India’s plant protection system,
see generally SABINE DEMANGUE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR CROP GENETIC
RESOURCES: A SUITABLE SYSTEM FOR INDIA (Herbert Utz Verlag Publishers 2005).
 See Wolpert, supra note 136, at 73 (observing as part of discussion of Hinduism that401
“[m]ost Indians are gentle, nonviolent people, in part perhaps because they view all life as
interrelated, and believe in the potential cosmic significance of individual deeds or actions and
their implications, extending over a hundred or more lifetimes.  One must be careful where one
treads, for the very earthworm beneath one’s foot shares cosmic connections.  We never know
where the ripple-current we set in motion could lead.  Hindus have reported nightmares after
eating beef, hearing a dead grandmother’s voice crying out in agony at the pain caused by so
violent a fall from vegetarian grace.”).
 See Part IV.A.3.a supra.402
 Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Order (April 5, 2005) (copy403
obtained from Dr. R.A. Mashelkar, Director General of the Council of Scientific & Industrial
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Act via the 2002 amendments  in order to codify domestically the TRIPS-permitted exclusion from398
patentability of  “plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes
for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.”399
As TRIPS also contemplates, India has chosen to exclude seeds as well as varieties and species of
plants and animals from patentability, but provides sui generis protection for this subject matter under
the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001.    400
The Section 3(j) treatment of “micro-organisms” as potentially patentable subject matter is
important for support of India’s booming indigenous biotechnology sector.  Given India’s cultural
traditions of great respect for animals, however, the potential patentability of any life form is a
difficult concept for many.   It is not surprising, then, that the Mashelkar Committee, in addition to401
interpreting the scope of Section 3(d)’s exclusion of chemical derivatives,  has also been charged402
with determining whether it would be TRIPS-compliant to exclude micro-organisms from
patentability.   TRIPS explicitly requires the patentability of “micro-organisms,” but does not define403
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Research, on file with author) (stating that Mashelkar committee will examine “whether it would
be TRIPs compatible to exclude micro-organisms for [sic, from] patenting.”). 
 See TRIPS 27.3 (b).404
 MPPP, supra note 370, at 141, ¶ 7.0 (in “Annexure I:  Examination Guidelines for405
Patent Applications relating to Inventions in the field of Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and
Biotechnology”).
 Id.  The MPPP position that a living micro-organism or vaccine is potentially patentable406
subject matter is consistent with the Calcutta High Court’s landmark decision in Dimminaco A.G.
v. Controller of Patents, A.I.D. No. 1 of 2001 (Jan. 15, 2002) (copy of unpublished decision on
file with author) (reversing Indian Patent Office’s rejection of claim to “process for preparation of
infectious bursitis vaccine,” where end product of claimed process contained a live virus).  The
import of the Dimminaco decision in India has been compared to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 333 (1980) (affirming patentability of living
genetically-engineered bacterium).  See Malathi Lakshmikumaran and Shilpi Bhattacharya, The
Dimminaco Case: A Landmark Judgment on the Patentability of Micro-Organisms (2003), at 63,
available at http://www.nipo.org.in/img2003/souvenir/TheDimminacoCase.html. 
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 3(k) (emphasis in original).407
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, § 4(e) (inserting clauses (j) through (p) into408
§ 3 of principal Act).
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the term.   Although the Mashelkar Committee had not issued its report as of July 2006, it seems404
likely that the committee might propose a narrow definition of “micro-organism” so as to minimize
the scope of allowable subject matter.  
Absent further legislative change and/or guidance from the Mashelkar Committee on the
scope of “micro-organism,” the current Patent Office position is that any “living entity of natural
origin” is not patentable, nor is any “living entity of artificial origin such as transgenic animals and
plants [or] any part thereof . . . .”   A “living entity of artificial origin such as [a] micro-organism405
[or] vaccines are considered patentable, however.”406
d.  Section 3(k): Business Methods and Computer Programs Per Se
India’s new patent statute provides that “a mathematical or business method or a computer
programe per se or algorithms” are “not inventions within the meaning of [the] Act.”   This407
prohibition was added to the Act in 2002;  prior to the 2002 amendment the Act did not refer to408
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 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 3(a)-(i) (enumerating categories of subject matter that409
are not inventions within the Act).
 See Interview with P.K. Patni, Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, India410
Intellectual Property Office, New Delhi branch (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author).
 The 2005 draft MPPP provides a number of examples of patentable and non-patentable411
subject matter under Section 3(k).  Patentable subject matter would include: “[a] contents display
method for displaying contents on a screen,” “[a] method for controlling an information
processing apparatus, for communicating via the Internet with an external apparatus,” and “[a]
method for transmitting data across an open communication channel on a wireless device that
selectively opens and closes a communication channel to a wireless network, and each wireless
device including a computer platform and including a plurality of device resources that selectively
utilizes a communication channel to communicate with other devices across the network.” 
Although all of these methods utilize computer programs in their operation, they are “not
computer programs as such and hence [are] allowable.”  MPPP, supra note 370, at 22-23.  
On the other hand, the following would be considered non-patentable subject matter: “[a]
method of executing a computer program, in which at least part of the copy of the program
available for execution is analysed to determine whether or not any change has been made thereto,
and in the event that a change is detected, a further copy of the program is retrieved and caused to
be executed instead of the first copy,” and “[a] method for generating a new computer program
using a software development tool.”  Id. at 23.  The latter examples are considered “programs
solely intellectual in [their] context and hence not allowable.”  Id.  Also non-patentable are a
“computer program product . . . claimed as ‘[a] computer program product in computer readable
medium” and “[a] computer-readable storage medium having a program recorded thereon.” 
These sorts of claims would be “treated as relating to software per[]se, irrespective of the medium
of [] storage” and therefore not patentable.  Id. at 22.  
In addition to these examples, the MPPP includes a separate set of “Examination
Guidelines for Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions,” id. at 143-156 (“Annexure II”),
which aim “to evolve uniform practice within Patent Offices and thereby eliminat[e] different
interpretation[s] of the provisions of the Act.”  Id. at 143.
 For example, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. was recently granted Indian Patent No.412
199,409, titled “A Data Detector and Method for Improving Performance of a Signal Processing
System in Maximum Likelihood Detection.”  See OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, June
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computer programs at all.   As with the other provisions of the Patents Act, the extent to which this409
provision will impede patenting in the software-implemented arts depends largely on implementation.
Indian Patent Office officials take the position that software embedded in hardware is potentially
patentable if a technical application exists therefor,  echoing the European position.   Several410 411
recently granted Indian patents appear to be directed to software-implemented devices or systems.412
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23, 2006, at 12304, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/pat_arch_062006/official_journ
al_23062006.pdf (PDF page 459).  The Samsung patent issued from Application No.
959/CAL/1998, filed May 29, 1998.  See OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, Nov. 11,
2005, at 24898, available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/pat_arch_112005/official_journal_11112005.pdf
(PDF page 217).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 3(p).413
 See N.S. Gopalakrishnan, TRIPS and Protection of Traditional Knowledge of Genetic414
Resources: New Challenges to the Patents System, 27(1) E.I.P.R. 11, 17 (2005).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 10(4)(ii)(D).  415
 Id. at § 25(2)(k) (specifying ground for post-grant opposition); § 64(1)(q)(specifying416
ground for revocation).
 See Colin Campbell, Hands Off Their Meds, MACLEAN’S, Mar. 27, 2006, at 40417
(describing cases in which “India has had to fend off Western science’s predatory practice of filing
patents on other countries’ traditional remedies.”).
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e.  Sec. 3(p): Traditional Knowledge
The new Patents Act also excludes from patentability “an invention which in effect, is
traditional knowledge or which is an aggregation or duplication of known properties of traditionally
known component or components.”   This exclusion is but one of several provisions inserted into413
the new Act in an effort to prevent the exercise of proprietary rights in India’s genetic resources and
indigenous knowledge.   For example, the Act’s disclosure requirements mandate inclusion of the414
source and geographical origin of biological material used in the claimed invention,  and interested415
parties may oppose or petition to revoke an Indian patent on the ground that the invention claimed
therein is anticipated “having regard to the knowledge, oral or otherwise, available within any local
or indigenous community or elsewhere . . . .”   416
Such provisions provide India with explicit statutory bases for fending off future attempts to
obtain Indian patents that exploit Indian natural resources and knowledge.  The well-publicized
episodes of foreign patenting of inventions derived at least to some degree from Indian natural
resources such as neem tree seeds, turmeric spice, and basmati rice are considered infamous examples
of biopiracy by the Indian public,  and the government likely wants to avoid any similar417
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 See id. at 40 (describing four-year effort to compile and digitize “every known piece of418
India’s vast body of traditional medicine, from yoga poses to simple cures for infections”).
 See id.419
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 2(1)(j).420
 The TRIPS Agreement specifies that “the term[] ‘inventive step’ . . . may be deemed by421
a Member to be synonymous with the term[] ‘non-obvious’ . . .,” TRIPS Art. 27.1 n.5, but
provides no definition of “non-obvious.”  To the extent that “non-obvious” refers to the U.S.
understanding of that term, see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006), TRIPS member countries are free to
adopt that understanding or to modify it for their own purposes.  
 Correa, supra note 392, at 23.422
 Compare Brazil Industrial Property Law § 13 (May 14, 1996), available at423
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/fiche.jsp?uid=br003 (providing that “[a]n invention is endowed with
inventive step provided that, to a technician versed in the subject, it is not derived in an evident or
obvious way from the state of the art.”).
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embarrassments at home.  
In a parallel effort, India’s National Institute of Science Communication and Information
Resources is compiling a massive Traditional Knowledge Digital Library.   Accessible to patent418
offices worldwide, the Digital Library will document India’s vast body of traditional knowledge in
five languages: English, French, Japanese, Spanish, and German.   The Digital Library thus creates419
a vast body of prior art documentation that can be relied on by patent examiners considering the
patentability of claims to inventions derived from India’s indigenous resources. 
B.  Inventive Step
India now defines an “invention” as a “new product or process involving an inventive step and
capable of industrial application,”  thus codifying in its laws the TRIPS-required substantive minima420
of patentability.  TRIPS does not further define the criteria of novelty, inventive step, and industrial
applicability, however, leaving member countries the flexibility to fashion their own understandings
thereof.   Accordingly, “[l]ess technologically advanced countries may prefer to set higher standards421
of novelty and inventive step in order to preserve and enhance competition without violating
minimum international standards.”  422
India has exercised this flexibility by adopting a unique  but rather ambiguous definition of423
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 The language was reportedly the result of a last-minute compromise to appease the Left424
parties, leaving no time for fine-tuning.  See Interview with attorney Krishna Sarma, Corporate
Law Group, in New Delhi, India (Nov. 14, 2005) (transcript on file with author).  
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 2(1)(ja).425
 MPPP, supra note 370, at ¶ 2.3 (page 12). 426
 See LexOrbis, India’s Patents Bill, 2005–Is It TRIPS Compliant?, at 1 (law firm427
monograph, on file with author).
 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (providing that “[a] patent may not be obtained428
though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title
[35 U.S.C.], if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
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the inventive step requirement.   According to the new Patents Act, inventive step now means “a424
feature of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or
having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled
in the art.”   The latest version of the Indian MPPP adds the following explanation:425
Inventive step is a feature of an invention that involves technical
advance as compared to existing knowledge or having economic
significance or both, making the invention non obvious to a person
skilled in art.  Here definition of inventive step has been enlarged to
include economic significance of the invention apart from already
existing criteria for determining inventive step.426
Thus, India appears to have adopted a “nonobviousness-plus” standard.  In order to be patentable,
the invention must be (1) nonobvious to a person skilled in the art, but in addition, it must also
(2) “involve[] technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or hav[e] economic
significance or both . . . .” 
By engrafting new “technical advance” and “economic significance” criteria onto the standard
nonobviousness requirement, India has been criticized for implementing a “vague and
arbitrary”definition that “fail[s] to reflect the distilled stock of knowledge” on what nonobviousness
means.   Each of the new statutory criteria certainly raises its own interpretative questions.  For427
example, the “technical advance over existing knowledge” language invites qualitative comparisons
with the prior art but is devoid of any requirement that such comparisons be made from the
perspective a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.   428
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are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”).
 See LexOrbis, India’s Patents Bill, 2005–Is It TRIPS Compliant?, at 1 (law firm429
monograph, on file with author).
 See Pejman F. Sharifi and Scott Blackman, Indian Patent Law Reform and Its Impact430
on Pharmaceutical-Related Outsourcing, 71 BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 173
(2005) (observing that “The notion of economic significance in the amendment appears to be
analogous to the concept of commercial success in determining non-obviousness under U.S.
laws”).
 Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Indus., [1978] INSC 254, 777431
(Dec. 13, 1978) (upholding trial court’s grant of defendant’s petition for revocation under Patents
Act, 1911 of patented method of making utensils on ground that invention was “neither a manner
of new manufacture or novel improvement, nor did it involve any inventive step, having regard to
what was publicly known or used at the date of the patent”), available at
http://www.commonlii.org/in/cases/INSC/1978/254.html. 
 Id. at 765.432
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The “economic significance” language may be redundant with the utility/industrial applicability
requirement,  or it may be intended as an explicit reference to U.S.-style “commercial success”429
secondary considerations evidence.   Because many patents are applied for well before the invention430
claimed therein has attained any economic significance, however, strict imposition of the new
“economic significance” language is likely to prejudice independent inventors and small business
entities.  As is the case with method of use patenting, India’s quest to limit the patent rights of foreign
pharmaceutical manufacturers may have unintended negative consequences in the form of lessened
opportunities for patenting by indigenous inventors.  
Although Indian legislators in the course of amending the Patents Act presumably are not
bound to follow the Indian judiciary’s patent case precedent, it is worth noting that the statute’s new
definition of “inventive step” represents a departure from that precedent.  In Bishwanath Prasad v.
Hindustan Metal Indus.,  the Supreme Court of India clearly equated “inventive step” with431
“nonobviousness” and acknowledged that the terms have “acquired special significance in the
terminology of Patent Law.”   432
Whatever the established significance of “inventive step” to the judiciary (and the Patent
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 See Part IV.A.3.b infra.433
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 2(1)(l).434
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 2(1)(g).435
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 2(1)(l).  India recognizes a limited twelve-month pre-436
filing grace period for disclosures made with the inventor’s consent in government-designated
exhibitions or before learned societies.  See id. at § 31.  
 See European Patent Convention (2006) Art. 54(1) (providing that “[a]n invention shall437
be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art.”); id. at Art. 54(2)
(providing that “[t]he state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the
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Office), the Indian legislators discounted those understandings in favor of a broadened definition that
now gives the Patent Office and courts an explicit mandate to consider a claimed invention’s
economic significance.  Whether or not the changed definition will result in fewer new patents being
granted (and more existing patents being revoked) is a subject for future empirical study.  In the
meantime, however, because nothing in TRIPS explicitly prevents imposition of this new definition
for the inventive step criterion of patentability, it will be left to the Patent Office and the courts to
interpret and apply it in individual cases. 
C.  Novelty
In addition to defining “invention” as discussed supra,  the Patents Act, 1970 (2005) also433
includes a separate definition of “new invention.”   First made part of the Act by the 2005434
amendments,  a “new invention” is defined as “any invention or technology which has not been435
anticipated by publication in any document or used in the country or elsewhere in the world before
the date of filing of patent application with complete specification, i.e. the subject matter has not
fallen in public domain or that it does not form part of the state of the art.”436
The intent of this definition appears to be the elimination of any geographic limitations on the
source of prior art.  In other words, India appears to be adopting a system in which an invention must
be novel not only as compared with what was previously published or known or used in India, but
also novel with respect to earlier publications or knowledge or uses in any foreign country.  This
worldwide scope for prior art is entirely consistent with the standards of the European Patent
Convention.437
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public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of
filing of the European patent application.”).  
 The section 2(1)(j) definition of “invention” refers to a “new product or process . . .”438
but does not incorporate the phrase “new invention.”  See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005)
§ 2(1)(j); see also E-mail from Manisha Singh, Partner, Lex Orbis Intellectual Property Practice,
New Delhi  (Sept. 12, 2005) (on file with author) (commenting that “the tricky part is that the
new definition of ‘new invention’ remains unconnected with the definition of ‘invention’ [in
section] (2(1)(j) or the grounds for opposition in Section 25(1)(d) or (e)”).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 13 (“Search for anticipation by previous439
publication and by prior claim”).
 See id. at § 25(1)(d) (providing as ground for pre-grant opposition that “the invention440
. . . was publicly known or publicly used in India before the priority date . . .”); id. at § 25(1)(e)
(listing as ground for pre-grant opposition that “the invention . . . is obvious and clearly does not
involve any inventive step, having regard to what was used in India before the priority date . . .”).
 See id. at § 25(2)(d) (limited to prior public knowledge or use “in India”); id. at441
25(2)(e) (same).  
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What remains unclear, however, is whether the Indian Patent Office and/or the courts have
the necessary statutory authority to apply this broadened standard for anticipation.  Notably, the “new
invention” definition is not incorporated into or even referred to in any other section of the new
Patents Act.   In fact, other provisions of the Act appear to affirmatively prohibit the consideration438
of foreign uses (as opposed to foreign publications) of inventions as prior art.  For example, the
extent of an Indian patent examiner’s inquiry for anticipation includes searches of documents
published worldwide but makes no mention of prior use (in India or elsewhere).   Pre-grant439
opposition may be based on prior public knowledge or use of an invention “in India,” but foreign uses
are not mentioned.   Post-grant oppositions operate under the same restrictions.   In the absence440 441
of further legislative amendments to India’s patent law, clarification of this apparent discrepancy
awaits decisions from the Patent Office and/or the courts.     
D.  Opposition System 
India’s new patents regime provides for both pre- and post-grant opposition.  Each form of
opposition is discussed below.
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 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(1).  The Patents Rules further specify that442
representation for pre-grant opposition “shall be filed at the appropriate office within a period not
exceeding three months from the date of publication of the application under Section 11 A of the
Act, or before the grant of patent, whichever is later . . . .”  India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005),
§ 55(1).
Moreover, a pre-grant opposition will not be considered by the India Patent Office until
the patent applicant has filed a request for examination of its application.  See India Patents
(Amendment) Rules, 2005, § 23, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/The%20Patents%20(Amendments)%20Rules%202005%20(E
NGLISH).pdf (substituting new § 55(2) for prior (2003) version of § 55(2), and providing in new
§ 55(2) that “[t]he Controller shall consider such representation only when a request for
examination of the application has been filed.”).
 Id.  In contrast, the India Patents Act, 1970, specified that “any person interested”443
could file a pre-grant opposition.  See Patents Act, 1970, § 25(1).  It therefore appears that the
current law was intended to expand opportunities for the filing of pre-grant oppositions.    
 Id. at § 25(2).444
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(1) (a)-(k).445
 See id.446
 See 35 U.S.C. § 315[c)) (2006) (providing that “[a] third-party requester whose447
request for an inter partes reexamination results in an order under section 313 [35 USCS § 313] is
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1.  Pre-grant opposition
Section 25 of the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) provides for pre-grant opposition of pending
patent applications.  Representation against the grant of patent by way of  pre-grant opposition may
be made “[w]here an application for a patent has been published but a patent has not been granted
. . . .”   “Any person” may represent against the grant of a patent by way of pre-grant opposition,442 443
in contrast with notices of post-grant opposition which can be filed only by “any person interested.”444
The grounds on which pre-grant opposition may be based include virtually all patentability criteria,445
including anticipation, lack of inventive step, non-invention under Section 3 of the Patents Act
(including the anti-evergreening provisions of Section 3(d)), insufficient or unclear description of the
invention in the specification, failure to disclose the source of biological material used for the
invention, and inventions which are considered traditional knowledge.   In contrast with the U.S.446
inter partes reexamination system,  the Indian Patents Act does not place any estoppel limitations447
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estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil action arising in whole or in part under section
1338 of title 28, the invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any
ground which the third-party requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes
reexamination proceedings. . .”). 
 Nothing in the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25, mentions any estoppel or448
preclusive effect in subsequent litigation.
 See Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, § 9 (titled “Opposition to grant of patent”),449
reprinted in Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at Appendix 9.
 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 25(1) (providing that “[a]t any time within four months450
from the date of advertisement of the acceptance of a complete specification under this Act . . .
any person interested may give notice to the Controller of opposition to the grant of the patent on
any of the following grounds . . .”).
 For example, England provided for pre-grant opposition as early as its 1852 Patent Act. 451
See Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 903 & 903 n.16 (2002). 
The U.K. Patents and Designs Act, 1907, included pre-grant opposition.  See U.K. Patents and
Designs Act, 1907, § 11 (titled “Opposition to grant of patent”), reprinted in Narayanan (1998),
supra note 50, at 825, 828-29 (Appendix 16).  The U.K. Patents Act, 1949, also included pre-
grant opposition.  See U.K. Patents Act, 1949, at § 14, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/gb/gb003en.pdf.  Pre-grant opposition in which the
opposer became a formal party to the Patent Office proceedings was abolished in the U.K.’s
Patents Act 1977.  See Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 7-01 n.1.  
 See Jan Vojacek, A SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL NATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS (Prentice-452
Hall 1936), at 28 (noting that examination for novelty coupled with pre-grant opposition was first
introduced by Germany and was then [in 1936] utilized in Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
Finland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Great Britain, Australia, India, and Japan).
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on a party who previously filed a pre-grant opposition and later attempts to challenge the patent’s
validity in a court proceeding.     448
Although it is now under close scrutiny in the wake of pharmaceutical product patenting in
India, pre-grant opposition is not a new feature of India’s patent laws.  Pre-grant opposition was first
introduced in the India Patents Act, 1911,  and carried forward in the India Patents Act, 1970.449 450
India’s inclusion of pre-grant opposition procedures is likely modeled on the English patent laws in
force at those times, which themselves provided for pre-grant opposition.   Nor were the British the451
only patent system to have relied on pre-grant opposition; a number of other countries historically
used a system of novelty-only examination but coupled it with pre-grant opposition  as a means of452
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 See id. at 29 (describing pre-grant opposition as “a complement of . . . the official453
examination as to novelty, differing from the latter in that the public is invited to cooperate”).
 Currently, the patent laws of at least Brazil and Jordan also permit pre-grant454
opposition.  See Jordan Patent Law for the Year 1999, Art. 14 (proving that “[a]ny persona shall
be entitled to object on the registration of a patent to the Registrar, within a period not exceeding
three months from the date of publication in the Official Gazette of the preliminary approval of the
application.”), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/jo/jo011en.pdf (last visited
Jan. 26, 2006);  Brazil Patent Act § 158 (providing that after being docketed, the application shall
be published so that opposition may be presented within a period of 60 (sixty) days).
Most countries that once had pre-grant opposition have abolished it in favor of post-grant
opposition.  See Nancy J. Linck et al, A New Patent Examination System for the New Millenium,
35 HOUSTON L. REV. 305, 323 (1998) (stating that most countries “have now abandoned such
[pre-grant opposition] proceedings, either because of the delay they have caused or because they
wanted to harmonize their laws.”).  For example, Japan repealed its pre-grant opposition system
effective January 1, 1996.  See id. at 323 n.81.  Germany switched from a pre-grant to post-grant
opposition system in 1981.  See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent
System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1763, 781 (2002) (citing correspondence with Mr. Ulrich Joos,
German Patent Office (1994)).  The United Kingdom abolished pre-grant opposition in its Patents
Act 1977.  See Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 7-01 n.1.  A third party could nevertheless
make observations concerning patentability of published patent applications under the U.K.
Patents Act 1977 and have such observations considered by the Controller, but the third party did
not become a party to any proceedings under the Act.  See id.  
The U.S. does not currently allow pre-grant opposition, although members of the public
can submit copies of patents or publications to the USPTO which are relevant to published
pending patent applications.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(a) (2006).  Nothing in Rule 99 mandates that a
USPTO examiner consider or act upon such submissions, however.  See id.
 Manojit Saha, Drug patent: A Viagra for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, DECCAN455
HERALD, April 4, 2005 (describing three areas where the OPPI believes that India is lagging
behind in implementing “[w]orld [c]lass” intellectual property protection), available at
http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/apr42005/93626200543.asp.
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supplementing the resources of the patent examiner.  453
Today, however, India remains one of only a handful of countries that still permit pre-grant
opposition.   Among proponents of stronger patent protection, pre-grant opposition is perceived454
as a decided weakness of India’s new regime.  For example, the pro-patent reform Organization of
Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI) advocates that India should move away from pre-grant
opposition, as have “other leading countries and progressive nations.”   The OPPI views pre-grant455
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 See id.456
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(1) (providing that “the Controller shall, if457
requested by such person for being heard, hear him and dispose of such representation in such
manner and within such period as may be prescribed.”).
Other commentators have also objected to pre-grant opposition as denying the patent
applicant her due process.  See See LexOrbis, India’s Patents Bill, 2005–Is It TRIPS Compliant?,
at 3 (law firm monograph, on file with author) (noting that there is “no provision in the Bill
enabling the Applicant to counter the pre-grant opposition,” making it “a one-sided affair.”).
 Interview with P.K. Patni, Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, India Intellectual458
Property Office, New Delhi branch (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author). 
 In an interview with the author, the head of the New Delhi branch of India’s Intellectual459
Property Office stated that an appeal from the Patent Office’s decision in a pre-grant opposition
to the applicable High Court would not delay the grant of a patent.  Interview with K.S. Kardam,
Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, New Delhi (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with
author).  In accordance with the India Patents Rules, the Patent Office would continue with its
process of granting the patent rather than putting that process “on hold” due to any pending
appeal.  Mr. Kardam cited as his authority for this Rule 55(6), which provides that
[a]fter considering the representation and submission made during the
hearing if so requested, the Controller shall proceed further
simultaneously either rejecting the representation and granting the
patent or accepting the representation and refusing the grant of patent
on that application, ordinarily within one month from the completion
of above proceedings.
India Patent Rules, 2003 (2005) § 55(6).  This language was added by the 2005 amendments to
India’s Patent Rules.  See India Patent (Amendment) Rules, 2005, at § 23 (substituting new Rules
55 to 57 for “rules 55 to 57 of the Principal [2003] Rules”).
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opposition as unduly lengthening the pendency of patent applications.   The Act mandates that the456
party filing the pre-grant opposition receive a hearing before the Controller if requested,  which457
would presumably lengthen the time to grant even if patentability was affirmed over the opposer’s
arguments.   
The Indian Patent Office, charged with implementing the new laws, denies that pre-grant
opposition will delay patent grants.   Patent Office officials say that grant will not be postponed even458
in cases where an appeal is taken from the Controller’s decision in the opposition.   The government459
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Id.460
 Id.461
 See Why Do We Need to Amend Patents Act?, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004,462
at 11 (noting that “[t]he MNC lobby is pushing for a post-grant opposition, whereas the domestic
lobby is asking for a pre-grant opposition”).
 Interview with K.S. Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, in New463
Delhi, India (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author).  During the period of January through
October, 2005, a total of 7,914 patent applications were filed in the New Delhi branch office
(2,924 “ordinary” or directly-filed applications and 4,990 applications filed under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT)).  Interview with P.K. Patni, Deputy controller, Indian Intellectual
Property Office, New Delhi Branch (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author).  During the same
January through October 2005 time period, a total of 4,106 requests for examination were filed. 
Id.  
 Gladys Mirandah, supra note 357, at 135.464
 Id.465
 E-mail from Donald L. Corneglio, attorney for Eli Lilly Corp. (Jan. 20, 2006) (on file466
with author).  Following publication of Eli Lilly’s patent application summary, see OFFICIAL
JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, Feb. 11, 2005, at 24898, available at
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views pre-grant opposition as a helpful way of getting prior art before the examiner.   The same460
examiner that initially examined the application will receive and consider the pre-grant opponent’s
submission.461
Not surprisingly, Indian generic pharmaceutical manufacturers favored retention of pre-grant
opposition in the new Patents Act.   Early indications are that these firms will become frequent users462
of the procedure.  For example, between January and November 2005, thirty pre-grant oppositions
were filed with the Indian Patent Office’s New Delhi branch alone.   As of February 2006, “Indian463
drug companies including Cipla, Ranbaxy and Cadila ha[d] filed around 45 pre-grant oppositions in
the form of representations with the Controller of Patents.”   Many of these oppositions target464
recently published mailbox applications, including “Novartis’ anti-asthma molecule, Pfizer’s new
controlled use of a known molecule and Schering’s formulation for PEG Interferon Alpha
conjugates.”   Ranbaxy in September 2005 filed a pre-grant opposition against Eli Lilly’s Indian465
patent application on the erectile dysfunction drug tadalafil (marketed as Cialis).   Press reports in466
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http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/pat_arch_110205/official_journal_110205.pdf
(PDF page 278), Ranbaxy filed its pre-grant opposition on September 23, 2005.  E-mail from
Donald L. Corneglio, attorney for Eli Lilly Corp. (Jan. 20, 2006) (on file with author).  Lilly
responded and requested a hearing.  Id.  The Indian Patent Office ordered Ranbaxy to file written
arguments in December 2005.  Id.  The matter was still pending as of April 2006.  E-mail from
Donald L. Corneglio, attorney for Eli Lilly Corp. (Mar. 31, 2006) (on file with author).  See also
P.T. Jyothi Datta, Pharma cos fight pitched battle on patent turf, HINDU BUSINESS LINE, March
7, 2006, available at http://www.blonnet.com/2006/03/08/stories/2006030801810300.htm
(reporting that Ranbaxy is opposing Eli Lilly’s “erectile dysfunction drug Tadalafil”).
 See Datta, Pharma cos fight, supra note 466 (reporting that “there are more than 40467
pre-grant oppositions in Delhi, over 20 in Chennai, an excess of 15 in Mumbai, and a similar
number in Kolkata”). 
 See id.468
 Greg Aharonian, AIDS Patent Application is Opposed in India, INTERNET PATENT469
NEWS SERVICE, March 30, 2006 (on file with author).
 See id.470
 Id.471
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March 2006 estimated that over 100 pre-grant oppositions were then pending in the four Patent
Office branches,  including challenges filed by Indian generic firms against pending patent467
applications on Astra Zeneca’s cholesterol drug Rosuvastatin, Pfizer's anti-fungal drug Voriconazole,
Wockhardt’s anti-bacterial drug Nadifloxacin, and Gilead-Roche’s bird-flu drug oseltamivir, and
Astra Aktiebolag’s formulation of ulcer drug Omeprazole.468
Non-governmental organizations and healthcare advocacy groups are also using the pre-grant
opposition proceeding as a new and potent weapon to challenge the grant of patents on essential
medicines.  On March 30, 2006, a pre-grant opposition was collectively filed by the Indian Network
of People Living with HIV/AIDS, the Manipur Network of Positive People, and the Lawyers’
Collective HIV/AIDS Unit in the Kolkata branch of the Indian Patent Office against the grant of a
patent on Glaxo’s combination therapy for HIV/AIDS.   Sold under the brand name Combivir, the469
drug is a fixed-dose combination of two AIDS drugs, zidovudine and lamivudine (AZT/3TC).   The470
grounds on which the AIDS groups’ opposition are based are reportedly “technical and health
grounds.”   On May 9, 2006, the Indian Patent Office heard arguments in a different pre-grant471
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See Amelia Gentleman and Hari Kumar, AIDS Groups in India Sue to Halt Patent for472
U.S. Drug, NEW YORK TIMES, May 12, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/world/asia/12aids.html?ex=1151121600&en=4be577c1c936
696c&ei=5070. 
 See Gentleman and Kumar, supra note 472.   The Novartis AG patent application titled473
“Crystal Modification of a N-Phenyl-2-Pyrimidineamine Derivative . . .,” the active ingredient in
Glivic, is No. 1602/MAS/1998A, filed July 17, 1998.  See OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT
OFFICE, Oct. 28, 2005, at 24057, available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/pat_arch_102005/official_journal_28102005.pdf
(PDF page 199).   
 See Notice for Termination of Exclusive Marketing Right EMR/1/2002, OFFICIAL474
JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, February 17, 2006, at 9, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/pat_arch_022006/official_journ
al_17022006.pdf (confirming that “the Patent application 1602/Mas/98 has been refused by the
Controller on 25.01.2006 as a result of pre-grant opposition”).  The Controller’s refusal of
Novartis’s patent application also had the effect of extinguishing its EMR, see id., which had been
the subject of ongoing litigation in the High Courts.  See Part V.B.3 infra.  
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opposition filed by the Delhi Network of Positive People and the Indian Network for People Living
with HIV/AIDS against the grant of a patent on Gilead Sciences’ application claiming the HIV/AIDS
therapy tenofovir, sold by Gilead under the brand name Viread.   472
Although most of the newly-filed pre-grant oppositions are still pending, some have already
succeeded in preventing the grant of Indian patents.  For example, Indian cancer patients (along with
generic drug manufacturers) filed a pre-grant opposition against the grant of a patent on Novartis’
claimed beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate, the active ingredient in an anti-cancer drug sold
by Swiss pharmaceutical manufacturer Novartis AG under the brand name Glivic (sometimes spelled
Gleevec).  According to press reports, the opposition asserted that Glivic was “a new form of an old
drug,”  presumably under Section 3(d) of the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005).  The Indian Patent473
Office agreed, refusing on January 25, 2006 to allow the Glivic application.    474
Although information on pre-grant oppositions is being made public by the opposers and the
press, accurate information on the volume of pre-grant opposition filings is not yet available from the
Indian government.  The Patent Office does not currently make public any information about the filing
of pre-grant oppositions, for example, through publication of notices of such filings in the Official
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 See E-mail from Dr. Gopakumar G. Nair, Gopakumar Nair Associates, Mumbai, India475
(Feb. 10, 2006) (stating that “[p]re-grant oppositions form part of prosecution history. These are
not published, unless a ‘spoken order’ granting or rejecting the application is made available to
the opposition.”) (on file with author).  See also E-mail from attorney Manoj Pillai, Lex Orbis
Intellectual Property Practice, New Delhi, dated April 1, 2006 (on file with author) (confirming
that Indian Patent Office does not publish notices of filings of pre-grant oppositions). 
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(1).476
 See India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005) § 55 (titled “Opposition by representation against477
the grant of patent”).  
 See id. at § 55(3) (providing that “[o]n consideration of the representation if the478
Controller is of the opinion that application for patent shall be refused or the complete
specification requires amendment, he shall give a notice to the applicant to that effect.”).  
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act (2005) § 23 (substituting into the principal Act a479
new § 25, titled “Opposition to the patent,” which provides for post-grant opposition in new
subsection 25(2), for previous (2002) version of § 25, titled “Opposition to grant of patent”). 
Prior to the 2005 amendments, India’s patent laws provided for only pre-grant opposition.  See
India Patents Act, 1970 (as amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 and the Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2002), § 25, reprinted in UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED
BY THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005 (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi)
(2005), at 172, 178-79 (“Annexe”).
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Journal.   The Controller’s only obligation when a party represents by way of opposition against475
the grant of patent, if that party has requested that it be heard, is to “hear him and dispose of such
representation in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed.”   The corresponding476
Patent Rules are silent in terms of any obligation of the Controller to give the public notice of the
filing of pre-grant oppositions.   In cases where the Controller does not deem the pre-grant477
opposition of sufficient merit to justify either refusal of a patent or amendment of the specification,
the rules do not even require the Controller to inform the patent applicant of the existence of the pre-
grant opposition.     478
2.  Post-grant opposition
Unlike pre-grant opposition, post-grant opposition is an entirely new feature of the India
Patents Act, 1970 (2005), added by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.   Notice of post-grant479
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(2) (providing that “[a]t any time after the480
grant of patent but before the expiry of a period of one year from the date of publication of grant
of a patent, any person interested may give notice of opposition to the Controller in the prescribed
manner on any of the following grounds . . . .”).  In contrast, an opposition against a European
patent must be filed within nine months from the publication of the mention of its grant.  See
European Patent Convention (2006) Art. 99(1).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(2).481
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 2(1)(t).  This definition is “not exhaustive and would482
appear to be capable of a liberal interpretation.”  Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 8-12.  The
standing requirement was first introduced in the India Patents Act, 1970, mirroring the
introduction of a “person interested” standing requirement for the filing of oppositions in the U.K.
Patents Act of 1949.  See id.  British courts recognized that “a member of the public having no
interest was not entitled to oppose the grant of a patent; as otherwise, the system might be used
so as to cause a vast amount of annoyance and expense of a most objectionable character to
patentees.”  Id.  
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(2) (a)-(k) (setting forth various grounds for483
post-grant opposition which mirror those set forth for pre-grant opposition at § 25(1) (a)-(k)); see
also Patent Opposition Post 2005!, in LEXORBIS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRACTICE
NEWSLETTER (Fall 2005), at 3, 4 (noting “negligible difference between the pre-grant and post-
grant opposition”).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(3)(b) (providing that “[o]n receipt of such484
notice of opposition, the Controller shall, by order in writing, constitute a Board to be known as
the Opposition Board consisting of such officers as he may determine and refer such notice of
opposition along with the documents to that Board for examination and submission of its
recommendations to the Controller.”).  See also India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005) § 56(1)
(providing that on receipt of notice of opposition, the “Controller shall, by order, constitute an
Opposition Board consisting of three members and nominate one of the members as the Chairman
of the Board.”);  id. at § 56(3) (providing that “[t]he examiner, who has dealt with the application
for patent during the proceeding for grant of patent thereon shall not be eligible as member of
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opposition must be filed in the one-year window following patent grant.   Post-grant oppositions480
can be filed only by “person[s] interested,”  which the statutes elsewhere defines non-exclusively481
as “includ[ing] a person engaged in, or in promoting, research in the same field as that to which the
invention relates.”   The grounds for post-grant opposition are essentially identical to those on482
which pre-grant opposition may be based, including virtually all patentability criteria.   Post-grant483
oppositions will be heard by a three-person Opposition Board that does not include the original patent
examiner.   After receiving the Board’s recommendation and giving “the patentee and the opponent484
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
[the] Opposition Board . . .”).  
Exclusion of the original examiner from the post-grant Opposition Board has benefits as
well as costs.  See  Patent Opposition Post 2005!, in LexOrbis Intellectual Property Practice
Newsletter (Fall 2005), at 3, 4 (stating that “[o]n one hand, this provision precludes the
apprehension of bias from the mind of the opponent, on the other hand the examiner who has
initially examined the application, and therefore understands the case and can provide better
advi[c]e, is no more a part of the opposition proceedings.”). 
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 25(4).485
 Id.  486
 See European Patent Office, The EPO in Figures, at Table 7.6, available at487
http://annual-report.european-patent-office.org/2004/statistics/_pdf/tab_7_6_splitted.pdf
(reporting that during 1978 to 2004, a total of 707,456 patents were granted by the EPO and
44,885 patents were opposed, for a ratio of 6.3 %);  id. (reporting that during 2004 alone, a total
of 58,730 patents were granted by the EPO and 3,110 were opposed, for a ratio of 5.3 %).  See
also Gerald J. Mossinghoff and Vivian S. Kuo, Post-Grant Review of Patents: Enhancing the
Quality of the Fuel of Interest, 43 IDEA 83, 99 (2002) (reporting 6.5 and 7.2 percent rates of
opposition for European patents granted in 1999 and 2000, respectively).
 After hearing the parties and considering the recommendation of the Opposition Board,488
the Controller must “notify his decision to the parties giving reasons therefor.”  India Patents
Rules, 2003 (2005) § 62(5).  
In contrast, the complete contents of files of European patents and applications, including
DRAFT August 16, 2006 (6:48pm) 100
an opportunity of being heard,”  the Controller “shall order either to maintain or to amend or to485
revoke the patent.”486
Post-grant opposition is a very important aspect of European patent practice (although not
yet part of U.S. patent law); approximately six percent of patents granted under the European Patent
Convention are the subject of post-grant oppositions.   It remains to be seen whether India’s new487
post-grant opposition procedure will be used more or less frequently, although presumably an
increasing number of oppositions will be filed as the first pharmaceutical product patents begin to
issue.  The number (if any) of post-grant oppositions filed (against patents on any type of invention)
during the first eighteen months of India’s new patents regime (January 2005 to June 2006) is
unknown.  Nothing in the Patents Act or Rules requires the Controller to publish in the Official
Journal the fact that a post-grant opposition has been initiated or to publish his decision and the
reasons therefor; he need only share these with the parties.     488
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
decisions in any opposition proceedings, are made available to the public at the EPO’s Online
Public File Inspection facility, available at http://ofi.epoline.org/view/GetDossier (last visited July
25, 2006).  “The European Patent Office's Online Public File Inspection service implements
Article 128 of the European Patent Convention, according to which the public is entitled to
inspect the complete contents of the files relating to all European patent applications after they
have been published.”  Id.  For example, a search of the EPO records for European Patent No.
0169672, the Harvard “oncomouse” patent, provides access to an image file of the January 16,
2003 decision of the Opposition Division maintaining the patent (titled “Interlocutory decision in
opposition proceedings (Article 106(3) EPC)”). 
 See notes 187-196 supra and accompanying text for further discussion of exclusive489
marketing rights (EMRs). 
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11A(7).  Although the statute does not state a490
geographic limitation, presumably the prior user defense of Section 11A(7) is limited to those
enterprises who manufactured the patented drug in India prior to January 1, 2005 and whom
continue to do so after January 1, 2005.   
 See id.491
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E.  Prior User Rights Vis a Vis Patents from Mailbox Applications
One of the most controversial features of India’s new patent law is a prohibition on lawsuits
for infringement of patents that issue from the mailbox applications that were filed during the TRIPS
transition period.  Regardless of whether a mailbox applicant also sought and received an EMR,489
the rights conveyed by a patent issuing from a mailbox application are now subject to significant
curtailment.  Section 11A(7) of the Patents Act, 1970 (2005) makes the prohibition on infringement
lawsuits specific to patents that issue after January 1, 2005 from mailbox applications, where a
competing firm was already making and selling (presumably in India) the patented product prior to
January 1, 2005.   Owners of the effected patents will be entitled to recover only “reasonable490
royalties” for ongoing infringement; injunctive relief is precluded, as is even the filing of an
infringement lawsuit.   The pertinent statutory language reads (emphasis added):491
On and from the date of publication of the application for patent and until
the date of grant of a patent in respect of such application, the applicant shall have
the like privileges and rights as if a patent for the invention had been granted on
the date of publication of the application: 
Provided that the applicant shall not be entitled to institute any
proceedings for infringement until the patent has been granted: 
Provided further that the rights of a patentee in respect of [mailbox]
applications made under sub-section (2) of section 5 before the 1st day of January,
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 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11A(7) (emphasis added).  The quoted language was492
inserted into the statute by the India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 10[c] (effective January
1, 2005).
 Professor Abbott has referred to the Section 11A(7) remedies limitation as “a form of493
‘prior user right’ adapted to India’s unique situation.”  Frederick M. Abbott, Beginning of a New
Policy Chapter, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April 6, 2006, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/print.php?content_id=87112.
 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 87 (titled “Certain patents deemed to be endorsed with494
the words ‘Licenses of right.’”), reprinted in Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 543, 575.  For a
reported example of a license of right, see Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Controller General of
Patents, AIR 1978 Calcutta 77 (decision of Calcutta High Court affirming Controller of Patents’
order deeming Imperial’s patent, claiming a catalyst useful in hydrocarbon reforming as well as a
process for making the catalyst, to be subject to licensing of right). 
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, § 39 (substituting new Chapter XVI495
(containing sections 82 to 94) for then-existing Chapter XVI (containing sections 82 to 98)).
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2005 shall accrue from the date of grant of the patent:
Provided also that after a patent is granted in respect of [mailbox]
applications made under sub-section (2) of section 5, the patent-holder shall only
be entitled to receive reasonable royalty from such enterprises which have made
significant investment and were producing and marketing the concerned product
prior to the 1st day of January, 2005 and which continue to manufacture the
product covered by the patent on the date of grant of the patent and no
infringement proceedings shall be instituted against such enterprises.492
In effect, this provision combines features of both the prior user rights defense  and493
compulsory licensing.  The prior use of the patented invention by the competing firm is privileged and
allowed to continue after the mailbox patent issues, but the patent owner will be entitled to receive
a reasonable royalty for ongoing use.  The distinction, however, is that a prior user right is generally
implemented as a complete defense to infringement, negating the recovery of any damages by the
patentee as against that prior user.  
The more accurate comparison, then, is to compulsory licensing.  The new remedies limitation
of Section 11A(7) effectively confers on the third parties who marketed the patented drug prior to
January 1, 2005 a “license of right.”  Earlier versions of India’s patent laws expressly included
licenses of right for patents claiming drug manufacturing processes,  but these provisions were494
deleted from the statute by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.   The Section 11A(7) remedies495
limitation effectively returns the license of right concept to India’s patent law for mailbox patents.
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 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 69 (stating that because “the Bill of 2003 [i.e., the496
Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2003, which was introduced into Parliament in December 2003 but
later lapsed] was silent on the issue, apprehensions were expressed that if and when the MNCs get
patents on these [mailbox] applications, the generic companies may not only have to suspend
operations (as in the case of Gleevec [an anti-cancer drug for which Novartis obtained and
successfully enforced an EMR]) but also may be hauled up for patent infringement.”).  Chaudhuri
further explains that the new § 11A(7) of the Patents Act, 1970 (2005), means that for patents
issuing from mailbox applications, “patent rights will accrue only from the date of grant of patent
and [] patent infringement cases cannot be filed before the grant of the patent.”  Id.  “Thus Indian
generic companies were not required to immediately suspend production and would not face any
penalty for their past manufacturing and marketing activities.”  Id. at 69-70.  Under the 2005 Act,
the generic firms “need not suspend production . . . [and] can continue to produce on payment of
‘reasonable royalty’ to patent holders . . . .”  Id. at 70. 
 Not all commentators appear to agree.  See Ragavan, supra note 87, at 291 (stating497
that “[c]urrently, the Indian patent legislation is fully compliant with TRIPS”). 
 See LexOrbis, India’s Patents Bill, 2005–Is It TRIPS Compliant?, at 3 (law firm498
monograph, on file with author).
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The distinction, however, is that it is now the patentee who appears to bear the burden of seeking its
reasonable royalty recovery, while the competitor need not have obtained any governmental (or
patentee) approval in advance of undertaking its manufacturing of the now-patented drug.  
No other provision of India’s new patents regime more clearly displays the tensions between
MNC patent holders and Indian generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.  From the MNC perspective,
the Section 11A(7) remedies abrogation for mailbox patents raises serious questions of TRIPS
compliance and  may have the potential to catalyze the filing of another dispute proceeding against
India in the WTO.  On the other hand, the indigenous concerns see this provision as critical to the
protection of their industry and a legitimate interpretation and exploitation of the flexibilities provided
to India by the TRIPS Agreement’s transition period arrangements.   496
Whether the Section 11A(7) remedies limitation for mailbox patents complies with TRIPS is
an open question.   The limitation on patent owner remedies has been said to “take[] away the very497
sanctity of Mail Box and transitional protection as envisaged in the TRIPS Agreement . . . and
definitely makes the [provision] TRIPS non-compliant.”   The Organization of Pharmaceutical498
Producers of India (OPPI) charges that the new statutory framework “treats patent holders in respect
of mail box applications on a discriminatory footing in so far as them being denied the rights and
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 See http://www.indiaoppi.com/pharmindindia.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006) (section499
titled “Intellectual Property Rights”).
 The USTR’s report states in pertinent part:500
India took a significant positive step toward strengthening patent
protection when it promulgated a temporary Patent Amendment
Ordinance at the end of 2004 and then passed permanent legislation
in early 2005.  However, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry reports
shortcomings in this patent legislation that we hope India will correct.
Most notably, the new law does not permit holders of patents that will
issue from “mailbox” applications to enforce their rights with respect
to generic copies that continue to be marketed on the date that the
patent is granted.  The extent to which India's new patent legislation
satisfies India’s TRIPS commitments is still under review and will
depend, in part, on its implementation.  Thus, we will monitor closely
India’s implementation of the patent amendment.
United States Trade Representative, SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Special_301/ass
et_upload_file195_7636.pdf. 
 The first pharmaceutical product patent to issue under India’s new patents regime was501
reportedly granted on March 2, 2006 to Roche India Pvt. Ltd., the Indian subsidiary of Swiss
pharmaceutical giant Hoffman-La Roche.  See Datta, Roche Gets Product Patent, supra note 9.  
 Id.502
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privileges from the date of publication retrospectively.”   The Office of the U.S. Trade499
Representative’s 2005 Special 301 Report singled out the remedies limitation as problematic,
indicated that the Office questions its TRIPS compliance, and warned that it will be closely
monitoring India’s implementation thereof.   500
This controversial remedies limitation had not yet been tested.  As of March 2006, only a
single pharmaceutical product patent had been granted in India, on a new-generation Hepatitis C
treatment marketed by Hoffman-La Roche as Pegasys.   According to Roche, no generic versions501
of Pegasys were being manufactured by third parties in India prior to the grant of Roche’s Indian
patent.   Thus, the Section 11A(7) compulsory license/prior user right is not available to Indian502
generics who wish to manufacture generic versions of Pegasys, currently sold by Roche in India at
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See note 305 supra.  Despite the apparent non-availability of a Section 11A(7) license,503
generic drug manufacturers may seek compulsory licenses to make and sell Pegasys under other
provisions of India’s Patents Act as discussed infra.  For example, a compulsory license
application might be filed under Section 84 of the Patents Act based on an allegation of
unreasonable pricing, but such applications are not permitted until three years after patent grant. 
See Section IV.F.1, supra.  On the other hand, compulsory licenses would be available
immediately if the Indian government declared by notification in the Patent Office’s Official
Gazette that it is necessary to make compulsory licenses available under the Roche patent in
“circumstances of national emergency or . . . extreme urgency or in case of public non-commercial
use.”  India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 92(1).  See also Section IV.F.2, supra.  The potential
market is considerable; approximately 11 million Indian citizens are estimated to suffer from
chronic Hepatitis C, see P.T. Jyothi Datta, Gilead Sciences-Roche Spat–Uneasy Clam Prevails
Over Bird Flu Drug, HINDU BUSINESS LINE, Oct. 26, 2005, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2005102702930500.htm&date=2005/1
0/27/&prd=bl&, more than twice as many as the estimated number suffering from HIV/AIDS. 
See Lawrence K. Altman, New H.I.V. Cases Reported to Drop in Southern India, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A5 (reporting that an estimated 5.1 million Indians are now living
with HIV).
 TRIPS Art. 27.1.504
 TRIPS Art. 28.1(a).505
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a price of about $10,000 per patient per year.503
The TRIPS Agreement requires that “patent rights [shall be] enjoyable without discrimination
as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products or imported or locally
produced.”   India’s remedies limitation for mailbox patents can be seen as discriminatory based on504
“the field of technology;” i.e., the field of pharmaceutical products.  TRIPS also mandates that “where
the subject matter of a patent is a product,” the patent owner shall have the exclusive rights “to
prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing[] for these purposes that product. . . .”   India’s remedies limitation for mailbox505
patents severely restricts these exclusive rights by limiting the patentee to reasonable royalties.  
The mechanics of seeking the limited relief under the new remedies limitation on mailbox
patents are also quite murky.  In the absence of a patent infringement lawsuit, the statute does not
specify how owners of patents issuing from mailbox applications are to establish their claim for
reasonable royalties, let alone how the amount of such royalties will be determined.  Presumably the
determination of whether such patentees are eligible for royalties and in what amount will be made
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 James Love, Options to Traditional Patents, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April 6, 2005, 506
available at http://www.financialexpress.com/print.php?content_id=87107 (asserting that “[s]oon
a large number of compulsory licenses will be issued for products now manufactured in India,
which are subject to the mailbox patents. This will increase the familiarity with compulsory
licensing and provide needed expertise in setting reasonable remuneration to patent owners.”),
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11A(7).507
 See id.508
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in the first instance by the Indian Patent Office in response to a claim for royalties made by the
patentee.  Because the Patent Office is already responsible for receiving and acting on compulsory
license applications, it would not be surprising if the agency created a similar administrative procedure
for mailbox patent owners seeking royalties from the generic firms that manufactured the patented
invention prior to January 1, 2005.  In this regard, the Patent Office may develop much-needed
expertise in determining what royalty rates are “reasonable.”    506
On the other hand, a patentee who questioned whether a generic firm was in fact making the
patented drug in India prior to January 1, 2005, might attempt to go directly to the Indian courts by
filing a lawsuit for infringement.  The burden would then be placed on the generic firm to respond by
showing that the remedies limitation should apply to shield it from any remedy beyond the payment
of royalties.  Presumably the court hearing the infringement action, if it agreed with the generic firm,
would determine what royalty rate was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. 
The new remedies limitation on mailbox patents raises a host of other interpretive questions
that will likely await resolution by the Patent Office and/or the courts.  For example, the mailbox
patentee is limited to a reasonable royalty from manufacturing third parties who have made
“significant investment. . . .”   One might argue that the patentee retains the right to sue and enjoin507
(rather than merely recover royalties from) lower-volume producers, but in such cases the cost of a
lawsuit may outweigh any potential recovery.  The statute also speaks of royalty payments on the part
of third parties that were “producing and marketing” the “concerned product” prior to January 1,
2005.  Would a firm that imports the drug from abroad, rather than manufactures it in India, be
subject to payment of reasonable royalties?  As noted above, the statute is not even clear as to
whether such “producing and marketing” must have occurred in India.   The statute also speaks of508
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 See Interview with attorney Krishna Sarma, Corporate Law Group, in New Delhi, India509
(Nov. 14, 2005) (transcript on file with author).  
 Saha, supra note 455.510
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(c].511
 Id. at § 84(b).512
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 85 (titled “Revocation of patents by the Controller for513
non-working”).  Section 85 provides that, beginning two years after a compulsory license has
been granted under a patent, the Central Government or any “interested person” may apply to the
Controller for an order revoking the patent.  The grounds on which revocation may be granted
under Section 85 are the same as those on which a compulsory license under Section 84 may be
granted: “the patented invention has not been worked in the territory of India or that reasonable
requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention has not been satisfied or that the
patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price.”  India Patents
Act, 1970 (2005) § 85(1).  An application for revocation “shall ordinarily be decided within one
year of its being presented to the Controller.”  Id. at § 85(4).  
It is unclear whether the Indian government has granted revocation of patents under
Section 85 with any frequency.  For example, one article states that India’s revocation provisions
“have been applied ten to fifteen times in the past two decades,” but cites no documentary
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the “product covered by the patent,” which raises the question of whether the third party’s product
must fall within the literal scope of the patent’s claims, or rather could be an equivalent outside the
literal scope but still within the scope of the subject matter enabled by the patent’s specification.   
F.  Compulsory Licensing 
This section describes the compulsory licensing provisions of India’s Patents Act, 1970
(2005), which are potentially applicable to all patents, not merely those issuing from mailbox
applications as described in the preceding section.  India’s compulsory licensing provisions are
undoubtedly the broadest and most comprehensive of all the world’s patent systems,  and so they509
justify explanation in some detail.  As codified in India’s patent law and described in further detail
below, the grounds upon which compulsory licenses may be granted go “much beyond national
emergency and extreme[ly] urgent situations, public health cris[e]s and anti-trust situations.”   They510
include the failure to work the invention in India  and even the non-availability of the patented511
invention at a “reasonably affordable price.”   These same grounds can even form the basis for the512
ultimate sanction against a patent holder, in the form of government revocation of its patent.   513
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evidence thereof.  See Martin J. Adelman and Sonia Baldia,  Prospects and Limits of the Patent
Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 524
(1996). 
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 83.514
 The India Patents Act, 1970, included principles (a) and (b) verbatim.  See India515
Patents Act, 1970, § 83(a)-(b), reprinted in Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 543, 573.
 According to one Indian Patent Office official, only three (or possibly five) compulsory516
licenses have been granted “in the history of the Indian Patent Office.”  Interview with P.K. Patni,
Deputy controller, Indian Intellectual Property Office, New Delhi Branch (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes
on file with author).  An experienced Indian patent agent confirmed that compulsory licenses have
been granted on only five occasions thus far.  Interview with L. Balasubrahmanyam, Head of
Intellectual Property Practice and Authorised Patent Agent, Corporate Law Group, in New Delhi,
India (Nov. 14, 2005) (transcript on file with author).  
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 93 (noting that although the Patents and Designs Act517
of 1911 had “elaborate” provisions for compulsory licensing, “during the British rule not a since
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The expansive scope of India’s compulsory licensing provisions is certainly consistent with
the Patents Act’s broadly stated “[g]eneral principles applicable to working of patented inventions”:
(a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the
inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that
is reasonably practicable without undue delay;
(b) that [patents] are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly
for the importation of the patented article; 
. . . 
(g) that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention available
at reasonably affordable prices to the public.  514
Like pre-grant opposition, these guiding principles are not new ideas for India; identical provisions
were included in the Patents Act, 1970  and reflect the Ayyangar Report’s focus on shedding the515
vestiges of colonialism through encouragement of a domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing industry.
Despite what would appear to be the easy availability of compulsory licenses, India has rarely
granted them.  According to Indian Patent Office officials and Indian patent attorneys, fewer than half
a dozen compulsory licenses have been granted in the history of India’s patent system.   Academic516
commentary confirms this low number, but does not indicate when the licenses were granted, under
what patents, to whom, and on what grounds.   Reported decisions of the Indian Patent Office or517
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compulsory license was granted.”) (citing a 1947 report of government-appointed Panel on Fine
Chemicals, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, at 15);  id. (further noting that “till 1972, that is, when the
1970 Act came into force, only five applications were made for compulsory licences.  It was
granted in only two cases and refused in one case.  The applications were ultimately withdrawn in
the remaining two cases.”) (citing Sudip Chaudhuri, “Indigenous Firms in Relation to the
Transnational Corporations in the Drug Industry in India,” unpublished thesis, New Delhi:
Jawaharlal Nehru University (1984));  Santanu Mukherjee, The Journey of Indian Patent Law
Towards TRIPS Compliance, 35 IIC: INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
COMPETITION LAW 125, 146 (2004) (“[i]t cannot be ignored that the compulsory licensing
provision was hardly used earlier under the old patent law, even when there were softer
provisions on compulsory licensing.”);  Bagchi, supra note 52, at 299 (compiling data in Table 5
showing that during eight-year period of fiscal years 1972-73 to 1979-80, a total of eight
applications for compulsory license were filed under Section 84 of the Patents Act, 1970; only
one or two of these applications appears to have been granted).   
 Two leading treatises on Indian patent law cite virtually no Indian court cases on518
compulsory patent licensing.  See Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 259-284 (Chapter 14,
titled “Compulsory Licenses, Licenses of Right and Revocation for Non-working”) (citing U.K.
case law entirely except for two Indian cases); Verkey, supra note 63, at 319-38 (Chapter 10,
titled “Compulsory Licensing) (citing no Indian cases).  The only Indian cases cited by Narayanan
in his chapter on compulsory licensing are Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Controller General of
Patents, Designs and Trademarks, AIR 1978 Cal 77 (High Court decision affirming Controller of
Patents’ order granting a “license of right” under India Patents Act, 1970, § 88 [now repealed]);
and Catalysts & Chems. India (West Asia) Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. (1976) IPLR 84
(concerning application for interim working of invention covered by patent endorsed for “licenses
of right” under India Patents Act, 1970, § 88 [now repealed]).  See Narayanan (1998), supra note
50, at 277 n.2 (citing Imperial Chem.); id. at 282 n.1 (citing Catalysts).
 Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 89.519
 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 53(a) (providing that “in respect of an invention520
claiming the method or process of manufacture of a substance, where the substance is intended
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the High Courts concerning compulsory licenses are scant.   The low numbers of compulsory518
licenses granted in the past are not surprising in view of India’s earlier refusal to grant patents on
pharmaceutical products under the Patents Act, 1970.  “[A] compulsory license was redundant in the
previous [pre-2005] regime [because] [b]eing free to produce the patented drugs, the indigenous
firms could develop their own processes and they [] did so. . . .”   Compulsory licenses were519
probably not needed the case of pharmaceutical process patents, either, because under the pre-TRIPS
regime such patents lasted only five to seven years  (and compulsory licenses in most cases could520
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
for use, or is capable of being used, as food or as a medicine or drug, be five years from the date
of sealing of the patent, or seven years from the date of the patent whichever period is shorter”).
The “date of sealing” in this provision was basically the date of grant, while the “date of the
patent” was apparently the date on which the complete specification had been filed.  See India
Patents Act, 1970, § 45(1).
 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 84(1) (providing that compulsory license applications521
could be filed “[a]t any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the sealing of the
patent”).  
 See Interview with A.S. Krishna, Director of Corporate Affairs, Pfizer India, in New522
Delhi, India (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with author). 
 See Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 116 (titled “Appellate Board”).  As of January 2006,523
the patent Appellate Board was not yet in operation.  Email correspondence from attorney Manoj
Pillai, Lex Orbis Intellectual Property Practice, New Delhi, dated Jan. 28, 2006 (on file with
author).  For further discussion of the patent Appellate Board, see Part V.A.5 infra.
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 117A(2) (providing that an “appeal shall lie to the524
Appellate Board from any decision, order or direction of the Controller . . . under . . . sub-
sections (1) to (5) of section 84.”).  
 The jurisdiction of the patent Appellate Board to review the Controller’s decisions525
granting compulsory licenses and setting their terms may raise a question of TRIPS compliance. 
The compulsory licensing provisions of TRIPS mandate that “the legal validity of any decision
relating to the authorization of [a compulsory license] shall be subject to judicial review or other
independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member,” TRIPS Art. 31(i), and that
“any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of [a compulsory license] shall be
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that
Member.”  Id. at Art. 31(j).  Once operational, will the patent Appellate Board’s review of the
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not even be applied for until three years after grant ).   521
Nevertheless, the fact that India has rarely granted compulsory licenses in the past does not
guarantee the same infrequency in the future.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Indian generic
pharmaceutical firms will take maximum advantage of opportunities to obtain compulsory licenses
under the pharmaceutical product patents that issue from January 1, 2005 onwards.  The ambiguity
of the compulsory licensing provisions and the broad discretion they confer on the Controller is a
source of much discomfort to MNC patent holders.   The not-yet operational patent Appellate522
Board,  which will have jurisdiction to review the Patent Office’s decisions on compulsory license523
grants and terms,  is likewise inexperienced in this area.524 525
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Controller’s decisions on compulsory licenses constitute “independent review by a distinct higher
authority” in India?  As further discussed in Part V.A.5 infra, the Indian Central Government is
responsible for appointing members to the patent Appellate Board.  See India Patents Act, 1970
(2005) § 117.  One way for a candidate to qualify as the “Technical Member” of the patent
Appellate Board is to have served as the Controller of Patents for five years.  See id. at
§ 116(2)(a).  The issue then becomes whether a patent Appellate Board that constitutes a former
Controller of Patents would operate in a manner that is truly independent of and distinct from the
Patent Office.  
 See India Declares Arrival of Avian Flu Where 50,000 Birds Died, NEW YORK TIMES,526
Feb. 19, 2006, at A12 (reporting the announcement of India’s first cases of bird flu after
thousands of birds infected with the deadly A(H5N1) strain died in India’s western Maharashtra
state).
 The Indian government has publicly announced plans to stockpile Tamiflu in case of a527
bird flu outbreak.  See India Creating Emergency Stockpile of Bird Flu Drug, TIMES OF INDIA,
Dec. 1, 2005, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1313900.cms.
 See TamiFlu, India and the Compulsory Licensing Dilemma!, LEXORBIS NEWSLETTER528
(Nov. 7, 2005), at 2 (on file with author).  Roche has sought permission from India’s Union
Health Ministry to market Tamiflu in India, and its mailbox application (No. 396/DEL/96) is being
processed on a fast track.  Id.  Roche acquired the ‘396 mailbox application from Gilead Sciences,
Inc., the U.S. biotech firm whose scientists invented the drug.  See India Patent Application No.
396/DEL/1996 A, filed Feb. 26, 1996, titled “Carbocyclic Compounds,” OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF
THE PATENT OFFICE, March 11, 2005, at 1277, available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/pat_arch_110305/official%20journal%2011.03.20
05.pdf;  P.T. Jyothi Datta, Gilead Sciences-Roche Spat–Uneasy Clam Prevails Over Bird Flu
Drug, HINDU BUSINESS LINE, Oct. 26, 2005, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2005102702930500.htm&date=2005/1
0/27/&prd=bl&.
On November 18, 2005, the Indian Patent Office published another Roche application
directed to a method of synthesizing Tamiflu.  See India Patent Application No.
305/MAS/2001A, filed Sept. 4, 2001, titled “Tamiflu, Gallacarboxylic Acid Approach,” in THE
PATENT OFFICE JOURNAL, Nov. 18, 2005, at 25541,available at
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The first test of compulsory licensing under India’s new pharmaceutical product patents
regime may soon arise and force the government to confront some of these uncertainties.  Even
before avian (bird) flu reached India in February 2006,  the Indian government had announced plans526
to stockpile drugs used to treat the disease.   As of November 2005, the Swiss pharmaceutical giant527
Hoffman-La Roche had acquired a mailbox application pending in the Indian Patent Office claiming
the chemical compound oseltamivir, sold under the brand name “Tamiflu.”   Roche has voluntarily528
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http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/pat_arch_112005/official_journal_18112005.pdf.
 See Roche Grants Tamiflu License to Hetero Drugs, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 24, 2005,529
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1344422.cms (reporting that “Drug
maker Roche Holding AG has granted a sub-licence to Hyderabad-based Hetero Drugs to
produce Tamiflu for developing nations.  The agreement with Hetero covers India and other
developing nations and allows the company to produce a generic version of the avian flu
treatment drug specifically for governments wishing to create emergency stores.”).
 See id. (reporting that “[o]nce launched in the market, the drug [Tamiflu] could cost530
$12 (around Rs 540) per capsule.”). 
 See, e.g., Yusuf K. Hamied, The Cipla Story on HIV and AIDS (text of speech given531
by chairman and managing director of Cipla Ltd., India, at “Tufts in India” seminar, Mumbai,
Nov. 9, 2005), at 4 (stating that Cipla has started to produce the avian flu drug Oseltamivir and
that Cipla will “provide this drug to India . . .”) (on file with author).  Cipla “strongly believe[s]
that when there are impending health emergencies [i]nternationally, then the patents involved
should be made available to anyone on payment of a maximum 4% royalty to the inventor.”  Id. 
“This would ensure that there would be no monopoly and [that the] life-saving drugs needed
could be made freely available again at affordable prices.”  Id.    
 It is by no means certain that the Indian Patent Office will grant a product patent on532
oseltamivir.  Leading Indian generic manufacturer Cipla reportedly filed a pre-grant opposition
against the Roche/Gilead patent application in April 2006.  See P.T. Jyothi Datta, Cipla Opposes
Patent Application on Bird-Flu Drug, THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE, May 1, 2006 (reporting that
“[t]he pre-grant opposition was filed at the Patent Office in New Delhi earlier this month.”),
available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/05/02/stories/2006050202250500.htm. 
The grounds on which Cipla challenges the oseltamivir product patent application are reported as
“known prior-art, invalid claim, lack of novelty and inventive step.”  Id.     
 See Datta, Cipla Opposes, supra note 532, at 1.  533
 See MPPP, supra note 370, at 97 (figure titled “Procedure for grant of compulsory534
license”). 
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licensed the Indian generic firm Hetero Drugs to make and sell Tamiflu in India,  but other generics529
may seek a piece of the lucrative pie  by applying to the Indian government for compulsory licenses530
when and if Roche is granted a patent on oseltamivir.   Until a patent is granted,  Indian generics531 532
such as Cipla and Ranbaxy remain free to copy the drug and sell it in India.533
India’s new patent law provides four avenues for seeking a compulsory patent license.  Three
of the four avenues are depicted in Figure 1 below (as derived from India’s MPPP ).  To summarize,534
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
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the compulsory licensing avenues are:  
(1) The Section 84 procedure (depicted as the middle of the three paths shown in Figure 1),
which is a carryover from the Patents Act, 1970, and provides the broadest grounds for seeking a
compulsory patent license (including the controversial ground of non-working).  As detailed below,
a compulsory license seeker under Section 84 cannot file an application until after the targeted patent
has been in force for a minimum of three years and she must make out a prima facie case in order to
be granted the license.  The patent owner can initiate an opposition proceeding against the grant of
this type of compulsory license;
(2) The Section 92 procedure (depicted as the left-most of the three paths shown in Figure 1),
also a carryover from the Patents Act, 1970, which is a more limited provision for the grant of
compulsory licenses on notification of the Indian government in circumstances of national emergency
such as public health crises;  
(3) The Section 92A procedure (depicted as the right-most of the three paths shown in
Figure 1), newly added by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.  In permitting manufacture and
export of patented medicines to other countries not having local manufacturing capacity, Section 92A
represents India’s own version of the framework set forth in the WTO’s 2003 Implementation
Decision of the Doha Ministerial on TRIPS and Public Health; and
(4) The Section 91 procedure (not depicted in Figure 1), which is a carryover from the Patents
Act, 1970, and provides for compulsory licenses in the case of certain blocking patents.
Each of these modes of compulsory patent licensing is separately discussed following
Figure 1.  
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 Adapted from Patent Office, India, MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 97535
(2005), available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual-2052005.pdf. 
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Prima Facie case made
out under section 87
Figure 1.   Three Modes of Compulsory Licensing
under India’s Patents Act, 1970 (2005)535
Section 92 Section 84 Section 92 A
Any time after grant Three years after grant Any time after grant
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http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(1).536
 Id.  537
 Section 84(1) of the India Patents Act, 1970, listed only ground (a) [reasonable538
requirements of the public not satisfied] and ground (b) [invention not available at reasonable
price] as the grounds on which a compulsory license could be granted, and did not explicitly
include ground [c) [non-working in India].  See Patents Act, 1970, § 84(1), reprinted in
Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 543, 573 (Appendix 1: “The Patents Act, 1970").  However,
the non-working ground was effectively subsumed into ground (a) via the language of Section 90,
which defined “[w]hen reasonable requirement of the public [shall be] deemed not satisfied.”  See
India Patents Act, 1970, § 90(a) (referring to “default of the patentee to manufacture in India to
an adequate extent . . .”).  
 See part III.A.2.b supra.539
 See, e.g., James Love, Options to Traditional Patents, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April540
6, 2005, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/print.php?content_id=87107 (asserting that
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1.  Compulsory Licenses under Section 84 
Applications for compulsory licenses under Section 84 of India’s Patents Act, 1970 (2005)
may not be filed until three years after a patent’s grant.   A Section 84 application may be based on536
any of the following three grounds: 
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the
patented invention have not been satisfied, or
(b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a
reasonably affordable price, or
[c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of
India.   537
The specifics of each ground are discussed separately below, but a few general observations are in
order.  The stated grounds for a compulsory license under Section 84 are not new, having been
carried over from the Patents Act, 1970.   The practical difference, however, is that under India’s538
current Act compulsory licensing is no longer a merely speculative proposition.  A pharmaceutical
product patents regime is now in place in India for the first time in 35 years.  The history of active
opposition to that regime by India’s generic drug manufacturers  significantly raises the likelihood539
that those firms will actively seek compulsory licenses in the future.  540
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“[s]oon a large number of compulsory licenses will be issued for products now manufactured in
India, which are subject to the mailbox patents. . .”).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(1).  The statute’s definitional section provides541
(in non-exclusive fashion) that a “‘person interested’ includes a person engaged in, or in
promoting, research in the same field as that to which the invention relates.”  Id. at § 2(1)(t)
(emphasis added).  
 See id. at § 84(2).  542
 See id. at § 84(2) (providing that “[a]n application under this section may be made by543
any person notwithstanding that he is already the holder of a license under the patent and no
person shall be estopped from alleging that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect
to the patented invention are not satisfied or that the patented invention is not worked in the
territory of India or that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably
affordable price by reason of any admission made by him, whether in such a license or otherwise
or by reason of his having accepted such a license.”).
 Id. at § 110.  The statute further provides that “a patentee so added as defendant shall544
not be liable for any costs unless he enters an appearance and takes part in the proceedings.”  Id. 
The right of the compulsory licensee to initiate infringement proceedings is not new; identical
language appeared in the 1970 Act.  See India Patents Act, 1970, § 110.
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There are few if any standing-type restraints on the identity of a Section 84 applicant for a
compulsory license.  Any “person interested” may apply,  even a party to an existing consensual541
license previously granted by the patentee as a result of negotiation with that party.   The existence542
of the pre-existing consensual license in no way estops the licensee from seeking a compulsory license
on the ground that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price.543
The licensee that successfully obtains a compulsory license under Section 84 is granted
unusually broad rights.  Not only is the compulsory licensee authorized by the government to compete
with the patentee in the manufacture and sale of the patented medicine, as in any compulsory licensing
situation, but also is given the right to enforce the patent against infringers if the patentee fails to do
so.  India’s patent law provides that a Section 84 compulsory licensee may “call upon the patentee
to take proceedings to prevent any infringement of the patent,” and if the patentee does not do so
within two months, the licensee “may institute proceedings for the infringement in his own name as
though he were the patentee, making the patentee a defendant . . . .”  544
Compulsory license applications with respect to Indian patents are filed with and granted by
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See Part V.A.1 infra.  545
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(6).546
 India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 52.547
 See Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005,548
1 INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY (2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=764066 (see PDF page 8).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(7)(a)-(e).  The full text of these provisions is549
as follows:
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the Controller of Patents.   In considering whether to grant a compulsory license under Section 84,545
the Controller must take into account the following four factors: 
(i) the nature of the invention, the time which has elapsed since the sealing
of the patent and the measures already taken by the patentee or any licensee
to make full use of the invention;
(ii) the ability of the applicant to work the invention to the public advantage;
(iii) the capacity of the applicant to undertake the risk in providing capital
and working the invention, if the application were granted;
(iv) as to whether the applicant has made efforts to obtain a license from the
patentee on reasonable terms and conditions and such efforts have not been
successful within a reasonable period as the Controller may deem fit . . . .”546
The 2005 amendments to the principal Act added a further “Explanation” providing that the
“reasonable period” of criteria (iv) “shall be construed as a period not ordinarily exceeding a period
of six months.”   The purpose of this amendment was presumably “to prevent patentees from547
dragging on voluntary negotiations to the detriment of [compulsory license] applicants.”548
a.  Ground One – Section 84(1)(a)  
With respect to the first ground on which a Section 84 compulsory license may be sought, i.e.,
whether the “reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not
been satisfied,” the statutory scheme gives the Controller virtually unfettered discretion in determining
whether this criterion has been satisfied.  The statute provides that “the reasonable requirements of
the public shall be deemed not to have been satisfied” if any of a host of various circumstances
apply.   For example, in a case where the patentee has refused to voluntarily grant a license under549
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84.  Compulsory licenses. . . .  (7) For the purposes of this Chapter, the reasonable requirements of the public shall
be deemed not to have been satisfied–
(a) if, by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a license or licenses on reasonable terms,--
(i) an existing trade or industry or the development thereof or the establishment of any new trade or
industry in India or the trade or industry in India or the trade or industry of any person or class of
persons trading or manufacturing in India is prejudiced; or
(ii) the demand for the patented article has not been met to an adequate extent or on reasonable
terms; or
(iii) a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being supplied or
developed; or
(iv) the establishment or development of commercial activities in India is prejudiced; or
(b) if, by reason of conditions imposed by the patentee upon the grant of licenses under the patent or upon the
purchase, hire or use of the patented article or process, the manufacture, use or sale of materials not protected
by the patent, or the establishment or development of any trade or industry in India, is prejudiced; or
[c) if the patentee imposes a condition upon the grant of licenses under the patent to provide exclusive grant
back, prevention to challenges to the validity of patent or coercive package licensing; or
(d) if the patented invention is not being worked in the territory of India on a commercial scale to an adequate
extent or is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable; or
(e) if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale is being prevented
or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article by–
(i) the patentee or persons claiming under him; or
(ii) persons directly or indirectly purchasing from him; or
(iii) other persons against whom the patentee is not taking or has not taken proceedings for
infringement. 
 Id.
 Id. at § 84(7)(a)(i).550
 Id. at § 84(7)(a)(iii) (emphasis added).551
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its patent, the reasonable requirements of the public are deemed not to have been met if the Controller
determines that “an existing trade or industry or the development thereof or the establishment of any
new trade or industry in India or the trade or industry in India or the trade or industry of any person
or class of persons trading or manufacturing in India is prejudiced.”   Not only is this clause sloppily550
drafted, but more importantly given the breadth of its wording, virtually any refusal of a patentee to
license could be deemed prejudicial to some form of trade in India.  
Other aspects of the Section 84(1)(a) “reasonable requirements of the public with respect to
the patented invention” ground give cause for concern.  The ground can be deemed unsatisfied not
only when a domestic industry is harmed by a patentee’s refusal to license, but also when that refusal
means that “a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being supplied
or developed.”   It is difficult to square this basis for the grant of a compulsory license with the551
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 TRIPS Art. 31(f).  552
 See World Trade Organization, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha553
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Sept. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.    
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 54 (substituting new language of Section554
90(1)(vii) for pre-existing text of § 90(1)(vii), which already required “that the license is granted
with a predominant purpose of supplying in [sic, an] Indian market . . .,” but which did not
mention Section 84(7)(a)(iii) window for exports).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 90(1)(vii) (emphasis added). 555
 See Basheer (Tryst with TRIPS), supra note 548, at 9.556
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requirement of TRIPS Art. 31(f) that compulsory licenses are to be granted “predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market” of the country granting the compulsory license.   Although the WTO552
has recognized the need for a waiver of the Art. 31(f) requirement in certain situations of public
health crises in countries having no or insufficient indigenous drug manufacturing capacity,  India’s553
patent statute deals separately with that scenario in the new Section 92A avenue of compulsory
licensing discussed below.  The TRIPS compliance issue raised here is that the reference to supplying
export markets remains in the general-purpose Section 84 avenue of compulsory licensing and is not
confined to the new Section 92A procedure.
India has seemingly recognized this potential TRIPS compliance problem, however, and
attempted to address it via a 2005 amendment  to counterpart Section 90 of the Patents Act, 1970554
(2005), which provides a set of criteria for determining the terms and conditions of a compulsory
license granted under Section 84.  The as-amended Section 90 provides that the Controller “shall
endeavor to secure” that a compulsory license “is granted with a predominant purpose of supply in
the Indian market and that the licensee may also export the patented product, if need be in accordance
with the provisions of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of section 84.”   Although555
some view this language as sufficient to reconcile any conflict with TRIPS Art. 31(f),  the true test556
will come in the provision’s implementation.  There may remain sufficient ambiguity in statutory
phrases such as “shall endeavor” and “if need be” to incite domestic generic firms to seek compulsory
licenses under Section 84 for purposes of export from India based solely on economic grounds (apart
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 Separately from the Section 84 compulsory license procedure, certain Indian product557
patents issuing from “mailbox” applications will be automatically subject to compulsory licenses
as soon as the patents issue (some time after January 1, 2005).  See Part IV.E supra.  
 See TRIPS Art. 31(k) (providing that “Members are not obliged to apply the conditions558
set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined
after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive.  The need to correct anti-
competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in
such cases. . . .”)
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(7)[c)).  559
 See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, § 39 (substituting new Chapter XVI560
comprising sections 82 to 94 for prior Chapter XVI comprising sections 82 to 98);  India Patents
Act, 1970, § 90 (titled “When reasonable requirements of the public deemed not satisfied”) (silent
as to any anticompetitive behaviors such as exclusive grant backs or coercive package licensing). 
 Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Property Under the Clinton Administration, 27 GEORGE561
WASHINGTON J. INT’L L. & ECON. 394, 409 (1993).
DRAFT August 16, 2006 (6:48pm) 120
from any public health crises that would support a § 92 or § 92A application).  The Controller’s
future handling of such applications is sure to be closely monitored by pharmaceutical MNCs and the
U.S. Trade Representative.  Of course, because a Section 84 application for compulsory license
cannot be filed until three years after a patent’s grant, no such applications could be filed with respect
to pharmaceutical product patents prior to 2008.     557
Section 84 of India’s Patents Act also sets up compulsory licensing as a remedy for
anticompetitive behavior by patentees, as contemplated by the TRIPS Agreement.   The558
Section 84(1)(a) “reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention”
ground may be deemed unsatisfied when a “patentee imposes a condition upon the grant of licenses
under the patent to provide exclusive grant back, prevention to challenges to the validity of [the]
patent or coercive package licensing.”   The explicit inclusion of anticompetitive practices as a559
ground for compulsory licensing under Section 84 was added to India’s patent laws for the first time
by the 2002 amendments.   The new competition law language takes advantage of flexibilities560
provided by Articles 31(k) and 40 of TRIPS.  Article 40, reportedly “put forward by developing
countries,”  allows TRIPS members to adopt “appropriate measures to prevent or control [anti-561
competitive] practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 TRIPS Art. 40.562
 See Brief Note on the Provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 and the Jurisdiction,563
Powers and Duties of the Competition Commission of India, available at
http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).  The Competition
Act, 2002, is designed to replace the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.  See
id.  The MRTP Act, which came into force during the socialist era of Indian business
nationalization, is said to have “crippled private industry for a generation.”  See Das, supra note
323, at 168.  
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(1)(b).564
 Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 264 (¶ 14-10).565
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preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and
regulations of that Member.”   562
Like TRIPS, India’s Patents Act does not further define nor elaborate on the nature of these
anticompetitive practices.  In ruling on compulsory license applications, the Indian Patent Office will
be called upon, at least in the first instance, to determine whether a particular case of alleged
anticompetitive  behavior or misuse by a patentee justifies the grant of a compulsory license as a
remedy.  Such determinations may look to U.K. or European Union competition case law for
guidance, or possibly even rely on the significant body of American patent/antitrust decisions.  The
direction to be taken by the Indian Patent Office and the courts presently remains difficult to predict,
for modern competition law in India (and hence its application to intellectual property matters) is still
very much in its infancy.  A modern competition law statute was enacted in 2002 but is not yet in
force; India’s Competition Commission was launched in 2003.563
b.  Ground Two – Section 84(1)(b)      
The second ground on which a compulsory patent license can be sought under Section 84 is
“that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price.”   The564
statute provides no guidance as to how the Controller of Patents is to determine what is a “reasonably
affordable price.”  A leading treatise rather unhelpfully suggests that “[w]hat is a ‘reasonable price’
for the patented article will depend upon the circumstances of each case.”  565
As with all three grounds on which a section 84 compulsory license can be sought, the license
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 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 87(1).  566
 Cf. Novartis AG v. Adarsh Pharma, 2004 (29) PTC 108, 115 (Mad[ras]) (noting in the567
context of an EMR dispute the defendant’s contention that patentee’s price per capsule of drug in
question was Rs. 1,700 whereas defendants’s price per capsule was less than Rs. 100). 
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(1)(c].568
 Such a broad interpretation would be nonsensical in light of the explicit reference in569
Section 84(7)(e) to “importation from abroad” of patented articles by the patentee or his
purchasers. 
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seeker under Section 84(1)(b) must make out a prima facie case.   Presumably a company seeking566
a compulsory license under an Indian pharmaceutical product patent would come forward with
evidence of drug prices charged by the patentee in India and would compare those prices with the
prices of non-patented substitutes available in India.   Prices charged by the patentee for the same567
drug outside of India might also be relevant, particularly if lower than the prices charged in India.
The patent owner would have an opportunity to counter the compulsory license applicant’s evidence
with the patentee’s own evidence by initiating an opposition procedure, as described below.  
c.  Ground Three:  Section 84(1)[c)
The third ground on which a Section 84 compulsory license may be based, i.e., “that the
patented invention is not worked in the territory of India,”  is the ground most likely to raise the ire568
of foreign patentees.  Assuming that the word “worked” is not interpreted broadly enough to
encompass imports,  MNCs that manufacture patented pharmaceutical products outside of India but569
import them into India for sale there are now potentially subject to compulsory licensing of their
Indian patents under Section 84(1)(c].  The unresolved legal issue is whether India’s imposition of
a domestic working requirement is inconsistent with TRIPS.  The analysis requires a general
understanding of the reasons why many countries besides India have imposed working requirements
on patentees.
Domestic working requirements for patents have a long history.  They were first employed
by many developed countries in the 1800s as protectionist measures intended to stem the outflow of
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See R. Carl Moy, The History of the Patent Harmonization Treaty: Economic Self-570
Interest as an Influence, 26 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 475-76 (1993).   
 See Paris Convention Art. 2.571
 See Moy, supra note 570, at 476 n.100 (noting that “[a] domestic inventor will either572
already have production facilities that are located domestically or, generally speaking, be able to
arrange for the construction of facilities more easily than will a foreign inventor.”).  
 See id. at 483-84 (observing that original text of Paris Convention, although silent on573
compulsory licensing, did provide that “[t]he patentee, however, shall be subject to the obligation
of working his patent conformably to the laws of the country into which he has introduced the
patented articles.”)
 Paris Convention, Art. 5A.2, available at574
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html#P123_15283 (last visited Feb. 2,
2006) (providing that “[e]ach country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result
from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”),
 Id. at Art. 5.A.4.575
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national wealth associated with the granting of patents to foreigners.   By stemming an otherwise570
entirely one-way flow of revenues from the sale of imported patented articles to the foreign patentee’s
home country, a working requirement forced the patentee to manufacture the invention in the patent-
granting country, thereby benefitting the domestic economy through capital investment, job creation,
and the like.  After enactment of the Paris Convention in 1883 and its guiding principle of national
treatment, which forbade signatory countries from treating foreign patent applicants or grantees any
less advantageously than domestic entities,  working requirements were nevertheless retained by571
many countries.  Such requirements were facially neutral in that they applied to domestic and foreign
patentees alike, and therefore appeared to comport with national treatment principles, but in reality
represented de facto discrimination against foreign patentees.   572
Although the original 1883 text of the Paris Convention explicitly recognized that signatory
countries could provide for domestic working requirements,  later versions of the Convention placed573
some restraints on the use of compulsory licensing in cases of  a patentee’s “failure to work.”574
Compulsory licenses based on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working could not be
applied for before the expiration of three years from the patent’s issuance,  and the compulsory575
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 Id.576
 Id. at Art. 5.A.1 (emphasis added).577
 See Moy, supra note 570, at 488 (stating that the “Paris Union has repeatedly revisited578
the issues of working requirements and compulsory licensing since 1883. . . .  The resulting
provisions place very few restrictions on national governments that wish to use these
mechanisms.”) (footnote omitted). 
India, of course, did not accede to the Paris Convention until 1998, and hence was not
subject until that time to the Convention’s relatively limited restrictions on compulsory licensing
on the ground of failure to domestically work.  See World Intellectual Property Organization,
Treaties Database–Contracting Parties–Paris Convention–India–Details, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=246C (noting India’s accession to the 1967
Stockholm Act version of the Paris Convention on Sept. 7, 1998, and the entry into force of that
Act in India on December 7, 1998).
 See Foster, supra note 119, at 292 (observing that TRIPS Art. 27.1 “arguably prevents579
a member from imposing the local working requirements prominent under the Paris
Convention.”).
 TRIPS Art. 27.1 (emphases added).580
 See United Kingdom Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, INTEGRATING581
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2002), at 134, available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm.
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license would be denied “if the patentee justifie[d] his inaction by legitimate reasons.”   Moreover,576
the Paris Convention provided that importation by the patentee “into the country where the patent
has been granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not entail
forfeiture of the patent.”        577
In light of these minor restrictions, Paris Convention signatories remained relatively
unencumbered in their ability to impose domestic working requirements and compulsory licensing
based on failure to domestically work.   The 1994 adoption of the WTO TRIPS Agreement changed578
that calculus, however.   Article 27.1 of TRIPS mandates that “patents shall be available and patent579
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced.”   Based on their interpretation of this580
provision, most developed countries, including the United Kingdom, have now removed domestic
working requirements from their patent laws.  581
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 World Trade Organization, Dispute DS199, Brazil–Measures Affecting Patent582
Protection, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds199_e.htm
(summarizing status of dispute as of June 2, 2006).
 See id.583
 See Hans Henrik Lidgard and Jeffery Atik, Facilitating Compulsory Licensing under584
TRIPS in Response to the AIDS Crisis in Developing Countries, at 9, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=794228.  Within two months after withdrawing its WTO complaint
against Brazil, the anthrax bioterrorism scare led the U.S. government to itself threaten
compulsory licensing against the German-owned patent on the antibiotic Ciprofloxacin.  Id.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 83(b).585
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Nevertheless, several advanced developing countries including India and Brazil have retained
domestic working requirements to protect and create incentives for indigenous industry.  Notably,
Brazil’s inclusion of a failure-to-domestically-work trigger for compulsory patent licensing caused
the U.S. to initiate a dispute proceeding in the WTO.  On May 30, 2000 the U.S. requested
consultations with Brazil concerning “those provisions of Brazil’s 1996 industrial property law (Law
No. 9,279 of 14 May 1996; effective May 1997) and other related measures, which establish a ‘local
working’ requirement for the enjoyability of exclusive patent rights.”   A WTO panel never resolved582
the dispute, however, because the U.S. dropped its claim by July 2001,  most likely in response to583
public pressure.   Thus no definitive WTO ruling exists on the apparent conflict between retention584
of local working requirements as a compulsory licensing trigger and the non-discrimination provision
of TRIPS Art. 27.1. 
This unresolved conflict may well be re-ignited by India’s new pharmaceutical product patents
regime and the susceptibility of foreign-owned product patents to compulsory licensing.  The
domestic working requirement is a pervasive theme of India’s patent laws.  India’s disfavor of
patented imports and its view that domestic working ought to be part of the basic quid pro quo for
the grant of an Indian patent are further evidenced in the current Act by Section 83's statement of
“general principles,” which provides that Indian patents “are not granted merely to enable patentees
to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article.”   The views of India and other585
developing countries who retain working requirements as a tool for domestic economic enhancement
will undoubtedly be challenged by MNCs that strongly prefer to consolidate production facilities in
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 However, the Patents Act provides that the Controller may postpone consideration of a586
compulsory license application based on non-working by up to one year where the patentee shows
that it was prevented by the Indian government from practicing the invention domestically.  See
id. at § 86.
 Id. at § 84(1)(a).587
 Id. at § 84(7)(d).588
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(7)(e)(i)-(iii).589
 The “Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006,” introduced in the U.S. House of590
Representatives on April 5, 2006 by Rep. Howard Berman, proposes adding the following
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order to achieve economies of scale and related efficiencies.  Foreign patentees can also be expected
to cite the difficulty of navigating Indian government bureaucracy to obtain necessary permits and
permission to establish domestic manufacturing facilities.      586
The Section 84(1)[c) “not worked in the territory of India” ground for compulsory licensing
also overlaps to a considerable extent with the Section 84(1)(a) ground, i.e., that “the reasonable
requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied.”   Criteria587
(d) and (e) of Section 84(7) for deeming the “reasonable requirements of the public” unsatisfied both
concern non-working.  Section 84(7)(d) provides that the reasonable requirements of the public are
deemed unsatisfied “if the patented invention is not being worked in the territory of India on a
commercial scale to an adequate extent or is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is
reasonably practicable.”   Similarly, Section 84(7)(e) provides that the reasonable requirements of588
the public will be deemed unsatisfied “if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India
on a commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented
article” by the patentee, his agents, or third parties against whom the patentee has not enforced the
patent.589
Whether the United States ultimately challenges India’s domestic working requirement in the
WTO may be tempered by the currently uncertain legislative direction of the U.S.’ own patent laws.
One of the more controversial aspects of the current U.S. patent law reform movement is whether
the availability of injunctive relief in cases of patent infringement should depend in some measure
upon whether the patent owner itself is manufacturing the patented invention.   Some reform590
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
language to the end of 35 U.S.C. § 283:
In determining equity, the court shall consider the fairness of the remedy in light
of all the facts and the relevant interest of the parties associated with the invention.
Unless an injunction is entered pursuant to a nonappealable judgment of
infringement, a court shall stay the injunction pending an appeal upon an
affirmative showing that the stay would not result in irreparable harm to the owner
of the patent and that the balance of hardships from the stay does not favor the
owner of the patent.
H.R. 5096, at § 8, available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c109:1:./temp/~c1094bv1yl:e27346: (last visited Aug. 12,
2006).
 A blank version of Form 17, titled “Application for Compulsory License,” is provided591
in India’s patent rules.  See India Patent Rules, 2003 (2005), at Form 17, reprinted in
UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED BY THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005
(Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi) (2005), at 85, 145.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 87(1).592
 Issues of the Official Journal published during 2006 are available at593
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/patent_journal_2006.htm.
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proponents would prevent a non-manufacturing “patent troll” from obtaining injunctive relief against
infringers.  This too is a form of domestic working requirement, or at least a differential treatment
of those who do not work their patents.  It would be rather ironic if the U.S. were to challenge India’s
domestic working requirements while at the same time contemplating a partial abrogation of remedies
available to its own non-working patentees. 
d.  Procedure for Section 84 Compulsory License Applications
The basic procedure for seeking a compulsory license under Section 84 is depicted in the
middle pathway of Figure 1 above.  The compulsory license applicant initiates the process by
submitting the appropriate form and fee to the Controller of Patents.   The Controller then591
determines whether the application establishes a prima facie case.   If it does, the Controller will592
publish the compulsory license application in the Patent Office’s weekly Official Journal  and593
instruct the applicant to serve copies of the compulsory license application on the patentee and any
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 Id.  The 2005 amendments changed the prior statutory text, requiring that the594
Controller “shall advertise the application in the Official Gazette,” to “shall publish the application
in the official journal.”  See India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 53.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 87(2) (providing that “[t]he patentee or any other595
person desiring to oppose the application may, within such time as may be prescribed or within
such further time as the Controller may on application (made either before or after the expiration
of the prescribed time) allow, give to the Controller notice of opposition.”).  The applicable
Patent Office rules provide that the “prescribed time” for filing the notice of opposition is two
months.  See India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005) § 98(1) (providing that a “notice of opposition
under sub-section (2) of section 87 shall be given in Form 14 and shall be sent to the Controller
within two months from the date of the publication of the application under sub-section (1) of the
said section.”).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 87(4).  See also India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005)596
§ 98 (titled “Notice of opposition under section 87(2)”).  
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 90(1)(i).597
 Id. at § 90(1)(ii).598
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 91-92 (stating that the “wording of the grounds for599
granting compulsory licenses in Section 84 is not amenable to easy interpretation and is not
operationally useful and the procedure specified is cumbrous.  The procedure is open-ended
without any time limit imposed for the grant of compulsory licenses.  The copy of the compulsory
licensing application will have to be advertised in the official gazette, though this is not required
under TRIPS. . . . [I]n case of an appeal, it may be years before a compulsory license is granted, if
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other interested parties.   The patentee has two months from the date of publication in the Official594
Journal to initiate an opposition against the grant of a compulsory license, if it desires to do so.595
Both the compulsory license applicant and the patentee opposer will be given an “opportunity to be
heard” before the Controller decides the case.   In setting the terms of a Section 84 compulsory596
license, the Controller must endeavor to secure the patentee a royalty or other remuneration that “is
reasonable, having regard to the nature of the invention [and] the expenditure incurred by the
patentee in making the invention or in developing it . . .,”  while also providing that the compulsory597
licensee make a “reasonable profit . . . .”598
It remains to be seen how frequently applicants will actually seek compulsory licenses under
the framework of Section 84.  Some commentators have criticized the framework as unduly
complicated and requiring more than TRIPS does in terms of procedural protections for patentees.599
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
at all.  The entire process is excessively legalistic and provides the patentees the opportunity to
buy time through litigation.  The huge legal expenses involved in fighting the MNCs holding the
patents may dissuade the generic companies from applying for licenses in the first place.”);  Why
Do We Need to Amend Patents Act?, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at 11 (stating that
according to NGOs and the domestic industry, “the present procedure for issue of compulsory
licences for commercial purpose is unduly elaborate and very time consuming and defeats the very
purpose of compulsory licensing for urgently required Drugs”).
 MPPP, supra note 370, at 96 (section 10.6).600
 The Controller’s decision under Section 84(4) with respect to a compulsory license601
application will be appealable to the Patent Appellate Board, once it is operational.  See India
Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 117A(2).  See also Part V.A.5 infra.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 92(1).602
 See notes 528-533 supra discussing pending Indian patent applications directed to bird603
flu drug oseltamivir.
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 The Indian Patent Office insists, however, that the procedure for grant of a compulsory license is
“not cumbersome.”   Although the larger Indian generic firms will likely seek compulsory licenses,600
the possibility of having to participate in an opposition proceeding (and potential appeal therefrom )601
may dissuade smaller generic firms from doing so in large numbers.  As has been the case in many
developed countries, India’s elaborate compulsory licensing provisions may prove to have effect
primarily in background mode, providing powerful motivation for parties to negotiate consensual
licenses instead of taking the risk that the government will set the license terms. 
2.  Compulsory Licensing under Section 92:  Notification by Government
The second avenue for obtaining a compulsory license under an Indian patent is Section 92
of the Patents Act, which would appear to be the government’s primary vehicle under the new patents
regime for ensuring that in cases of health emergencies, the Indian public has meaningful access to
patented medicines.  Section 92 provides for the filing of compulsory license applications at any time
after the Indian Central Government has declared by notification in the Patent Office’s Official
Journal that it is necessary to make compulsory licenses available under a particular patent (or
patents) “in circumstances of national emergency or . . . extreme urgency or in case of public non-
commercial use.”   The government has not yet invoked the Section 92 procedure, but a serious602
outbreak of avian (bird) flu in India could serve as the necessary catalyst.      603
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 James Love, Options to Traditional Patents, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April 6, 2005,604
available at http://www.financialexpress.com/print.php?content_id=87107.
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 84(6)(iv) (providing that in considering a605
compulsory license application filed under Section 84, the Controller shall take into account “as to
whether the applicant has made efforts to obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms
and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period as the
Controller may deem fit . . .”).;  id. at “Explanation” (stating that “[f]or the purposes of clause
(iv), ‘reasonable period’ shall be construed as a period not ordinarily exceeding a period of six
months.”).  
 Id. at § 92(1)(i).           606
 Id. at § 92(1)(ii).  607
 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 87 (titled “Certain patents deemed to be endorsed with608
the words ‘Licenses of right.’”), reprinted in Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 543, 575.  
 One of the few reported decisions concerning compulsory patent licensing in India is609
Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Controller General of Patents, AIR 1978 Calcutta 77 (affirming
Controller’s order deeming Imperial’s patent to be subject to licensing of right). 
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Section 92 compulsory licenses are broadly available for “all medicines, without any prior
negotiation with patent owners,”  in contrast with Section 84 licenses.   When a section 92604 605
application has been received following the requisite government notification, the Controller “shall
. . . grant the applicant a license under the patent on such terms and conditions as he thinks fit.”  606
In so setting the terms and conditions of a Section 92 license, the Controller “shall endeavour to
secure that the articles manufactured under the patent shall be available to the public at the lowest
prices consistent with the patentees deriving a reasonable advantage from their patent rights.”  607
The framework for granting compulsory licenses under Section 92 is thus reminiscent of
India’s former “license of right” procedure, under which process patents pertaining to substances
capable of being used as medicines or foods, as well as process patents for making chemical
substances (such as alloys), were automatically deemed to be endorsed with the words “licenses of
right.”   Thus designated, these patents were available for compulsory licensing by all applicants.608 609
Some key differences between the old license of right procedure and the current Section 92 procedure
are that compulsory license applications under the former could not be made until three years had
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 See id. at § 87(1)(b).610
 See id. at § 87(5) (providing that the royalty would “in no case exceed four per cent of611
the net ex-factory sale price in bulk of the patented article (exclusive of taxes levied under any law
for the time being in force and any commissions payable) . . .”).  
 See Chaudhuri, supra note 78, at 90.612
 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 97 (titled “Special provision for compulsory licenses on613
notification by Central Government”), reprinted in Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at 543, 578.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 92(3).614
 See id. 615
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passed following the patent’s issuance,  and the royalty rate for a license of right could not be610
greater than four percent of net sales price.   The license of right provisions of India’s patent laws611
were abolished in the 2002 amending Act in order to comply with TRIPS.  612
Procedural protections for patentees under Section 92 of the new Patents Act, 1970 (2005)
are few.  Although the current provision for compulsory licensing in cases of government notification
of health emergencies under Section 92 has been essentially carried over from the Patents Act,
1970,  the patentee’s opportunity to oppose the grant of a compulsory license has been abrogated613
in circumstances of health crises.  The current Section 92 includes a new sub-section (3) which
provides that such procedural protections (e.g., the opportunity to oppose the grant of a compulsory
license and the right to be heard on the matter, as would otherwise apply through Section 87) will not
apply in cases of national emergency, extreme urgency, or public non-commercial use, and specifically
in “public health crises, relating to Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome, human immuno
deficiency virus, tuberculosis, malaria or other epidemics . . . .”  The Controller is nevertheless614
required, “as soon as may be practicable,” to inform the patent holder that the Section 87 procedural
protections do not apply.   615
3.  Compulsory Licensing under Section 92A:  Exports for Public Health
Section 92A of India’s Patents Act, 1970 (2005) creates a new, third avenue for compulsory
licensing that will permit the manufacture and export of patented pharmaceuticals from India to other
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 See id. at § 92A(1) (providing that a compulsory license “shall be available for616
manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or
no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address
public health problems, provided [that a] compulsory license has been granted by such country or
such country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the patented
pharmaceutical products from India.”).  
 Id. at § 92A “Explanation.”617
 See id. at § 92A (not specifying any post-grant waiting period); see also Figure 1,618
supra, depicting “[i]mmediate grant” of a Section 92A compulsory license application. 
 As with compulsory license applications under Sections 84, 91, and 92, a Section 92A619
application must be filed using Form 17.  See India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005) § 96.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 92A(2).620
 See id. at § 92A;  Figure 1, supra.  621
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countries lacking their own manufacturing capacity.   The range of products that can be made and616
exported by the grantee of Section 92A compulsory license is extensive; the Act defines the relevant
pharmaceutical products as “any patented product, or product manufactured through a patented
process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address public health problems and shall be inclusive
of ingredients necessary for their manufacture and diagnostic kits required for their use.”   Unlike617
a Section 84 application which cannot be filed before three years post-grant, an application for a
compulsory license under Section 92A can be filed at any time after a patent has issued.   618
The Controller’s power to grant a Section 92A compulsory license appears to be virtually
unfettered.  The Act provides that on receipt of a Section 92A application in the prescribed manner,619
the Controller “shall . . . grant a compulsory license solely for manufacture and export of the
concerned pharmaceutical product to such country under such terms and conditions as may be
specified and published by him.”   Unlike the Section 84 compulsory license, there are (as of yet)620
no procedural mechanisms allowing the patent owner to oppose the grant of a Section 92A
compulsory license or otherwise be heard on the matter.  621
Section 92A implements in India’s domestic patent laws a modified version of the framework
that has already been agreed to by WTO members for implementing a waiver to Article 31(f) of the
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See WTO General Council, WT/L/540, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha622
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Aug. 30, 2003) (hereafter “WTO Doha
Implementation Decision”), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
 TRIPS Art. 31(f) (emphasis added).623
 See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public624
Health (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
 WTO General Council, WT/L/540, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha625
Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health (Aug. 30, 2003) (hereafter “WTO Doha
Implementation Decision”), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
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TRIPS Agreement.   Article 31(f) requires that non-consensual use of patented inventions to be622
authorized by WTO member countries in accordance with Article 31 “shall be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.”   Least-623
developed and other countries with little or no domestic drug manufacturing capacity need to import
patented drugs from other countries that do have such capacity.  As written, the language of
Article 31(f) precludes the grant of compulsory licenses in the manufacturing country solely for
purposes of exporting the patented drugs to other countries.  The need for a waiver of Article 31(f)
in justified circumstances involving public health crises quickly became apparent.  
In response to calls by a number of least-developed nations, WTO members in November
2001 issued a ground-breaking Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health at the Fourth
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar.   Paragraph six of the Declaration recognized that624
“WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could
face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement,” and
instructed the TRIPS Council to find a solution by the end of 2002.  In August 2003, the WTO’s
General Council announced agreement on a scheme to solve the Paragraph six dilemma.   The625
Implementation Decision provided a waiver of the Article 31(f) restriction if several conditions were
met.  Chiefly, (1) an importing member country must notify the WTO of its lack of manufacturing
capacity, and (in cases where the drug in question is patented in the importing country) that it has or
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 See id. at § 2(a).626
 See id. at § 2(b).627
 See id. at §§ 4 & 5.628
 No importing country has yet given the WTO such a notification.  See629
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm (last visited Aug.
14, 2006).  Nor has any exporting country.  See
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_export_e.htm (last visited Aug.
14, 2006).
 See WTO Deal on TRIPS/Medicines Welcomed by Governments, Industry, 71 BNA630
PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL 165 (Dec. 9, 2005). 
 Id.631
 Id.632
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will grant a compulsory license permitting the import;  and (2) an exporting member country must626
notify the WTO that it has granted a compulsory license for export which limits the manufacture of
the patented drug product in only such amounts as are needed by the importing member country and
which clearly identifies those products by specific labeling or marking.   Action to prevent diversion627
of the products from the intended importing country to other countries is also required.   628
Not very surprisingly, the Implementation Decision framework has been criticized as
complicated and burdensome.  As of August 2006, not a single WTO member country has made
notification to the WTO of its intent to use the system.   Despite the criticisms, WTO members629
reached an agreement on December 6, 2005 that will formally incorporate the framework of the
August 2003 Implementation Decision into TRIPS as Article 31 .   Implementation will occur afterbis 630
two-thirds of the WTO’s 148 members have ratified the changes.   Ratifications must take place by631
December 1, 2007; until that date, the current temporary waivers from TRIPS Art. 31(f) will remain
in effect.  632
The issue now facing India is whether the compulsory licensing framework it has implemented
in its domestic law via Section 92A will be viewed by the rest of the world as compliant with the
analogous TRIPS provisions.  India’s implementation is certainly consistent with similar activity in
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 See E.U. Lawmakers Pass Regulation to Allow Compulsory Licensing for Needy633
Nations, 71 BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 166 (Dec. 9, 2005).  In addition to the
European Union and India, Canada, China and Norway also have implemented similar compulsory
licensing provisions in their national patent laws.  See Emma Barraclough, Weekly News: China to
Export Drugs under Compulsory Licences, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Dec. 12, 2005,
available at
http://www.managingip.com/default.asp?Page=9&PUBID=198&SID=603061&ISS=21054.
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 92A(1) (emphasis added).  634
 Compare WTO Doha Implementation Decision ¶ 2(b) with India Patents Act, 1970635
(2005) § 92A.
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the European Union, China, Norway, and Canada,  but it may be the broadest in scope.  For633
example, India does not require as a prerequisite for issuing a Section 92A compulsory license that
the importing country have already granted (or intends to grant in the future) its own compulsory
license to permit the import of the patented pharmaceuticals in the importing country (assuming that
a patent covering the imported product is in force there).  It is enough if the importing country “has,
by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products from
India.”   Moreover, in contrast with the TRIPS framework, India’s Section 92A is completely silent634
on any obligation of the Indian government or the compulsory licensee to specify the amount of
pharmaceutical products that will be exported, to specially label or mark those products, or to make
public any information about the export by posting to a website or other means of publication.   635
As with other open questions concerning India’s new patent laws, this TRIPS compliance
issue will turn on the manner in which India actually implements its new Section 92A framework.
The Controller has wide discretion to set the terms and conditions of a Section 92A compulsory
license.  Thus the Controller could, in each individual case, set a quantity limit on the amount of
pharmaceutical product to be made and exported, require the licensee to specially package or mark
its products, and so on.
Widespread use of the Section 92A avenue for compulsory licensing to export patented
medicines appears likely.  For example, leading Indian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer Cipla
takes the position that even in situations where it will now be prevented by the new product patent
regime from copying and selling patented medicines within India, the company would nevertheless
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 E-mail from Dr. Yusuf K. Hamied, Chairman and Managing Director, Cipla Ltd., India636
(Feb. 6, 2006) (on file with author). 
The WTO recognizes that developing and even developed Member countries may make
use of the TRIPS Article 31(f) waiver framework so long as they properly notify the WTO of
their intention to use the system as an importer.  Least-developed countries, by contrast, are
automatically deemed to be eligible importing Member countries.  See WTO Doha
Implementation Decision at ¶ 2(b) (defining “eligible importing Member”), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm#fntext3.  A number of
developed countries, including the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Japan, and Canada, have already
informed the WTO that they will not be using the system as importers.  See id. at Note 3 (listing
23 countries).    
 As of August 2006, the WTO recognized 50 member countries as least developed637
countries in accordance with the United Nations’ designation.  See World Trade Organization,
Least-Developed Countries, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).   
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 91(1).638
 Id.639
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be able to make those products for export to least-developed countries and to any other countries that
have the legal right to import those products.   There are currently fifty countries recognized by the636
WTO and United Nations as least-developed countries,  so the available export market for Indian637
generic drug manufacturers is potentially very significant.
4.  Compulsory Licensing under Section 91:  Blocking Patents
The fourth mode of compulsory patent licensing recognized in India, although not depicted
in Figure 1 above, is available to alleviate the situation of blocking patents; i.e., where an
“improvement” or “dependent” patent cannot be practiced without infringing another’s pre-existing
“basic” or “dominant” patent.  Section 91 (titled “Licensing of related patents”) of India’s Patents Act
provides that any person who has the right to practice a second patented invention, either as patentee
or licensee thereof, may apply to the Controller for the grant of a license under a first patent on the
ground that that person “is prevented or hindered without such license from working the other
[second] invention efficiently or to the best advantage possible.”   Unlike a Section 84 license, a638
Section 91 license may be applied for “at any time after the sealing of a patent [i.e., the first
patent].”   639
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 See id. at § 91(2)(i) (providing that no license shall be granted unless the Controller is640
satisfied “that the applicant is able and willing to grant, or procure the grant to the patentee and
his licensees if they so desire, of a license in respect of the other [second] invention on reasonable
terms”).
 See id. at § 91(2)(ii).641
 Id. at § 91(3).  “[T]he license granted by the Controller shall be non-assignable except642
with the assignment of the respective patents.”  Id.
 See id. at § 91(4) (stating that “[t]he provisions of sections 87 [“Procedure for dealing643
with applications under sections 84 and 85"], 88 [“Powers of Controller in granting compulsory
licenses”], 89 [“General purposes for granting compulsory licenses”] and 90 [“Terms and
conditions of compulsory licenses”] shall apply to licenses granted under this section as they apply
to licenses granted under section 84"). 
 See id. at § 87(2).644
 Subpart (l) of TRIPS Art. 31 specifies that:645
where such use [without the authorization of the patentee] is authorized to permit the exploitation
of a patent ("the second patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent ("the
first patent"), the following additional conditions shall apply:
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The Patents Act sets forth two prerequisites for the granting of a Section 91 compulsory
license.  First, the compulsory license applicant must show that it is in a position to grant to the first
patentee a cross-license under the second patent on “reasonable terms.”   Second, the compulsory640
license applicant must show that its [i.e., the second] invention “has made a substantial contribution
to the establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities in the territory of India.”641
If both conditions have been met to the Controller’s satisfaction, he may “make an order on such
terms as he thinks fit granting a license under the first mentioned patent and a similar order under the
other [second] patent [i.e., a cross-license] if so requested by the proprietor of the first mentioned
patent or his licensee. . . .”   The procedural provisions already discussed above in relation to Article642
84 compulsory licenses also apply to licenses granted under Section 91;  e.g., the patentee may643
oppose the grant of a compulsory license under Section 91.  644
The grant of a compulsory license for the purpose of alleviating a blocking patents situation
is also contemplated by TRIPS, and the terms of India’s Section 91 appear consistent with the
requirements set forth in TRIPS Article 31(l).   As Professor Jerome Reichman has proposed, the645
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(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important technical advance of
considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent;
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the
invention claimed in the second patent; and
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with the
assignment of the second patent.
Id.
 Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions: Comparing646
United States Law and Practice with Options under the TRIPS Agreement, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AALS WORKSHOP IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, June 14-16, 2006, Vancouver, British Columbia,
at 43, 46. 
 See Part IV.A.3 supra for further discussion of the Section 3(d) exclusion from647
patentability of certain derivative forms of known substances.
 See TRIPS Art. 31(h) (mandating that “the right holder shall be paid adequate648
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization”).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 91(3).649
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implementation of this type of compulsory licensing in developing country patent regimes “enable[s]
innovators to adapt foreign inventions to local needs.”   India’s generic drug manufacturers may646
well engage in this type of sequential innovation, for example by developing drug delivery systems
compatible with local climate conditions and distribution networks for new drugs invented abroad and
patented in India by MNCs.  Assuming that such a hypothetical delivery system were independently
patentable despite the strictures of the anti-evergreening Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970
(2005),  the resulting delivery system patent to the generic firm might nevertheless be blocked by647
the MNC’s drug patent.  A compulsory license granted under Section 91, consistent with TRIPS Art.
31(l), would permit the generic company to exploit its own innovation while providing adequate
remuneration to the MNC.   The MNC would also be entitled to a cross-license under the generic648
firm’s patent.    649
G.  Other Limitations on Patentees’ Exclusive Rights
1.  Experimental/Research Use
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See generally Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from650
U.S. Patent Infringement Liability:  Implications for University/Nonprofit Research and
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 47(3).651
 See Mueller (2004), supra note 650, at 920 n.10.652
 See Jonathan D. Glater, Offshore Services Grow in Lean Times, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,653
2004, at C1; Steve Lohr, Many New Causes for Old Problem of Jobs Lost Abroad, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2004, at 17 (citing 2002 Forrester Research study predicting that 3.3 million service jobs
in the United States will move offshore by 2015, and that about 500,000 of these jobs will be in
the computer software and services sector). 
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 3(k) (providing that “a mathematical or business654
method or a computer programe per se or algorithms” are not inventions within the meaning of
the Act) (emphasis in original);  Interview with P.K. Patni, Deputy Controller of Patents and
Designs, India Intellectual Property Office, New Delhi branch (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with
author) (observing that software embedded in hardware can be claimed if a technical application
exists therefor).
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India’s patent statute, like those of most countries other than the U.S.,  provides an explicit650
experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability.  Section 47(3) of the Patents Act
specifies that uses of patented inventions “for the purpose merely of experiment or research including
the imparting of instructions to pupils” are not actionable as patent infringement.   651
As the author has suggested elsewhere, the Section 47(3) research exemption may have
special significance for software development in India.   The outsourcing-to-India phenomenon is652
increasingly likely to encompass value-added work in the design and development of software.   As653
protection of software innovation through patenting becomes more common, it likewise becomes
increasingly likely that the R&D efforts necessary to develop new computer programs will require
the use of software algorithms and programming techniques that may be proprietary.  To the extent
that such subject matter can be patent-protected in India,  reliance on the experimental/research use654
exemption from infringement liability may provide immunity from patent infringement liability for the
ever-growing volume of software development taking place in India.  The existence of the
experimental/research use exemption may also be a factor (albeit one of many) that will continue to
motivate U.S. firms to outsource innovative software development to India, rather than to conduct
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 U.S. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).655
 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 656
 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006), which provides in pertinent part:657
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .
 The section 271(e)(1) safe harbor is not limited to testing conducted by generic drug658
manufacturers, however.  The U.S. Supreme Court recently interpreted the scope of § 271(e)(1)
in Merck KgaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005), and held it broad enough
to encompass clinical (human) trials as well as pre-clinical (test tube and laboratory animal) testing
activity associated with the development of new (or “pioneer”) drugs.
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such development in the U.S. without the statutory shield of an experimental/research use exemption.
2.  Data Gathering for Regulatory Approval
India’s Patents Act, 1970 (2005) includes a provision that parallels Section 271(e)(1) of the
U.S. Patent Act (the “Bolar exemption”).  The exemption was made part of U.S. patent law pursuant
to the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”).655
Enacted to legislatively overrule the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm.
Co.,  the exemption provides inter alia that the use of a patented invention solely for purposes656
reasonably related to gathering data in support of an application seeking U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval for the manufacture and sale of a generic version of a previously
FDA-approved drug (i.e., an “Abbreviated New Drug Application” or ANDA) is not an act of U.S.
patent infringement.   Without such a provision, a generic drug manufacturer would have to wait657
to begin testing of an equivalent drug until after the relevant patent had expired, giving the patentee
of the branded drug a de facto extension of the patent term.658
The parallel Indian provision is broader in scope than its U.S. counterpart.  The Indian Bolar
exemption provides:
For the purposes of this Act, . . . any act of making, constructing, using,
selling or importing a patented invention solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information required under any law for
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 107A(a).659
 For example, Ranbaxy has filed more than 110 ANDAs with the U.S. Food and Drug660
Administration.  See RANBAXY LABS. LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 7, available at
http://www.ranbaxy.com/ar2005/ar2005.pdf.  Doctor Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. (DRL) has filed
seventy ANDAs.  See DR. REDDY’S LABORATORIES LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005-06, at 6,
available at http://www.drreddys.com/investors/pdf/annualreport2006.pdf. 
 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).661
 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc, 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (affirming Federal662
Circuit’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) as broad enough to encompass not only
regulatory data gathering on pharmaceuticals, but also the comparable testing of medical devices).
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the time being in force, in India, or in a country other than India, that
regulates the manufacture, construction, use, sale or import of any product
. . . shall not be considered as a infringement of patent rights.   659
This Indian version of the Bolar provision broadly exempts unlicensed data gathering uses of patented
inventions for purposes of seeking regulatory approval to market any product (not just drugs) in any
country.  The exemption’s applicability to data gathering for purposes of regulatory approval by
foreign countries obviously reflects the fact that Indian companies now routinely seek approval from
the U.S. FDA to sell generic drugs in the U.S. market.   The breadth of products for which660
regulatory approval is sought (i.e., “any product”) is also broader than the U.S.’ Bolar exemption,
which is limited to approval under U.S. federal law of “drugs” (or “veterinary biological products”).661
The Indian provision’s applicability to regulatory approval of “any product” likely recognizes that
even in the U.S., the Bolar exemption’s literal terms have been expanded through judicial decision;
i.e., the U.S. courts have given the statutory term “drugs” some extra-literal scope by deeming it to
include medical devices.662
3.  Parallel Imports
India’s new Patents Act adopts the principal of international exhaustion of patent rights; i.e.,
that once a patented product has been sold with the patentee’s authority outside of India, the
subsequent importation of that same patented item into India is not an act of infringement of the
Indian patent.  But the new Patents Act goes even further, by shielding importation of products
acquired from sources other than the patentee in countries not yet recognizing product patent
protection.  Section 107A(b) of the Act provides that
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 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 107A(b).  663
 This first hypothetical is consistent with the narrower scope of the pre-2005 version of664
the parallel imports provision.  Prior to the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, the provision read
as follows: 
importation of patented products by any person from a person who is duly
authorised by the patentee to sell or distribute the product, shall not be
considered as a infringement of patent rights. 
India Patents Act, 1970 (2002), § 107A(b) (emphasis added).  The statutory language “who is
duly authorised by the patentee to sell or distribute the product” was changed to “who is duly
authorised under the law to produce and sell or distribute the product” by the Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2005, §58(b), reprinted in UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS
AMENDED BY THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005 (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
Delhi) (2005), at xiii, xxvi.
 See TRIPS Art. 66.1;  World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS665
Agreement and Public Health (Nov. 14, 2001), ¶ 7, available at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
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importation of patented products by any person from a person who is duly
authorised under the law to produce and sell or distribute the product, shall
not be considered as a infringement of patent rights.663
Two examples will illustrate the potentially very broad scope of this provision.  
First, consider a hypothetical MNC that obtains a patent on a pharmaceutical product in India
and also sells the same product more cheaply outside of India, for example in South Africa.  A third
party who purchases the product from the patentee (or its agent) in South Africa and imports it into
India for re-sale there would not be liable under Section 107A(b) for infringement of the  Indian
patent.   This result is consistent with the  traditional view of international exhaustion as one in664
which the patentee has obtained its “reward” by a first sale anywhere in the world. 
Second, consider again the same hypothetical MNC having obtained a patent on a
pharmaceutical product in India.  In this variation, however, the same product is being sold by an
independent source (i.e., one not connected with the patentee) in a least-developed country, for
example Bangladesh, that is not yet required under TRIPS to provide pharmaceutical product patent
protection.   In the absence of patent protection in Bangladesh, the source company is, within the665
language of Section 107A(b), “duly authorised under the law to produce and sell or distribute the
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 107A(b).666
 Basheer (Tryst with TRIPS), supra note 548, at 10.667
 See Lisa Urquhart, Product Launches Give Beximco a Lift, FINANCIAL TIMES (London,668
England), May 3, 2006, at 22 (available on LexisNexis).
 See note 528 supra and accompanying text.669
 For example, U.S. patent case law rejects the concept of international exhaustion of670
patent rights.  See Jazz Photo Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(confirming that “United States patent rights are not exhausted by products of foreign
provenance”).  Countries within the European Union are bound by decisions of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), which have thus far rejected attempts by individual member states to
adopt international exhaustion in domestic intellectual property laws.  See, e.g., Case C-355/96,
Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998
E.C.R. I-4799.  Among the leading developed country patent systems, Japan is an exception in
this regard, its Supreme Court having recognized international exhaustion of patent rights in BBS
Kraftfahrzeug Technik AG v. Kabushiki Kaisha Racimex Japan and Kabushiki Kaisha JapAuto
Prods., Case No. Heisei 7(wo)1988 (1997), available at http://www.okuyama.com/c3v01ok.htm
(English translation).
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product.”   In other words, the source company can make and sell the product in Bangladesh666
without restriction.  A third party who then purchases the product from the source in Bangladesh and
imports it into India for re-sale there likewise would not be liable under Section 107A(b) for
infringement of the Indian patent.  
It has been suggested that Indian generic drug manufacturers could capitalize on the breadth
of this provision “by shifting their manufacturing base to neighboring LDCs such as Bangladesh
(which have time till 2015 to shift to a pharmaceutical product patents regime) and importing the
same into India.”   Such a strategy is not far-fetched.  In fact, generic pharmaceutical production667
is already well established in Bangladesh.  For example, Beximco, the leading generic drug
manufacturer in Bangladesh, has already launched production of “Oseflu,” its version of the bird flu
anti-viral Tamiflu,  which is the subject of pending patent applications in India that are assigned to668
Hoffman-La Roche.669
Although most developed country patent regimes have refused to adopt the notion of
international exhaustion of patent rights,  the developing and least developed world strongly favors670
the concept as a means of ensuring access for its citizens to lower-cost drugs.  Because the Uruguay
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS,671
International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333, 346 (2000)
(explaining that issue of international exhaustion was “hotly debated” by TRIPS negotiators but
“[e]ventually the exhaustion discussion exhausted the negotiators.”).
 TRIPS Art. 6 (titled “Exhaustion”).672
 Basheer (Tryst with TRIPS),supra note 548, at 11.673
 Id. at 10; see also TRIPS Art. 28(1)(a) (including “importing” within the exclusive674
rights of a product patent owner).
 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health675
(Nov. 14, 2001), ¶ 5(d), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
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Round debates over international exhaustion were so contentious, the TRIPS Agreement was
ultimately left silent on this issue,  providing that “[f]or the purposes of dispute settlement under671
this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 [national treatment] and 4 [most-favoured-
nation treatment] nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights.”   672
If called upon to defend the legitimacy of its broad Section 107A(b) shield from infringement,
India may need to rely on more than simply the silence of TRIPS.  The dispute will turn on the scope
and meaning of “exhaustion.”  Shamnad Basheer has suggested that India’s Section 107A(b)
provision violates TRIPS because by “go[ing] even beyond ‘exhaustion’ (i.e. there is no requirement
that the patentee have sold the good in the country from where it is exported),”  the provision673
“virtually extinguishes the exclusive right to import.”   India may counter that  it is merely making674
the most of the flexibilities provided by TRIPS, particularly in view of the explicit recognition in the
Doha Ministerial’s Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health that “[t]he effect of the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights
is to leave each member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge,
subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.”  675
H.  Process patent infringement
Consistent with the obligation imposed by Article 34 of the TRIPS Agreement, the 2002
amendments to India’s Patents Act implemented a provision for burden-shifting in the case of alleged
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 The text of Section 104A reads in full:676
Burden of proof in case of suits concerning infringement.–(1) In any suit for
infringement of a patent, where the subject matter of patent is a process for
obtaining a product, the court may direct the defendant to prove that the process
used by him to obtain the product, identical to the product of the patented process,
is different from the patented process if,--
(a) the subject matter of the patent is a process for obtaining a new
product; or
(b) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product is
made by the process, and the patentee or a person deriving title
or interest in the patent from him, has been unable through
reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used:
     Provided that the patentee or a person deriving title or
interest in the patent from him first proves that the product is
identical to the product directly obtained by the patented
process.
(2) In considering whether a party has discharged the burden imposed upon him
by sub-section (1), the court shall not require him to disclose any manufacturing
or commercial secrets, if it appears to the court that it would be unreasonable to
do so.
India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 104A.
 See id. at § 104A(1)(a).677
 See id. at § 104A(1)(b).678
DRAFT August 16, 2006 (6:48pm) 145
infringement of a process patent.  Under Section 104A of the current Patents Act, 1970 (2005),676
when the owner of the process patent in suit establishes that the product of the accused infringer is
identical to that obtained by the patented process, the court under either of two conditions may order
the burden of proof shifted to the accused infringer to disprove that its process is different from the
patented process.  Those conditions are that (a) the patented process is one that obtains a new
product,  or, more typically, that (b) there is a substantial likelihood that the accused infringer is677
using the patented process and that the patent owner has been unable through reasonable efforts to
determine the process actually used by the accused infringer.   678
V.  IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIA’S NEW PATENTS REGIME
A serious question exists as to whether India has the institutional capacity in place to support
its newly strengthened patent system.  This Part critically examines the implementation issue for each
of the key actors in the new patents regime:  (1) the Indian Patent Office, which examines patent
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, supra note 14, at 6679
(organizational chart).  
 See id.680
 Basheer (Policy Style), supra note 782, at 319.681
 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Powers and Duties”) and § 3(a) (“Under682
Secretary and Director”).
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applications and grants patents, adjudicates oppositions and revocation proceedings, and considers
applications for compulsory licenses; and (2) the Indian court system, which tries cases alleging
infringement and invalidity of issued patents.
A.  Administrative Capacity:  Indian Patent Office
This section explains the Patent Office’s place in India’s governmental structure and its
institutional capacity in terms of physical facilities and human resources.  This section also overviews
the patent examination process in India, comparing it to U.S. practice; presents data on the current
and anticipated levels of patenting activity and Indian Patent Office backlog; and describes the newly-
created Patent Appellate Board. 
1.  Political Structure
The Indian Patent Office operates under the auspices of the Office of the Controller General
of Patents, Designs and Trademarks & Registrar of Geographical Indications.   The Office of the679
Controller General is part of the Indian Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, which is in turn
part of the Indian Ministry of Commerce & Industry.   “The Controller of Patents, as well as the680
various examiners and other officers are appointed by the Central Government.”  681
The powers given to the Controller of Patents under India’s Patents Act, 1970 (2005) are
remarkably broad in comparison to those of the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.682
The following is a partial list of the enumerated powers of India’s Controller:  
!  Upon receipt of an examiner’s report that is adverse to the applicant or requires
amendment of the application, the Controller “shall communicate as expeditiously as possible the gist
of the objections to the applicant and shall, if so required by the applicant within the prescribed
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 14.683
 See id. at § 15. 684
 See id. at § 16.685
 See id. at § 19(1).686
 See id. at § 19(1)(a).687
 See id. at § 19(1)(b).688
 See id. at § 25(1).689
 See id. at § 25(3) (b)-[c).690
 See id. at § 25(4).691
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period, give him an opportunity of being heard”;   683
!  When the Controller is satisfied that an application does not comply with the Patents Act
or Patents Rules, he may refuse the application or require that it be amended to his satisfaction;684
!  The Controller may require an application to be divided if he concludes that its claims
relate to more than one invention;   685
! If it appears to the Controller that the practice of an invention claimed in a pending
application would infringe another patent, he has the power to require that the application include a
statement making reference to the potentially infringed patent, as a way of giving notice to the
public.   The applicant can avoid having to add this reference if it can establish to the Controller’s686
satisfaction that reasonable grounds exist for questioning the allegedly infringed patent’s validity,687
or if it otherwise amends the application to the Controller’s satisfaction;   688
!  The Controller decides pre-grant oppositions, after a hearing if requested by the opposer;689
!  Post-grant oppositions are initially heard by an Opposition Board constituted by order of
the Controller;  the Controller ultimately decides the post-grant opposition after receiving the690
recommendations of the Opposition Board and after affording the patentee and the opponent a
hearing;   691
!  The Controller has broad powers in deciding whether and on what terms to grant
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 See Part IV.F supra.692
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 85(3).693
 See id. at § 77(1).694
 See id. at § 77(1)(a).695
 See id. at § 77(1)(b).696
 See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, supra note 14, at 6. 697
Although all four branches accept utility patent applications, only the Kolkata branch accepts
design applications.  See id.    
 See id. at 3.698
 See UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED BY THE PATENTS699
(AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005, at 167 (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi) (2005)
(providing table titled “Territorial Jurisdiction of Appropriate Office for the Applicants”). 
  Id.  Many foreign patent applicants reportedly select local counsel in New Delhi or700
Mumbai.  If patent applications filed in those branches of the Patent Office are refused, appeals
can be taken to the Delhi or Bombay High Courts, at least until the new Patent Appellate Board
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applications for compulsory licenses, as detailed supra;   692
!  When a compulsory license has been granted and in effect for more than two years, the
Controller has the power to order the revocation of a patent for non-working in India;   693
!  The Controller also has broad evidentiary powers in carrying out his adjudicatory
functions; in any proceedings before him under the Patents Act the Controller has certain powers of
a civil court,  including the power to summon and enforce the attendance of any person and to694
examine that person under oath,  and to require the discovery and production of documents.695 696
Another notable feature of the Indian Patent Office that it comprises four branch offices:
Kolkata (formerly known as Calcutta), which is designated the “Head Office”; New Delhi; Chennai
(formerly known as Madras); and Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay).   The multiple-branch697
structure for a patent office is currently unique in the world.   Indian residents file patent698
applications in the appropriate Patent Office branch for the state in which they reside or have a
principal place of business.   For a non-residents of India, the appropriate branch for filing is699
determined by “the address for service in India or principal place of business of his agent . . . .”700
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
becomes operational.  See Part V.A.5 infra.  The Delhi and Bombay High Courts are generally
considered superior in terms of their handling of patent and business cases.  See Interview with
attorney Krishna Sarma, Corporate Law Group, in New Delhi, India (Nov. 14, 2005) (transcript
on file with author).
 See Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, Addresses and Name of701
the Contact Persons of the Intellectual Property Offices, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/ipo_office_add.htm (last visited June 10, 2006).
 See id.702
 See India IP Office Gets Revamp, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Sept. 5,703
2005) (reporting that the “Commerce and Industry Department said that the government had
spend Rs1.24 billion ($28 million) on the project to modernize India’s IP offices.”), available at
http://www.managingip.com.  
 See Intellectual Property India, Intellectual Property: Initiatives and Status, available704
at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/ip_ini_status.htm (last visited June 10, 2006).
 See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, supra note 14, at 4705
(providing photographs of completed buildings at Kolkata, Chennai and Delhi).  
 See Interview with P.K. Patni, Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, India706
Intellectual Property Office, New Delhi branch (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author). 
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The office of the current Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks, Shri S.
Chandrasekran, is located in Mumbai.   Each of the four branch offices is headed by a Deputy or701
Assistant Controller of Patents & Designs.       702
2.  Institutional Capacity
a.  Physical facilities
India’s physical facilities for implementation of its strengthened patents regime are quite
impressive.  The Government of India has funded a $28 million modernization project  resulting in703
new buildings for each of the four Patent Office branches.   New buildings are complete in Kolkata,704
Chennai, and Delhi; the Mumbai building is at an “advance[d] stage” of construction.705
Computerization efforts are far less advanced than the brick-and-mortar improvements of the
Patent Office branches.  As of November 2005, Indian patent examiners had Internet access to public
domain databases of prior art, but did not have the means to electronically search any proprietary
databases.   Indian patent applications must still be filed on paper; plans for electronic filing have706
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 See id.707
 See Intellectual Property India, Office of the Patent Information System, available at708
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/pis/pis.htm (last visited June 10, 2006).
 See id.709
 See id.710
 See data provided in Figure 3 infra.711
 See, e.g., Sreenivasaro Vepachedu and Martha Rumore, Patent Protection and the712
Pharmaceutical Industry in the Indian Union, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY (Oct. 2004), at
46 (stating that “the inadequate patent office capacity level in India to ensure the application of
patent criteria and examination of patent examinations” presents one of several challenges to
implementation of the new patent laws, and noting that despite some modernization including
computerization, “a backlog of patent applications still exists” in the Indian Patent Office).  
 See India IP Office Gets Revamp, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Sept. 5,713
2005), available at http://www.managingip.com.  However, the perceived inefficiency may be
more an aspect of India’s mishandling of trademark applications than patent applications.  See id.
(noting that India’s Trade Mark Registry was ranked “worst in the world” for “two years
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not yet been implemented due to contract disputes.   The Patent Office does receive some assistance707
of the Patent Information System (PIS), established by the government in 1980 under the auspices
of the Controller General as a repository of patent information.   Located in Nagpur, India, the PIS708
provides full-text access to U.S., U.K., European Patent Office, PCT and Japanese patents and
published applications via microfilm and CD-ROM as well as paper copies of Indian patents issued
from 1912 onwards.   The PIS also provides various computerized tools such as INPADOC for709
searching patent bibliographic data.710
b.  Human Resources
Prior to FY 2001-02 the Indian Patent Office never examined more than 5,000 patent
applications in a single year.   With the new pharmaceutical product patents regime in place, patent711
application filings sharply on the rise, and a rapidly mounting number of pre-grant oppositions to
contend with, the question of adequate levels of patent examining staff becomes much more pressing.
Commentators are already questioning the Office’s capacity to adequately deal with the strengthened
patents regime.   India’s IP system previously has been characterized as “notoriously inefficient,”712 713
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
running” in the MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Trade Mark Poll).
 Id.714
 For data on mailbox applications, see Part II.C.2 infra.715
 See P.T. Jyothi Datta, First phase scrutiny to cover 3,000 drug patent requests, HINDU716
BUSINESS LINE, Jan. 5, 2006, available at
http://www.blonnet.com/2006/01/05/stories/2006010503340100.htm (citing anonymous ministry
official expressing “concerns on the shortage of examiners and other technical staff” and Indian
Patent Office’s “problem retaining or attracting talent”).
 See Interview with K.S. Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, India717
Intellectual Property Office, New Delhi branch (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author)
(stating that the “India IP Office now employs a total of 150-160 examiners, but 210 are
budgeted, so we are recruiting.”).  See also Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-
2005, supra note 14, at 21 (Appendix A) (“Statement of Staff Strength As On 31  March, 2005”st
listing 150 examiner posts as “working strength” under heading “Under Modernization Project”
and 14 examiner posts as “working strength” under heading “Regular”). 
 See Interview with K.S. Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, India718
Intellectual Property Office, New Delhi branch (Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author).
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and government officials seem eager to shed this negative image.  Inaugurating the new Patent Office
branch facility in New Delhi, Indian Commerce Minister Nath exhorted IP officials that they “must
now ensure delivery of services in an equally efficient and transparent manner, befitting the working
environment.”714
Current examiner staffing levels appear grossly inadequate for the onslaught of mailbox
applications now awaiting examination,  a concern reportedly expressed by Indian government715
officials.   According to Patent Office officials and as confirmed by the Office’s ANNUAL REPORT716
2004-2005, a total of 164 patent examiners were employed in the four branches of the Indian Patent
Office in 2005 (not including senior staff positions such as Deputy and Assistant Controllers).   It717
is unknown how many of these examiners have experience or training in the chemical arts, but Patent
Office officials have admitted that the Office needs more chemical examiners.   718
Recruiting efforts appear to be underway, or at least contemplated.  The total “sanctioned
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 See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, supra note 14, at 21719
(Appendix A) (“Statement of Staff Strength As On 31  March, 2005” listing 190 examiner postsst
as “sanctioned strength” under heading “Under Modernization Project” and 22 examiner posts as
“sanctioned strength” under heading “Regular”). 
  Adarsh SV, Harmonised global patent search may become a reality, FINANCIAL720
EXPRESS, Aug. 20, 2005, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=99772#.
 See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, supra note 14, at 71721
(describing “Training Programme for Examiners of Patents and Designs”).  
 See India Patents Rules, 2003 (“principal rules”), available at722
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_re_03.pdf;  India Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2005,
available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/The%20Patents%20(Amendments)%20Rules%202005%20(E
NGLISH).pdf;  India Patents (Amendments) Rules, 2006, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_rules_2006.pdf.  
 Available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).723
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strength” for Indian patent examiner positions as of March 31, 2005 was 212 positions,  so it719
appears that the Office has authorization to hire at least about fifty new examiners.  The numbers may
be higher; the Indian press has reported that “[t]he government is in the process of recruiting nearly
300 patent examiners.”720
Training for Indian patent examiners is provided to some degree through the Intellectual
Property Training Institute (IPTI) in Nagpur, which provides courses that “aim to improve the legal
and technical ability of examiners and to enhance the qualitative level of the examination.”   The721
degree of formal training available beyond the IPTI courses is unknown.  
3.  Patent Examination Procedure
Figure 2 below provides a flow-chart of prosecution procedures in the Indian Patent Office.
Key features are highlighted below and compared to U.S. practice; additional details are provided in
the India Patents Rules, 2003 (2006)  and the Indian MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND722
PROCEDURE.723
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Adapted from Intellectual Property India, Department of Industrial Policy and724
Promotion, Government of India, PATENT OFFICE (Nov. 2005) (brochure on file with author).
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Figure 2.  Indian Patent Office Examination Procedure724
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 See PATENT OFFICE, INDIA, MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005)725
§ 5.13(iii), available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual.htm.
 See Patrick Mirandah, Enforcement of Patent Rights in India and South East Asia: A726
Comparative Analysis, BNA WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT (June 2006) (noting that
India, along with Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, “do[es] not require the translation of
the patent specifications if they are in English.”). 
 See PATENT OFFICE, INDIA, MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005)727
§ 5.13(iii), available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual.htm.
 The filing of a provisional application in the USPTO is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)728
(2006).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 9(1).729
 See id. at § 10(1).730
 See id. at § 11(2).731
 See id. at § 10(4)[c).732
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Patent applications are typically filed with the Indian Patent Office in the English language.
Although Hindi and English are both official languages of the Office,  translation of applications or725
patents from English to Hindi is not required.   International applications filed under the PCT in726
other languages must be accompanied by an English language translation in order to enter national
phase examination in India.727
Consistent with current U.S. practice,  India facilitates claims of domestic priority via the728
filing of provisional applications (for “ordinary” applications, not those filed as PCT national phase
applications or as “convention” applications claiming the benefit of an earlier foreign priority date
under the Paris Convention).   The provisional application need not include any claims; it must729
merely provide a description of the invention and a title.   Provided that a complete [i.e., non-730
provisional] specification is filed within the subsequent twelve months, each claim thereof that is
“fairly based on the matter disclosed in the [provisional] specification” will be assigned the priority
date on which the provisional specification was filed.   The complete specification must conclude731
with one or more claims  and, in addition to a full and particular description of the invention and its732
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See id. at § 10(4)(a).733
 Id. at § 10(4)(b).  In contrast with India’s retention of a best mode requirement, recent734
U.S. patent law reform efforts contemplate elimination of the requirement.  If enacted into law,
the U.S. Patent Reform Act of 2005 would repeal the best mode requirement currently set forth in
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.  See H.R. 2795 (June 8, 2005) at § 4(d)(1)(B).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11B(1) (providing that “[n]o application for a735
patent shall be examined unless the applicant or any other interested person makes a request in the
prescribed manner for such examination within the prescribed period.”).
 See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05, supra note 14, at 30736
(Appendix G, item 5). 
 See India Patents (Amendments) Rules, 2006 at § 8(a)(i), available at737
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_rules_2006.pdf (amending time limit from previous 36
months to new 48 months).  
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11B(4).738
 See id. at § 12(1).739
 See India Patents (Amendments) Rules, 2006 at § 8[c), available at740
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_rules_2006.pdf (amending Rule 24B(3)).  
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use,  must disclose “the best method of performing the invention which is known to the applicant733
and for which he is entitled to claim protection.”  734
Several notable differences exist between Indian and U.S. patent filing and examination
procedures.  As depicted in Figure 2 above, substantive examination will not begin in the Indian
Patent Office until the applicant (or other interested person) files a request for examination
subsequent to publication (at 18 months or earlier) of the application in question.   A separate filing735
fee is due in connection with the request for examination.   Under the most recent amendments to736
India’s Patents Rules, an applicant now has up to 48 months after the application’s filing or priority
date in which to make the request.   Applications for which a request for examination is not made737
within that period are considered withdrawn.   When the request for examination has been timely738
filed, the Controller refers the application to an examiner who will make an examination report to the
Controller.   The Patents Rules now specify that a first examination report must ordinarily be issued739
to the applicant within six months of her request for examination.  740
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 See India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005) § 24B(4)(i).  741
 See id. at § 24B(4)(ii).  742
 India Patents (Amendments) Rules, 2006 at § 8(d) (substituting new language for prior743
Rule 24B(4)(i)-(ii)).  
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11A(3); India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005) § 24744
(providing that “[t]he period for which an application for patent shall not ordinarily be open to
public under sub-section (1) of section 11A shall be eighteen months from the date of filing of
application or the date of priority of the application, whichever is earlier.”).  The 2006
amendments to the Patents Rules extended the Controller’s window for publication.  See India
Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2006, § 7 (adding the following proviso in rule 24 of the principal
rules: “Provided that the period within which the Controller shall publish the application in the
Journal shall ordinarily be one month from the date of expiry of said period, or one month from
the date of request for publication under rule 24A.”).  
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 11A(2).745
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Figure 2 above includes the notation “6 + 3” between the arrows connecting “Objections” to
“Grant,” which notation referred to the time periods provided under the 2005 version of India’s
Patents Rules for responding to the examiner’s report.  The “6 + 3” notation indicated that the
applicant had six months after receiving the examiner’s first statement of objection in which to put
the application in order for grant,  with an additional three-month extension of time available upon741
request “in circumstances beyond the control of the applicant.”    The “6 + 3” notation is no longer742
correct.  The 2006 amendments to the Patents Rules, which took effect May 5, 2006, mandate that
“the time for putting an application in order for grant under section 21 [of the Patents Act] shall be
twelve months from the date on which the first statement of objection is issued to the applicant to
comply with the requirements.”   No extension of time beyond the twelve months is available under743
the current Patent Rules.   
Figure 2 above also depicts “18 Months Publication,” but the Indian notion of “publication”
in this context is far less transparent than that of U.S. and European patent practice.  At eighteen
months after an application’s filing or priority date,  or earlier if the applicant so requests,  the744 745
Indian Patent Office posts a one-page summary of data concerning the application on the Internet via
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Weekly issues of the Official Journal are available at746
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/patent_journal_2006.htm (last
visited June 21, 2006).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 5.  Unfortunately the four branch offices of the Indian747
Patent Office have not adopted a uniform format for supplying even this limited information.  For
example, application summaries from the Kolkata and Mumbai branch clearly indicate whether the
application in question was a mailbox application filed during the TRIPS transition period under
then-Section 5(2) of the Patents Act; application summaries from the New Delhi and Chennai
branches do not. See, e.g., Official Journal, May 23, 2006, available at
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/pat_arch_062006/official_journ
al_23062006.pdf (contrasting summaries of Application No. 00081/KOL/2004 [PDF page 315]
and Application No. 74/MUM/2004 [PDF page 109] with summaries of Application No.
686/CHE/2004A [at PDF page 97] and Application No. 1038/DEL/2004 [at PDF page 121]).    
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 6(b).748
 See Intellectual Property India, Publications of Patent Office (item 2), available at749
http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/publications.htm (last visited June 21, 2006).
 Of course, the full text of international applications filed and published in accordance750
with the PCT and designating India can be viewed at the WIPO’s electronic search facility,
available at http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
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its weekly on-line Official Journal.   The application summary “shall include the particulars of the746
date of application, number of application, name and address of the applicant identifying the
application and an abstract,”  but does not include any claims.  After the application summary has747
been published, “the patent office may, on payment of such fee as may be prescribed, make the
specification and drawings, if any, of such application available to the public.”   The Patent Office’s748
website confirms that copies of “accepted Indian patent specification[s] (in paper form)” are available
for 30 rupees “per specification (Printed)” at any of the Office’s four branches.   Thus, it is currently749
impossible to access in electronic form the full text of a patent application filed in the Indian Patent
Office.750
Another major difference between Indian Patent Office practice and that of the U.S. (and
other developed countries) is the availability of pre-grant opposition, as depicted in Figure 2 above.
Part IV.D.1 of this article discussed pre-grant opposition in greater detail and the specifics will not
be repeated here.  The potential for pre-grant opposition to significantly extend patent application
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 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 53(2);  India Patents Rules, 2003 (2005), at “First751
Schedule,” Entry 17(i)-(xvii) (listing annual renewal fees).
 See id.752
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 13(1)(a).753
 Id. at § 13(1)(b).754
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pendency is self-evident.
Also in contrast with U.S. practice, maintenance fees (termed “renewal fees”) for Indian
patents are due every year beginning in the second year after grant.   Like the U.S. system, however,751
India’s renewal fees are progressively higher in the later years of a patent’s life.752
Lastly, like the rest of the world other than the U.S., India operates on a first-to-file system
for determining time-wise priority between rival inventors.  In other words, if two applicants
independently filed Indian patent applications directed to the same invention, the application with the
earlier filing date will be granted (all other patentability criteria being satisfied) because it would
anticipate the claims of the application with the later filing date.  This is most clearly illustrated by
Section 13 of India’s Patents Act, which provides that an invention claimed in a complete
specification is considered anticipated if it was disclosed “before the date of filing of the applicant’s
complete specification” in any “specification filed in pursuance of an application for a patent made
in India”  or if it was “claimed in any claim of any other complete specification published on or after753
the date of filing of the applicant’s complete specification,” where the other specification was filed
“in pursuance of an application for patent made in India” and entitled to the benefit of a filing date
earlier than the applicant’s filing date.754
4.  Increasing Number of Filings and Application Pendency
The volume of patent applications filed in India has increased dramatically since the nation
joined the WTO.  Figure 3 below sets forth the number of patent applications filed, examined, and
granted by the Indian Patent Office for a ten-year period spanning April 1, 1995 to March 31, 2005.
Although the approximately 17,500 patent applications filed in India in FY 2004-05 is still a
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 By comparison, over 400,000 patent applications were filed in the U.S. Patent and755
Trademark Office during FY 2005.  See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Performance
and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2005, at Table 2 (“Patent Applications Filed (FY 1985 -
FY 2005)”), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/060402_table2.html
(reporting for FY 2005 that a total of 409,532 patent applications were filed, comprising 381,797
utility patent applications, 25,304 design patent applications, 1,288 plant patent applications, and
1,143 reissue applications).  
 See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05, supra note 14, at 27756
(Appendix C) (148% increase in 2004-05 filings of 17,466 over 1995-96 filings of 7,036).  
 Id. at 28 (Appendix D).  The above figures exclude design applications, which are the757
subject of a separate statute, the Designs Act, 2000.  See id. at 39-46 (reporting on administration
of the Design Act, 2000 for the year 2004-05).  The reporting year for Figure 3 data runs from
April 1 to March 31  for each year reported.  See id. at 21 (Appendix A) (referring to data “as onst
31  March, 2005").  st
 The dramatic drop in application filings in FY 1999-2000 is likely explained by India’s758
entry into the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) effective December 7, 1998.  Between the 1998-
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minuscule number by U.S. standards,  it represents a 148% increase over the ten-year period755
depicted in Figure 3.   756
Figure 3.  Patenting Activity in India, 1995-2005757
1995-
1996
1996-
1997
1997-
1998
1998-
1999
1999-
2000
2000-
2001
2001-
2002
2002-
2003
2003-
2004
2004-
2005
Filed 7036 8562 10155 8954 4824 8503 10592 11466 12613 17466
Examin
ed
2862 3042 2688 2931 2824 4264 5104 9538 10709 14813
Grant
ed
1533 907 1844 1800 1881 1318 1591 1379 2469 1911
Figure 3 illustrates a relatively steady increase in the number of applications filed each year
since FY 1995-96, with the exception of 1999-2000 (a transition year for PCT implementation in
India ).  Notably, the “Filed” data in Figure 3 include almost all of the approximately 9,000 mailbox758
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99 fiscal year and the 1999-2000 fiscal year, directly-filed applications owned by foreigners
dropped from 6,707 to 2,349.  See ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05 at 27 (Appendix C).  In the 1999-
2000 fiscal year, the first in which PCT filings were received by the Indian Patent Office, only 269
PCT national phase applications were filed.  See id.  In the following year (FY 2000-2001), 4,164
PCT national phase applications were filed.  See id.  These numbers indicate that about two-thirds
of foreign filers stopped filing directly in India and switched to PCT filing when this option
became available.   
 The 1995-96 application filing data in Figure 3 begin on April 1, 1995.  Applicants759
were first able to file mailbox applications on January 1, 1995, the first day of the TRIPS
transition period.  Therefore, those mailbox applications filed between January 1 and March 31,
1995, are not reflected in Figure 3.  
 See Part II.C.2 supra.760
 See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05, supra note 14, at 27761
(Appendix C) (difference between 17,466 total filings in FY 2004-2005 and 12,613 total filings in
FY 2003-2004 as a percentage of the 12,613 total filings in FY 2003-2004).  
 See id. at 29 (Appendix E, “Number of Patent Applications Filed During Last Five762
Years from 2000-01 to 2004-2005 Under Various Fields of Inventions”).  This 37 percent does
not include biotechnology-related filings, of which there were 1,214 in FY 2004-05, or about ten
percent of the total of 17,466 filings.  The remaining breakdown of application filings for FY
2004-05 is 1,079 in electrical; 3,304 in mechanical; 2,787 in computer/electronics, and 2,659
classified as “general.”  See id. 
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applications claiming substances capable of use as food, medicine or drug that were filed during the
TRIPS transition period of 1995-2004.   As explained supra,  none of these mailbox applications759 760
were taken up for examination (nor a summary even published) prior to January 1, 2005, so the
“Examined” data in Figure 3 for 1995-2004 do not reflect them.  
The full implementation of India’s new pharmaceutical product patents regime effective
January 1, 2005 appears to have catalyzed patent application filings to an even greater degree than
India’s joining the WTO did.  The number of patent applications filed in India during FY 2004-05
notably increased by approximately 38 percent over the previous year.   Approximately 37 percent761
of these FY 2004-05 filings claimed chemical-, drug-, or food-related inventions.   The 2004-05762
fiscal reporting year includes the first three months (January through March, 2005) during which
regular (i.e., non-mailbox) applications claiming pharmaceutical substances could be filed.  
As in other developing countries, the majority of applicants for Indian patents are foreigners.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 The PCT national phase filings received by the Indian Patent Office are primarily763
applications assigned to foreigners (i.e., non-Indians), but in FY 2004-05 a small number of Indian
entities also began to file via the PCT rather than originally filing applications in the Indian Patent
Office.  See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05, supra note 14, at 24
(Appendix B) (indicating that in 2004-05, Indian entities filed 345 PCT national phase
applications and 26 convention applications, as compared to 3,630 ordinary applications). 
 A PCT applicant files a single “international application” with the patent office of her764
home country (acting as a PCT “receiving office”), or with the International Bureau of the WIPO
in Geneva.  See Patent Cooperation Treaty Art. 3 (“The International Application”), available at
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/a3.htm#_3 (last visited June 6, 2006).  Through
designation of any or all of the PCT contracting states, including India, the international
application will have the effect of a national patent application in each designated contracting
state.  See id. at Art. 4 (“The Request”), available at
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/a4.htm#_4; id. at Art. 11 (“Filing Date and Effects of the
International Application”), available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/a11.htm#_11. 
The PCT applicant generally must file a copy of her international application and translation (if
required) with each designated national patent office (e.g., the Indian Patent Office) within 30
months of the application’s priority date.  See id. at Art. 22 (“Copy, Translation, and Fee, to
Designated Offices”), available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/a22.htm#_22.  This
latter step represents entry into the “national phase” of the PCT procedure.  
 For FY 2004-05, 10,671 PCT national phase applications were filed out of 17,466 total765
applications filed, or 61.1 percent.  Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05, supra
note 14, at 27 (Appendix C).  Out of the remaining 6,795 non-PCT applications, 2,396 were
“convention applications” which claimed the priority date of a corresponding application filed
within the previous twelve months in another country under the Paris Convention’s right of
priority, and 4,399 were “ordinary applications” not claiming any foreign priority.  See id. at 26
(Appendix B, “Grand Total” figures).  
For further explanation of the designations “ordinary application,” “convention
application,” and “PCT national phase application,” see Patent Office, India, MANUAL OF PATENT
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005) § 3.6 (“Various Types of Patent Applications in India”),
available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual-2052005.pdf. 
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For the last four years, the majority (about 60 percent) of patent applications filed in India have been
foreign-owned  “PCT national phase” applications filed in accordance with the provisions of the763
WIPO-administered Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT); i.e., applications originating as PCT
international applications filed abroad and designating India,  rather than as applications filed764
directly with the Indian Patent Office.   India became a member of the PCT effective December 7,765
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database–Contracting766
Parties–PCT–India–Details, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=500C (last visited Aug. 4, 2006) (noting
India’s accession to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) on September 7, 1998, and the entry
into force of the PCT in India on December 7, 1998).
 For FY 2000-01, 4,164 national phase applications under the PCT were filed out of a767
total of 8,503 applications filed, or 49.0%.  See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT
2004-05, supra note 14, at 27 (Appendix C).
 In FY 2002-03, 7,049 national phase applications under the PCT were filed out of a768
total of 11,466 applications, or 61.5%.  In FY 2003-04, 7,717 PCT applications were filed out of
12,613, or 61.2%.  In FY 2004-05, 10,671 PCT applications were filed out of 17,466, or 61.1%. 
See id. at 27 (Appendix C).
 Out of a total of 10,671 PCT national phase applications filed in the Indian Patent769
Office in FY 2004-05, 4,053 were filed by U.S. applicants, 1,292 were filed by German
applicants, 671 were filed by French applicants, 626 were filed by Japanese applicants, and 520
were filed by applicants from the Netherlands.  See id. at 24-26 (Appendix B) (titled
“Applications for Patent Filed in The Year 2004-05 As Against 2003-04 Classified According to
Country/State of Origin”).
 See Patent Cooperation Treaty Art. 15 (“The International Search”), available at770
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/a15.htm#_15 (last visited June 6, 2006).
 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 8(2).771
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1998.   By the 2000-01 fiscal year, the number of PCT-filed applications entering the national phase766
in India nearly equaled the number of applications filed directly.   In each of the most recent  four767
fiscal years, the percentage of PCT national phase filings has remained constant at around 60-61
percent.   Applicants from the U.S. were the most prevalent filers of PCT national phase768
applications in India during 2004-05, followed by applicants from Germany, France, Japan, and the
Netherlands.  769
It is unclear to what extent Indian patent examiners, during the course of their examination
of PCT national phase applications, rely on or consult the International Searching Authority (ISA)
report and prior art previously generated for these applications by foreign patent offices.   An770
examiner can require an applicant “to furnish details . . . relating to the processing of the application
in a country outside India,”  but reliance on the ISA-generated materials is neither automatic nor771
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Interview with K.S. Kardam, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, New Delhi772
(Nov. 16, 2005) (notes on file with author).    
 Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05, supra note 14, at 27 (Appendix773
C).
 Id.  These 3,630 applications filed in 2004-05 are “ordinary applications” as defined774
above; i.e., filed by Indians for the first time with the Indian Patent Office.  See id. at 24
(Appendix B).  In addition, Indian entities in 2004-05 filed 26 convention applications and 345
PCT national phase applications.  See id.  
 See id.  Out of the 3,630 ordinary applications filed by Indian entities in 2004-05, 1,093775
filers were from Maharashtra state (which includes Mumbai) and 935 were from Delhi (Union
Territory).  Id.  The third-highest state of origin for Indian patent filers was Tamil Nadu (which
includes Chennai).  Id. (showing 397 filers from Tamil Nadu state).  Both Mumbai and Chennai
are centers of Indian industry and home to many chemical and biotech firms.    
 See GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, DEPARTMENT776
OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND PROMOTION, ANNUAL REPORT 2005-06, at 78, available at
http://www.dipp.nic.in/anrepo_e/annual_report_eng_2005-06.pdf (reporting that a “total of
17,466 applications, including 13,452 from other countries, were filed during 2004-05 . . .”).  In
contrast, approximately 55 percent of applicants for U.S. patents in FY 2005 were U.S. residents. 
See United States Patent and Trademark Office, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2005, at Table 7 (“Patent Applications Filed By Residents of the United States (FY
2005)”) (reporting 225,152 filings for FY 2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/060404_table7.html; id. at Table 9 (“United
States Patent Applications Filed By Residents of Foreign Countries (FY 2001 - FY 2005)”)
(reporting 184,380 filings for FY 2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/060409_table9.html.
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conclusive.772
Foreign entities are not solely responsible for the dramatic increase in India’s patent filings.
The number of patent applications filed by Indian entities has also increased dramatically during the
ten-year period depicted in Figure 3.  In 1995-96, Indians filed 1,606 patent applications  in the Indian
Patent Office.   By 2004-05, that number had increased by 126 percent to 3,630.   The largest773 774
number of Indian filers were from the state of Maharashtra (which includes Mumbai) and the Union
Territory of Delhi.   Despite the significant increase in filings by Indian citizens, their applications775
made up only 23 percent of the total filed in India in FY 2004-05, as opposed to the remaining 77
percent filed during that period by foreigners.   At the end of the day, India’s patent system is still776
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 In contrast, pendency figures for U.S. applications are available at United States Patent777
and Trademark Office, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2005, at
Table 4 (“Patent Pendency Statistics (FY 2005)”), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/060404_table4.html.
 India Modifies Patent Rules to Boost Innovation and Attract Investment, WORLD778
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT (June 2006) (reporting comments of Akash Taneja of the
National Intellectual Protection Organization that due to Indian government’s modernization
efforts and recent hiring of new patent examiners, “the average time taken to secure a patent in
India could come down from the current three to six years to about a year and one-half to three
years.”). 
 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2006) (“Adjustment of patent term”), which was implemented779
by the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act,  P.L. No. 100-418, Title IX, Subtitle A, § 9002,
102 Stat. 1563 (Dec. 8, 1994).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 53 (“Term of patent”).  See also Patrick780
Mirandah, Enforcement of Patent Rights in India and South East Asia: A Comparative Analysis,
BNA WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT (June 2006) (noting that Singapore is the only
one of the South and South East Asian countries (i.e., India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore,
Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines) that presently allows term extensions for unreasonable
patent office-caused delays).
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utilized largely by foreigners rather that its own citizens.       
Data are not yet available that would provide a clear picture of India’s patent examination
pendency; i.e., the average time lag between application filing and ultimate disposition (allowance or
final rejection).  Both the Patent Office and the applicant may contribute to this time lag.  For
example, because the applicant must file a Request for Examination following publication of her
application, any delay in making that request would extend application pendency to some degree.
The Indian Patent Office does not yet publish average pendency figures.   Secondary literature777
suggests that average pendency ranges from three to six years.   The pendency issue is of potential778
concern to the pharmaceutical industry, where a patent may be as much or more economically
valuable at the end of its life than at the beginning.  Notably, and in contrast with U.S. patent laws,779
the Indian Patents Act currently does not make any provision for patent term adjustment due to
Patent Office delay.780
Despite the significant annual increase in both number of applications filed and applications
examined in India since FY 1999-2000, the number of patents granted annually by the Indian Patent
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 Based on 14,813 applications examined in 2004-2005 versus 1,911 applications granted781
in the same period.  See Intellectual Property India, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, supra note 14,
at 8.
 Shamnad Basheer, “Policy Style” Reasoning at the Indian Patent Office,782
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY QUARTERLY, No. 3 (2005), at 309, 316, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=829464.  See also Ragavan, supra note 87, at
281 n.53 (observing that the “Ayyangar Report, as modified by the Report of the Joint Committee
of Parliament in 1966, forms the backbone of the Indian patent system.”). 
 Basheer (Policy Style), supra note 782, at 310.783
 Id.784
 Id. at 323.785
 Id. 786
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Office has barely changed.  Comparing the number of patents granted versus those examined in
Figure 3, one can only conclude that the Indian Patent Office has taken a very restrictive approach
to patentability.  For example, the ratio of patents granted in FY 2004-05 to applications examined
during that year is only about thirteen percent.   The low numbers are consistent with the781
observations of Shamnad Basheer, who has noted the Indian “Patent Office’s deep entrenchment with
the Ayyangar report and a consistently conservative approach to the issue of patentability.”782
Because in Basheer’s view the Indian Patent Office is “rooted in a system that stressed the virtues of
a weak patent system,”  it is “likely that the Patent Office w[ill] continue with a conservative783
approach to the issue of patentability, even with regard to pharmaceutical inventions (that are
patentable under the 2005 Act).”   784
More specifically, Basheer suggests that the new Patents Act’s “several patent eligibility
exclusions such as the ‘new use’ exclusion, method of medical treatment exception, and the ‘product
of nature’ exclusion [] could be interpreted in a fairly liberal manner to limit the scope of protection
to pharmaceutical inventions.”   In addition, Basheer suggests, “the traditional patentability criteria785
of novelty, non-obviousness, or utility could be strictly construed to limit the scope of such patent
grants.”   If these restrictive views towards patentability represent the philosophical viewpoint of786
the majority of India’s patent examining corps, as Basheer suggests, they soon will be subject to the
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 See India Patents Act, 1970, § 116 (titled “Appeals”) (providing that “an appeal shall787
lie to a High Court from any decision, order or direction of the Controller under any of the
following provisions, that is to say, section 15, section 16, section 17, section 18, section 19,
section 20, section 25, section 27, section 28, section 51, section 54, section 57, section 60,
section 61, section 63, sub-section (3) of section 69, section 78, section 84, section 86, section
88(3), section 89, section 93, section 96 and section 97.”)
 See part V.B.1 infra.788
 See India Patents Act, 1970, §§ 116(3), 117(1).789
 See id. at §§ 117(2), 117(3).790
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 116(1) (providing that “[s]ubject to the791
provisions of this Act, the Appellate Board established under section 83 of the Trade Marks Act,
1999 shall be the Appellate Board for the purposes of this Act and the said Appellate Board shall
exercise the jurisdiction, power and authority conferred on it by or under this Act . . .”).
 See part V.B.1 infra.792
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review of a newly-formed appellate body within the Patent Office, as next discussed.
5.  Creation of Patent Appellate Board 
Under the Patents Act, 1970, decisions of the Indian Controller of Patents were appealable
to the Indian High Courts,  which occupy in India’s judicial hierarchy a position comparable to the787
state supreme courts of the U.S.   Patent Office appeals to the courts were initiated by written788
petitions that had to filed within three months from the date of the Controller’s decision, order or
direction.   The appeals were typically heard by a single Judge of the High Court, who was to789
“endeavour . . . to decide the appeal within a period of twelve months” of its filing.790
The jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts to hear Patent Office appeals is soon to be removed
and transferred to a new, specialized administrative tribunal known as the Intellectual Property
Appellate Board (IPAB).  The India Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, expanded the jurisdiction of
the existing IPAB, previously established for trademark matters by India’s Trade Marks Act, 1999,
to encompass patent appeals.   The legislation’s intent is to remove appellate jurisdiction over Patent791
Office matters from a non-specialized forum with a notorious backlog of cases  and relocate it under792
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See E-mail from Manoj Pillai, Partner, Lex Orbis Intellectual Property Practice, New793
Delhi (Jan. 28, 2006) (on file with author).
 See E-mail from Manoj Pillai, Partner, Lex Orbis Intellectual Property Practice, New794
Delhi (Jan. 28, 2006) (on file with author);  see also Basheer (Policy Style), supra note 782, at
321 n.73 (stating that “[a]lthough the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (‘IPAB’) has been
established and has already rendered some important decisions in the area of trade marks, no rules
have been finalised so far for the purposes of hearing appeals under the Patents Act.  The IPAB
has therefore not started functioning with respect to patents.”).
 Interview with attorney Krishna Sarma, Corporate Law Group, in New Delhi, India795
(Nov. 14, 2005) (transcript on file with author).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 116(1).796
 See id. at § 116(2).797
 See id. at § 117G (titled “Transfer of pending proceedings to Appellate Board”)798
(providing that “[a]ll cases of appeals against any order or decision of the Controller and all cases
pertaining to revocation of patent other than on a counter-claim in a suit for infringement and
rectification of register pending before any High Court, shall be transferred to the Appellate
Board from such date as may be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette and
the Appellate Board may proceed with the matter either de novo or from the state it was so
transferred.”).  
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the auspices of a specialized, patent-focused administrative tribunal.  793
As of early 2006, however, the patent Appellate Board was not yet operational  because the794
Indian government had not yet named a Technical Member to the Board.   Section 116 of the795
current Patents Act provides that the Appellate Board shall have power to hear appeals from
decisions of the Controller provided that the Board includes a Technical Member.   The Technical796
Member must be either a former Controller of Patents, or an individual with a scientific or technical
degree and at least ten years experience as  a Registered Patent Agent.  797
Once the Patent Appellate Board is in operation, its decisions in appeals from Patent Office
matters will be for all practical purposes final.  No further direct review of Patent Appellate Board
decisions will be available through the Indian court system, and then-pending proceedings before the
High Courts will be transferred to the Appellate Board.   Nevertheless, the High Courts  retain798
constitutional powers to entertain “writ petitions” against decisions of an administrative body such
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 See Constitution of India, Art. 226, available at799
http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/Art1-242%20(1-88).doc, at 79.
 E-mail from Manoj Pillai, Partner, Lex Orbis Intellectual Property Practice, New Delhi800
(Jan. 28, 2006) (on file with author); see also L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India (AIR 1997 SC
11265) (decision of Indian Supreme Court holding that while the High Court cannot hear appeals
from the orders of an administrative tribunal, it nevertheless retains jurisdiction to entertain writ
petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution).  
 See Part IV.A.3.a supra for a discussion of the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 3(d).801
 In the U.S., for example, trial courts are just beginning to grapple with the implications802
of the watershed claim interpretation decision, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc).  In India, the High Courts are already being asked in pharmaceutical patent cases
to apply British claim construction approaches such as the older “pith and marrow” doctrine and
the more recent “purposive construction” principle.  See Novartis AG v. Adarsh Pharma, 2004
(29) P.T.C. [India Patent and Trade Marks Cases Reporter] 108, 132 (Mad[ras]).  The Novartis
litigation is discussed in further detail in Part V.B.3 infra.
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as the Patent Appellate Board.   Typically the High Courts will entertain such a petition only if it799
establishes a prima facie case of “patent illegality in the decision rendered,” “miscarriage of justice,”
or a “question of law that merits attention.”   Having had their heavy caseload reduced by the800
creation of the Patent Appellate Board, it seems highly unlikely that the High Courts will entertain
writ petitions challenging Board decisions with any frequency. 
B.  Judicial Capacity:  India’s Court System
In addition to the Patent Office (including the Patent Appellate Board), the other key actor
in the implementation of India’s new patents regime is the judiciary, which decides issues of patent
enforcement.  As pharmaceutical product patents begin to issue in India, their potential economic
worth can be expected to catalyze a rapid increase in volume of patent infringement litigation.  The
Indian courts will face challenging statutory interpretation issues when they are asked to apply the
new patentability provisions of the Patents Act, 1970 (2005), such as the anti-evergreening provision
of Section 3(d).   The Indian courts can also expect to confront a rising number of patent claim801
interpretation and infringement issues, at a time when those issues remain very much in flux even in
developed-country patent systems.   802
Prior to implementation of the new pharmaceutical product patents regime, few patents were
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See Part V.A.4 supra for statistics on Indian patent grants.803
 Decisions of the Indian High Courts are reported in the ALL-INDIA REPORTER (AIR),804
which is part of the collection of a few U.S. law school libraries such as that of Columbia
University.  A specialized PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT (PTC) REPORTER also exists for
Indian intellectual property cases.  Subscriptions to the content of these reporters on CD-ROM
can be purchased, see http://www.allindiareporter.com/ahc.php (last visited June 12,2006), but
that content is not accessible via the Internet.  In the U.S., Lexis provides Indian Supreme Court
decisions from 1999 onwards, but neither Lexis nor Westlaw currently provides Indian High
Court decisions.  Recently, several of the High Courts began making their opinions available for
free via the Internet, see http://indiancourts.nic.in/sitesmain.htm (last visited June 12, 2006), but
text search capabilities are varied.  The best free Internet site for locating Indian case law is the
World Legal Information Institute site for India, available at
http://www.worldlii.org/catalog/2179.html (last visited June 12, 2006). 
 See Theodore A. Mahr, An Introduction to Law and Law Libraries in India, 82 LAW805
LIBRARY J. 91, 121 (1990) (noting that “[t]he High Courts in India correspond to the state
supreme courts in the United States, although there is not a dual federal and state court system.”). 
A list of India’s eighteen High Courts, their territorial jurisdiction and seats is available at
http://indiancourts.nic.in/indian_jud.htm (“Annexure A”) (last visited June 12, 2006).  A list of
various High Court websites is available at http://indiancourts.nic.in/sitesmain.htm (last visited
June 12, 2006).
 A list of District Court websites is available at http://indiancourts.nic.in/sitesmain.htm806
(last visited June 12, 2006).
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granted each year in India and even fewer were litigated.   As a result, there is a relative paucity of803
Indian patent case law from which to predict how the Indian courts will rule in future cases.
Moreover, accessing and searching the reported Indian patent decisions is not straightforward.804
Early indicators of the Indian courts’ treatment of pharmaceutical product patents do not bode
well for uniformity.  Two recent and conflicting High Court decisions in preliminary injunction
proceedings involving the same patent application and EMR, described below, may well be harbingers
of future forum shopping and inter-High Court conflicts in patent cases.  
1.  Court Structure and Backlog Concerns
Unlike the U.S., India does not have a dual state and federal court system.  Rather, India’s
unitary court system comprises a Supreme Court based in Delhi and eighteen High Courts, each
having jurisdiction over at least one state of India.   Beneath the High Courts in the judicial805
hierarchy are the District Courts.   The High Courts were first implemented in 1861 by the British,806
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 See Mahr, supra note 805, at 100-102.807
 See id. at 107.  Other Indian legal cultures co-exist with the adversarial court system. 808
See id. (describing “traditional panchayat village councils, which use customary law and
procedure to settle disputes and maintain social control” and the social norms of Brahmin “high
culture” law).
 Jayanth K. Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy and the Role of the Courts in India, 21809
AMERICAN ASIAN REV. 91 (2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=682326 (last visited June 12, 2006).
 Jishnu Guha, Time For India’s Intellectual Property Regime to Grow Up, 13 CARDOZO810
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225, 240 (2005).
 USAID India, Strategy 2003-2007, Section 1, available at811
http://www.usaid.gov/in/our_work/strategy/strategy1.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).  The
USAID report states in pertinent part:
One of India's most recognizable strengths is its independent and well-regarded
judiciary.  However, the legal system is hampered by critical problems that often affect
the poor most.  Backlogs total as high as 28 million cases.  Case processing times are
exceedingly long, effectively denying justice to those who need the system’s
protection.  Too many citizens charged with minor crimes spend lengthy periods in
jail awaiting trial.  Legal literacy is low, and there are few mechanisms for legal aid.
Id.
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who bequeathed to India their common law system including stare decisis principles.   After India807
gained its independence in 1947, leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi “chose to maintain the adversary
court system with its rule of law, individualistic rights, and ideas of equality.”    808
India’s independent judiciary and adherence to the rule of law are well regarded, but the
fundamental weakness of the Indian judicial system is the immense backlog of cases it faces.  Indian
courts are said to be “the most crowded of any in the world”  and the Indian judiciary809
“overburdened to the point of dysfunction.”   A recent USAID study reported that the Indian810
judicial backlog may be “as high as 28 million cases” and that exceedingly long case processing times
“effectively deny[] justice to those who need the system’s protection.”811
The Indian government appears to be concerned that the courts’ backlog will negatively
impact the nation’s desired image as one of new-found respect for intellectual property rights.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
 See Dhananjay Mahapatra, Intellectual rights cases to get top priority, says CJI, TIMES812
OF INDIA, Nov. 13, 2005, at 19.
 Id.813
 See Law Commission of India, 188  Report on Proposals for Constitution of Hi-Tech814 th
Fast-Track Commercial Divisions in High Courts (Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/INLC/2004/188.pdf (visited Oct. 21, 2005).
 See id.815
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 104 (“Jurisdiction”).816
 See id. at § 107 (“Defenses, etc., in suits for infringement”).817
 See id. at § 64(1)(a), (e), (l), and (q).818
 See id. at § 64(1)(g).819
 See id. at § 64(1)(f).820
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Keynoting the November 2005 annual meeting of the Asian Patent Attorneys Association, the Chief
Justice of the Indian Supreme Court, Y.K. Sabharwal, proposed fast-tracking of IP cases through the
Indian courts.   The Chief Justice “promised to include IPR cases in his priority list, which he had812
unveiled as Chief Justice designate, to put on fast track trial.”   Along similar lines, the Law813
Commission of India has proposed the creation of a high-tech commercial court.   The commercial814
court’s docket would include patent cases, with resolution in a one-to-two year time frame.  815
2.  Litigating Patent Infringement and Revocation in India
Lawsuits alleging infringement of Indian patents are filed before the District Courts, but if the
accused infringer files a counter-claim for revocation (or in U.S. parlance, invalidity) of the patent,
the case will be transferred to the appropriate High Court for hearing and decision.   Those816
defending a patent infringement action may raise as a defense any ground set forth in Section 64
(“Revocation of patents”) of the Patents Act,  which enumerates an extensive list of bases for817
revocation including lack of novelty,  utility  and inventive step;  failure to provide an enabling818 819 820
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 See id. at § 64(1)(h).821
 See id. at § 64(1)(h) (application “does not disclose the best method of performing [the822
invention] which was known to the applicant for the patent and for which he was entitled to claim
protection.”).
 See id. at § 64(1)(i).823
 See id. at § 64(1)(d) (subject of any claim “is not an invention within the meaning of824
this Act”); § 64(1)(k) (subject of any claim “not patentable under this Act”).
 See id. at § 64(1)(p).825
 See id. at § 105 (“Power of court to make declaration as to non-infringement”).826
 See id. at § 105(3) (stating that “[t]he validity of a claim of the specification of a patent827
shall not be called in question in a suit for a declaration brought by virtue of this section . . .”).
 See id. at § 64 (1) (providing that “a patent, whether granted before or after the828
commencement of this Act, may be revoked on a petition of any person interested or of the
Central Government by the Appellate Board or on a counter-claim in a suit for infringement of the
patent by the High Court . . .”). 
 The Delhi High Court has held that “[a] ‘person interested’ within the meaning of829
section 64 must be a person who has a direct, present and tangible commercial interest which is
injured or affected by the continuance of the patent on the register.”  India Patents Act, 1970
(2005) § 64, Comment (i) (citing Ajay Industrial Corp. v. Shiro Kanao of Ibaraki City, AIR 1983
Del 496), reprinted in reprinted in UNIVERSAL’S THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, AS AMENDED BY THE
PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005 (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi) (2005), at 1,
41.  See also India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 2(1)(t) (defining “person interested” to “include[] a
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disclosure;  failure to disclose the best mode;  lack of claim clarity;  non-patentable subject821 822 823
matter;  and failure to disclose the source or geographical origin of biological material used for the824
invention.  825
Affirmative actions are also permitted by those seeking a judicial declaration of non-
infringement,  but unlike U.S. declaratory judgment actions, such actions in India cannot assert826
patent invalidity.   The party seeking to revoke a patent outside the context of defending an827
infringement suit must file a petition for revocation with the Indian Patent Office.   The revocation828
petitioner must be a “person interested,” suffering tangible commercial harm from the continued
pendency of the challenged patent.    829
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
person engaged in, or in promoting, research in the same field as that to which the invention
relates”).
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 13(4) (providing that “[t]he examination and830
investigations required under section 12 [“Examination of application”] and this section [“Search
for anticipation by previous publication and by prior claim”] shall not be deemed in any way to
warrant the validity of any patent, and no liability shall be incurred by the Central Government or
any officer thereof by reason of, or in connection with, any such examination or investigation or
any report or other proceedings consequent thereon.”).
 See Narayanan (1998), supra note 50, at ¶ 1-19. 831
 See 35 U.S.C. § 282, ¶ 1 (2006) (providing that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid.”).832
 See Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials America, Inc., 98833
F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
 See Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988).834
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Unlike the U.S., India does not recognize a presumption of validity for issued patents.   A830
leading treatise explains thus:
The [India Patents] Act provides for search among the records of the Patent
Office for anticipation based on published material.  Such a search, however,
can never be exhaustive or final. . . .  Besides, the question of obviousness
or inventiveness has to be judged from the point of view of a man skilled in
the art which requires evidence of experts.  This question can be resolved
only in opposition or revocation proceedings.  But many patents are granted
unopposed.  The Act therefore does not guarantee the validity of the patent
which can finally be decided only by the High Court in infringement or
revocation proceedings.831
In contrast, the U.S. does recognize a presumption (though not a warranty or guarantee) of validity
for issued patents,  based at least in part on an assumption of administrative correctness on the part832
of the USPTO.   Federal Circuit case law further mandates that the quantum of a challenger’s833
burden of proof in invalidating an issued patent is clear and convincing evidence (a higher standard
than the preponderance of the evidence typically required to prevail in a civil case).   Because this834
evidentiary standard is not applied in India, it would appear relatively easier to obtain revocation of
an Indian patent than to invalidate the corresponding patent in the U.S. 
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 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) §§ 104-115.835
 See id. at Chapter XVIII (“Suits Concerning Infringement of Patents”) §§ 104-115.836
 Id. at § 48 (“Rights of Patentees”).837
 TRIPS Art. 28.  838
 See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) (not mentioning contributory infringement or839
inducing infringement).  
 See TRIPS Art. 28 (enumerating only acts of direct infringement); Cynthia M. Ho,840
Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35 U.S.C. § 287[c), 33 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 601, 664 (2000) (observing that “TRIPS does not require members to recognize
contributory infringement.  The exclusive rights that each member country must provide under
TRIPS are limited to direct infringement, although each nation is free to provide additional rights,
such as contributory infringement.”) (footnotes omitted).   
 See id. at 664.841
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Chapter XVIII of India’s Patents Act, titled “Suits Concerning Infringement of Patents,”835
does not provide a provision explicitly enumerating acts of direct infringement along the lines of
Section 271(a) of the U.S. Patent Act.  Elsewhere, however, India’s Patents Act specifies that a836
product patentee has “the exclusive right to prevent third parties, who do not have his consent, from
the act of making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for those purposes that product in
India.”   This definition is entirely consistent with the TRIPS Agreement, which mandates the837
identical exclusive rights.   838
No provision exists in the India Patents Act regarding indirect liability under a theory of joint
tortfeasance, e.g., for acts by entity X that aid and abet or materially contribute to the direct
infringement of entity Y, such as by intentionally providing a non-staple component or starting
material for the manufacture of a directly infringing product.   In contrast with its treatment of direct839
infringement, the TRIPS Agreement does not mandate recognition of (nor even mention) indirect
infringement liability.   Because TRIPS sets forth only minimum standards, member countries have840
the option of expanding a patentee’s rights.   The U.S., which has statutorily recognized liability for841
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 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c] (2006).842
 See id. at § 271(b).843
 Although the Patents Act does not specifically refer to liability for inducing or844
contributory infringement, a form of protection therefrom is available indirectly through the
statutorily-codified remedy of seizure.  See India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) § 108(2) (providing
that, in addition to seizure of infringing goods, “materials and implements, the predominant use of
which is in the creation of infringing goods shall be seized, forfeited or destroyed, as the court
deems fit under the circumstances of the case without payment of any compensation.”)
 Id. at § 108(1).845
 Id.846
 See Aro Mfg. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964).847
 See Novartis AG v. Adarsh Pharma, 2004 (29) P.T.C. [India Patent and Trade Marks848
Cases Reporter] 108, 113-14 (Mad[ras]) (citing plaintiff Novartis’s statement of facts as set forth
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acts of contributory  and inducing  infringement since the 1952 Patent Act, is a case in point.842 843
India, by contrast, has chosen not to statutorily implement this expanded protection for patentees,
consistent with TRIPS’ silence on the point.844
Remedies for infringement of an Indian patent include injunctive relief, “subject to such terms,
if any, as the court thinks fit.”   The primary distinction between infringement remedies available in845
the U.S. and India is that in India (in addition to injunctive relief) the plaintiff may elect to receive
either damages or an “account of profits.”   The former refers to damages suffered by the patentee,846
e.g., profits lost by the patentee on sales that it would have made but for the infringement, while the
latter refers to disgorgement of the accused infringer’s wrongly-obtained profits.  Congress eliminated
the accounting remedy in the U.S. in 1946.847
3.  High Court Patent Conflicts
During 2004, two Indian High Courts reached opposite conclusions concerning whether Swiss
pharmaceutical manufacturer Novartis AG, holder of an Indian EMR on the anti-cancer drug
marketed as Glivic (sometimes spelled Gleevec), and its Indian subsidiary Novartis India Ltd. (jointly
“Novartis”) were entitled to an interlocutory injunction against infringement of the EMR by generic
competitors.  The facts common to both cases are these:   Novartis AG filed in 1998 an Indian848
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in its pleadings).
 Id. at 114.849
 Id.850
 Id.  The various requirements for obtaining an EMR are discussed in Part II.C.2.851
 Id.852
 Id.853
 2004 (29) P.T.C. 108 (Mad[ras]).854
 See id. at 119 (concluding that “there is no scope, in my considered opinion, for855
examining the said patent claim on the basis of any of the other provisions of the Act, which may
stand attracted when the patent claim is taken up for consideration on merits after 31.12.2004.”).
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patent application claiming the “beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate,” having the previous day
filed a patent application claiming the same drug in Australia.   The Australian government granted849
marketing approval in 2001 and issued an Australian patent in 2002.   On the basis of the Australian850
approvals, Novartis AG in 2002 filed its application for an EMR with the Kolkata branch of the
Indian Patent Office.   The EMR was granted in November 2003, conferring on Novartis an851
exclusive right to sell Glivic in India for up to five years or until Novartis’s pending product patent
claim was disposed of, whichever was earlier.   The Drug Controller of India also gave Novartis852
India marketing approval (i.e., an import license) to sell Glivic for the three-year period of January 1,
2003 through December 31, 2005.   853
In Novartis AG v. Adarsh Pharma,  Judge Balasubramanian of the High Court of Madras854
(Chennai) on April 28, 2004 confirmed Novartis’s earlier-granted ex parte injunction against further
infringement of its Glivic EMR.  The Madras court refused to consider the defendant’s arguments that
the EMR was invalid on grounds of anticipation by virtue of the claimed invention having previously
been disclosed in earlier-filed U.S. and Canadian applications and patents assigned to Novartis and
in earlier-published journal articles.  The Madras court interpreted the statutory provisions pertaining
to the granting of EMRs as strictly limited to consideration of whether the covered product was or
was not considered patentable subject matter under sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Patents Act.   At855
least at the interlocutory injunction stage, it would not be proper to challenge an EMR based on
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 India Patents Act, 1970 (2005) §§ 12-13.  See also Novartis v. Adarsh, 2004 (29) PTC856
108, 119 (Mad[ras]) (reading section 24-A(1) of Act as “inevitabl[y]” meaning that “examination
under section 12(1) of the Act stands postponed till 31.12.2004 . . .”).
 Id. at 120.  857
 Id. at 129.858
 See id. at 115 (stating defendant’s assertion that the cost per patient per year of Glivic859
is Rs. 25 lakh).  The Indian “lakh” refers to a quantity of 100,000.  Thus Rs. 25 lakh means
2,500,000 rupees.  At an exchange rate of about 46 rupees per U.S. dollar, see Yahoo Finance
Currency Converter, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/currency, this amount converts to
approximately $54,000.
 See Novartis v. Adarsh, 2004 (29) PTC 108, 133 (Mad[ras]) (citing India Patents Act,860
1970 (2002) § 24D(2) (giving Indian government the right, “in the public interest,” to set the
price of an EMR-covered drug “at a price determined by an authority specified by it in this
behalf”)).  As a creature of the TRIPS transition period, Section 24D(2) (along with all other
statutory provisions pertaining to EMRs) has now been repealed.  See India Patents (Amendment)
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sections 12 and 13 of the Patents Act, under which a patent examiner in the course of examining a
conventional patent application would be required to conduct a search for “anticipation by previous
publication and by prior claim.”   In the Madras court’s reading of the statute, anticipation “by856
previous publication or by prior claim has no relevancy while examining the patent claim in the
context of deciding to grant or not to grant an ‘EMR.’”  The Madras court’s interpretation is thus857
fully consistent with the notion that the grant of an EMR (a legal instrument that existed solely as an
interim measure during India’s TRIPS transition period) is fundamentally premised on recognition
that other countries have already awarded patent rights to the EMR applicant on the same
technology.
Nor was the Madras court troubled by the fact that Novartis AG, the Swiss parent company,
had applied for the Indian patent and EMR, while it was Novartis India, the Indian subsidiary, that
held the marketing approval; the two entities, although legally separate, were fairly treated in this
context as “one economic unit.”   The very high price charged for Glivic  did not persuade the858 859
Madras court to deny an injunction; any potential harm to the public’s interest through the
maintenance of the injunction was fully allayed by the Indian government’s statutory power to fix the
price at which Novartis could sell Glivic under the EMR.   Noting that the accused infringer began860
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Act, 2005 at § 21.
 See Novartis v. Adarsh, 2004 (29) PTC 108, 135 (Mad[ras]).861
 See id. at 134.862
 See id. at 134-35.863
 2005 (30) PTC (Bom[bay]).864
 See id. at 174 (concluding that Madras court had “not properly considered the settled865
law in the matter of grant of temporary injunction in relation to a patent of recent origin”).  
 See id. at 172-73.866
 Id. at 173.  The Bombay court thus rejected Novartis’ contention that while its Indian867
patent application and EMR are directed to a particular (beta-crystalline) form of imatinib
mesylate, its Canadian application filed in 1993 disclosed only “imatinib per se, and not [] imatinib
mesylate, let alone the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate.”  Id. at 162.  
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marketing its product in India after Novartis did,  the Madras court also rejected the defendant’s861
argument that an injunction was improper because the Novartis EMR was of merely “recent
origin.”   Although such a rule might have been applicable in earlier cases involving issued patents,862
in the Madras court’s view it was not properly applied to limit enforcement of an EMR, a unique legal
right which by definition could last at most five years.  863
The Madras court’s reasoning was rejected in Novartis AG v. Mehar Pharma,  wherein864
Judge Deshmukh of the High Court of Bombay (Mumbai) on December 23, 2004 denied Novartis’s
motion for a temporary injunction against infringement of the same Glivic EMR by different
defendants.  Contrary to the Madras court’s view,  the Bombay court concluded that the “recent865
origin” of Novartis’s EMR justified a substantive analysis of the novelty of the invention claimed in
the Novartis patent application on which the EMR was based.   The court concluded that the866
teachings of Novartis’s 1993 Canadian patent application raised “a serious question as to whether the
product in relation to which [the] EMR has been granted is really a new product or not.”   Also867
weighing against Novartis was the Bombay court’s observation that the company imports Glivic into
India from Switzerland, where it is manufactured, creating risk associated with “rely[ing] entirely on
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art43
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 Id.  According to the defendants’ submission, “the drug of the plaintiffs costs Rs. 1000869
[per tablet] whereas the drug as sold by the defendants costs about Rs. 90.”  Id. at 170.
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the international transport system” for ensuring availability in India of a “life-saving drug.”   Lastly,868
the Bombay court observed that “the aspect of the difference in price of the product of plaintiffs and
the defendants also cannot be ignored, especially at the stage of considering the question whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to any interim relief.”869
That the Madras and Bombay High Courts relied on diametrically opposed reasoning to reach
opposite conclusions about the propriety of injunctive relief for infringement of the same EMR does
not bode well for uniformity and certainty in Indian patent litigation.  These decisions portend future
patent law conflicts between the various High Courts that could catalyze rampant forum shopping
in Indian patent litigation.  One approach to dealing with pronounced variations in judicial philosophy
concerning patents is to hope for Supreme Court resolution; given the immense backlog facing India’s
courts as discussed above, that solution does not seem particularly palatable.  Another approach
would involve creating a specialized appellate tribunal with nationwide jurisdiction to resolve patent
cases, as the U.S. did by establishing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982.  India may
want to consider the letter approach.     
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Viewed after its first eighteen months in operation, India’s new pharmaceutical product
patents regime is neither the fully-Westernized panacea hoped for by its pro-TRIPS advocates nor
the unmitigated disaster for the Indian public predicted by its fiercest critics.  Innovation in India’s
pharmaceutical sector is slowly on the rise and patent application filings are increasing dramatically.
At the same time, the price of most medicines has not been affected by the newly expanded
availability of product patent protection.  Longer-term effects of patent protection on drug pricing
in India are not yet known, but the government has a number of tools at its disposal to deal with that
concern.  As this article has demonstrated, India’s new patents regime is still evolving and a great deal
remains to be clarified through implementation.
What has already become clear, however, is that India’s generic drug manufacturers, along
with NGOs, public interest groups, and patient advocacy organizations will not be passive observers
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of the new regime.  Rather, they are already making active use of available statutory flexibilities to
challenge pharmaceutical product patents and will likely continue to push the envelope in an attempt
to obtain favorable precedents.
Those advocating stronger patent protection will also find ample basis for challenging the new
Patents Act.  Significant questions of TRIPS compliance remain to be settled, especially with regard
to the Act’s provision of prior user rights for those infringing patents issuing from mailbox
applications and the Act’s maintenance of domestic working requirements as a trigger for compulsory
licensing.  The Indian Patent Office has a great deal of discretion in applying these provisions and in
setting the terms and conditions of government-compelled licenses.  The manner in which it exercises
that discretion will have much to do with whether another WTO TRIPS dispute proceeding is
initiated against India. 
Although a number of the new Patent Act’s provisions provide the Indian government with
legitimate means for balancing innovation incentives against the social costs of pharmaceutical
product patents, other provisions should be re-thought.  In reaching eleventh-hour compromises to
appease concerns about patent-driven drug price increases, India’s lawmakers may also have
triggered unintended negative consequences for indigenous innovation.  If retained in their current
form, the Act’s broad prohibitions on new use patents and its obviousness-plus standard emphasizing
commercial success will likely prevent deserving local innovators from obtaining the benefits of patent
protection. 
The Indian Patent Office and Indian judiciary face a formidable learning curve in interpreting
and applying the new Patent Act’s ambiguous patentability requirements, compulsory licensing
conditions, and the like.  Although opponents of stronger patent protection may exploit the current
uncertainties to their advantage, in the long term the lack of confidence in the availability of patent
protection for legitimate advances could prevent both increased foreign direct investment by MNCs
and a greater degree of indigenous innovation.  Rapid implementation of the new Patent Appellate
Board is important to give the Patent Office examiners guidance in these matters as well as to
alleviate High Court delays in Patent Office appeals.  
As the world watches India to see how its unique and still unsettled patent system matures,
greater transparency is needed from the Indian Patent Office.  To begin with, the Patent Office would
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perform a valuable public service by posting on its website a consolidated version of the current
Patents Act and Rules, incorporating all amendments that have been made to date to the principal
(1970) Act and principal (2003) Rules.  Additionally, the full text of patent applications should be
published electronically at eighteen months after filing, along with current versions of the Patent
Office’s Annual Reports.  Notification of the filing of both pre- and post-grant oppositions should
be made public, as should written decisions in oppositions that involve interpretation and application
of new and ambiguous patentability criteria.  When the Patent Appellate Board becomes operational,
its decisions should be in writing and made publicly available.  The four branch offices of the Indian
Patent Office should adopt uniform standards for patent application data reporting.
If the recent trend of dramatic increases in patent application filings continues, the current
Indian Patent Office staffing inadequacy will soon escalate to crisis proportions.  The Indian
government’s exemplary funding of new and improved physical facilities for its Patent Office branches
needs to be matched by significant funding commitments for the hiring, training and retention of
scientifically skilled patent examiners, especially in the chemical and biotechnological arts.
Computerization of Patent Office functions should also be prioritized.    
Lastly, fast-tracking of patent infringement cases will be required if patent enforcement in
India’s clogged court system is to have any real meaning.  Preliminary indications of inter-High Court
conflicts in patent cases may also foster forum shopping and disparate doctrinal development,
problems that spurred creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the U.S.  If such
conflicts and inconsistencies continue to fester, India should consider establishing a specialized
patents court with nationwide jurisdiction at the High Court level.
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